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This thesis considers several frictions related to the uncertainty firms face when they raise financing to
fund future production projects. Following shocks to factors affecting the firm’s profitability between
the financing stage and the spending stage, the firm’s managers may choose to spend less than the
amount decided upon at the time of financing (underspending mechanism). Or, if the firm’s revenues
do not cover the amount due to debtors as a result of the shock, the firm might decide to default
on existing debt obligation (endogenous default mechanism). Chapter 2 studies the underspending
mechanism in the context of a general equilibrium model. This study is then extended to the case of
an economy with multiple industries linked through an input-output network (chapter 3). Chapter
4 provides firm level empirical evidence to the underspending mechanism studied in chapter 2. This
is achieved by linking some of the firm’s growth indicators - firm-level total factor productivity in
particular - to the equity holders’ cash rewards.
The theoretical study of the underspending mechanism, links underspending to the level of shocks
experienced by the economy and the cost of servicing current debt. Simulation results illustrate
the asymmetric effect of underspending and the role it plays in worsening the lows of the business
cycle. The aggregation results of chapter 3 prove that the underspending effects remain significant
in economies with large number of industries affected by independent shocks, if the provision of
intermediary goods is dominated by a small number of industries.
Chapter 5 is dedicated to modelling endogenous defaults in a real business cycle setup. This
chapter presents a model able to endogenously generate countercyclical default rates and credit spreads
in line with empirical observation, a feature that is lacking in popular financial acceleration general
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The 2008 Great Recession is associated with the bursting of the American housing bubble. The
drop in house prices, combined with leverage effects, wiped out a large proportion of the wealth
of households in the United States, leading to a decrease in consumer demand. The banking
sector was also heavily exposed to the housing market through asset-backed securities. The
deterioration in banks’ balance sheet that followed the collapse in the value of mortgage-backed
securities dented the confidence in the banking sector in a process that culminated with the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. This led to a rationing of bank credit
available to non-financial firms and increased their financing costs. The drop of aggregate
output that followed was both rapid and significant. The Federal Reserve and other major
central banks reacted swiftly to this chain of events. Short-term interest rates were set to
zero, and central banks’ balance sheets were used to engage in large-scale purchase programs
to replenish and stabilise banks’ balance sheets and restore the flow of credit. By spring 2009,
the Federal Reserve stress tests concluded that commercial banks had adequate capital levels
relative to assets, signalling the end of the financial crisis. The trough of the cycle occurred
shortly after. However, the recovery that followed was slow, as confirmed by the European
Investment Bank report [European Investment Bank (2016)], ”the slowness of the recovery in
investment by firms [was] disturbing, particularly given the extraordinary monetary stimulus”.
This is the story of a particularly asymmetric cycle. The downturn was violent and brief, and
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the recovery long and slow. Gertler and Gilchrist (2018) provide a more detailed timeline of
the Great Recession as well as a survey of the main prevailing theories explaining it. These
surveyed theories share the common feature that borrowers’ net worth affects their access to
credit and thus their ability to spend.
In chapter 2 of this dissertation, rather than following the literature and focusing on the
borrowers net worth, I study a mechanism based on the way firms consider their financing and
spending problems when credit is not constrained. Within the studied framework, firms decide
their level of financing first. Following unexpected drops in productivity between the financing
stage and the time of spending, the firm may choose to spend less than the previously set
financing. This does not happen when productivity matches or beats expectations. The studied
mechanism asymmetrically affects the business cycle: it worsens the slumps of the cycle and does
not operate following shocks that improve productivity. The reason for considering situations
where credit is not rationed is two-fold. First, it has been documented that larger corporates
with direct access to credit markets took advantage of this access and tapped the bond market
to counteract the decline in bank lending in the early stages of the Great Recession. As a result,
these firms could maintain stable overall debt levels throughout the credit cycle (Adrian, Colla,
and Shin (2012)). In addition, as mentioned above, liquidity was readily available after the
early stages of the Great Recession with no significant recovery in terms of output growth.
The studied mechanism can contribute to understanding the collapse in output by firms that
maintained access to credit markets in the early stages of the Great Recession whilst providing
a potential explanation for the slow recovery that followed the financial crisis.
I assume that the firms may decide to spend less than the financing raised if their produc-
tivity is affected by large unpredicted shocks in the elapsed time between the financing and
spending stages. At the financing stage, the firm considers current financing costs and expec-
tations of future productivity and production costs to set the financing level. The financing
level is set such that the marginal impact of financing on expected profit matches the cost
of financing as proxied by interest rates. After executing its financing operations and gaining
more knowledge about its own productivity and the production costs it faces, the firm reviews
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its expenditure problem and is usually constrained by its financing level. How much the firm
is going to spend is decided by weighing two options: either spending all the cash available on
production or returning a portion of it to investors. Returning cash to investors implies no gain
and no loss, or equivalently a return on investment equal to one. On the other hand, the return
on spending targeted at the financing stage was supposed to be large enough to cover the cost
of financing - the targeted return is higher than one. As long as no unexpected adverse shocks
hit the firm’s productivity, the marginal profit to shareholders from spending on production
would remain positive at the financing constraint, and the profit maximising firm would spend
all the cash available to finance production. However, if productivity unexpectedly drops low
enough between the financing stage and the time of spending, the firm might find it more
advantageous not to use all the available financing. After a large enough unexpected drop in
productivity, returning some cash to investors becomes more profitable than investing all the
funding available in the production process. The studied firm based financial mechanism only
functions following unexpected deteriorations in firms’ profits and thus provides a potential
explanation for the asymmetry of the business cycle.
To help explain the significant drop in output during the Great Recession, the model pre-
sented in chapter 2 requires a sizeable unexpected drop in productivity. Fernald (2014) has
documented an important decline in the United States’ total factor productivity (TFP) growth
between 2005 and 2008. More recent productivity data published by the Bureau of Labour
Statistics indicate a decline in utilisation-adjusted TFP growth after the recession. Other fac-
tors contributing to an unexpected deterioration in firms’ profits can achieve a similar effect
and push firms to spend less than the previously raised financing. For example, a surprise
collapse of consumer demand following a deterioration in the households’ net worth as in Mian
and Sufi (2012) can play a similar role to unexpected drops in productivity.
Chapter 3 builds on the work of Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012)
and extends the model of chapter 2 to a multiple industry setup where firms are linked through
input-output relationships. The chapter discusses the impact of the nature of the production
network on the main mechanism of the model presented in chapter 2 and provides aggrega-
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tion results for two notable productions networks. I show that the business cycle asymmetries
generated by the underspending mechanism do not necessarily fade away as the number of
industries making the economy grows large. The nature of the production network connecting
the industries plays a crucial role in the aggregation of the effects of underspending. For in-
stance, one can prove that the probability of having all industries entering an unconstrained
spending mode remains stable as disaggregation increases when the industries are connected
through a ”star” network. A star network describes an input-output structure where a single
industry provides all others with all their intermediary input needs. Conversely, when the pro-
vision of the intermediate goods is equally supplied by all industries (symmetric fully connected
network), underspending becomes very unlikely when the number of industries grows large.
Chapter 4 provides a firm-level empirical validation to the underspending mechanism studied
in chapters 2 and 3. This mechanism suggests that firms tend to distribute the excess cash to
shareholders when they become less productive or face less attractive investment opportunities.
To present some empirical validation of this claim, chapter 4 builds on the work of Fama and
French (2001), Grullon and Michaely (2004) and others to study the relationship between
the firm’s productivity and the level of cash it diverts towards shareholders in the form of
dividends and share buybacks. The corporate finance literature includes many empirical studies
stipulating that firms tend to distribute less cash to shareholders when they invest in their
production process through research and development, capital expenditure or hirings. The
empirical work in chapter 4 brings further confirmation to this while focusing on the impact
of firm-level total factor productivity. I find that firms with low productivity are more likely
to distribute cash to shareholders and that they tend to distribute more cash relative to their
size, as measured by market capitalisation.
Chapter 5 considers another possible reaction by the firm to an unexpected drop in produc-
tivity, namely failing or refusing to pay previously contracted debt obligation, i.e. bankrupting
on existing debt contracts. The chapter presents a general equilibrium model with endogenous
defaults where default rates and credit spreads are countercyclical without the need to introduce
an exogenous process driving credit risk. Endogenous defaults happen when the revenues gen-
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erated by the borrowing firms do not cover their debt obligations. Countercyclical fluctuations
of default rates and credit spreads throughout the business cycles are achieved by assuming
an intermediate/final production structure. The countercyclical behaviour of the intermedi-
ate input prices implies countercyclical revenues of intermediate producers, thus pushing their
bankruptcy rates higher in the lows of the business cycle.
The general equilibrium model presented in chapter 5 assumes the existence of a class of
intermediate production firms that employ no labour and that provide a final good producing
representative firm with intermediate input. While the representative final good producer firm
relies on equity investments for financing, the intermediate producers finance their operations
using bank loans. Defaults are therefore limited to the intermediate production sector that
employs no labour. This simplifies the model by disentangling the bankruptcy problem from
the labour demand problem. Intermediate producers have heterogeneous productivities with
two components: an idiosyncratic component that determines whether any particular firm
ends up defaulting or not and a systemic component that is linked to aggregate TFP and that
contributes to the fluctuations of the size of the defaulting subset of firms. To enable the
calibration of the model to reproduce historical volatilities of credit spreads, I introduce costly
adjustments to the size of intermediate production. The costly adjustment to the production
size implies that resetting the loan demand by the borrowing firms also comes at a cost. This
adjustment cost affects the demand side of the loan market and is used to generate reasonable
credit spread dynamics.
The remainder of this introductory chapter provides a brief and selective summary of the
main strands of literature related to this work and highlights this thesis’ contributions to the
existing literature.
Contributions and Related Literature
This work is related to many strands of economic literature. First, there is the empirical
literature studying the recent slump in private investment. The model I study in chapter
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2 assumes that capital is accumulated by households outside the firm while focusing on the
firms’ production spending. Nevertheless, capital expenditure is generally a good indicator of
firms’ behaviour towards their total expenditure, as firms tend to cut capital spending early
when entering a low spending period. Through the empirical study of the relationship between
firm-level productivity and shareholders rewards (dividends and share buybacks), this work
is also related to the corporate finance literature concerned with explaining the relationships
between dividends and share buybacks on the one hand and corporate investment activities on
the other. In addition, the main mechanism presented in chapter 2 and extended in chapter
3 only functions during the slumps of the business cycle, so it is related to the empirical
literature concerned with business cycle asymmetries. Then there is the ”financial acceleration”
literature that highlights the relationship between finance and the real economy and shows the
”accelerating” effect of finance-related mechanisms on the business cycle. This literature is
related to the content of chapters 2, 3 and 5. Furthermore, this work studies the effect of the
firm’s financial behaviour as industry disaggregation increases. It is therefore related to the
literature concerned with aggregation of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Finally, through the
content of chapter 5 of this thesis, this work relates to the effort of modelling credit risk, in the
form of endogenous firm bankruptcies, in the context of modern general equilibrium models.
The sluggish recovery that followed the financial crisis has been linked to weak corporate
investment. IMF (2015) shows that private business is responsible for most of the slump in
global investment and argues that this is caused by weak demand and, in some countries, by
financial frictions and political uncertainty. European Investment Bank (2016) explains that
real investment in Europe fell sharply between 2008 and 2013 before starting a recovery that
led to it being back to pre-crisis levels in core European countries by 2016 while it remained
substantially lower than pre-2008 levels in Europe’s peripheral countries. In their study of
private investment in the American economy, Gutierrez and Philippon (2016) show that invest-
ment in the United States is low relative to measures of profitability and valuation (particularly
Tobin’s Q). On the other hand, the authors argue in another paper that investment has been
low in Europe in the post-crisis period, but in line with the relatively low levels of Tobin’s
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Q.1 The assumptions underlying the underspending mechanism of chapter 2 imply that pro-
ductivity affects firms’ spending asymmetrically throughout the business cycle: productivity
does impact the firms’ demand for financing throughout the cycle, but the effect on spending
is only immediate following unexpected and large negative shocks. In other words, I assume
that financial investment is consistent with Q-theory while real investment is determined by
financial investment unless there are large unforeseen drops in productivity. I also show that
the underspending mechanism is more likely to operate when nominal interest rates are low.
The possibility of underspending later provides the firm with protection against large drops
in profits, thus increasing the firm’s financing demand. The option to underspend affects the
firm’s financing demand more when underspending is more likely, as is the case when interest
rates are low.
Another related empirical topic is the asymmetry of the business cycle, a fact that has been
argued by economists as early as the work of Burns and Mitchell (1946). The seminal work of
Neftci (1984) provided a statistical test that proved that ”the behaviour of unemployment is
characterised by sudden jumps and slow drops”, using a finite state Markov process framework.
Other authors continued to focus on this topic. For instance, Ramsey and Rothman (1996)
link business cycle asymmetry to the notion of ”time irreversibility”. The latter concept is
intuitively related to the mechanism I study in chapter 2 where predetermined financing levels
constrain firm expenditure only when productivity is higher than a minimum level that is
mainly determined by past interest rates.
This work builds on the existing finance literature concerned with explaining the levels of
cash distributed by firms towards shareholders. These cash distributions take two important
forms: dividends and share buybacks. Jensen (1986) argues that, when the firm is facing
less attractive investment opportunities, a conflict of interest arises between shareholders and
managers, with the latter having an incentive to keep more resources under their control and
thus not distributing free cash flows. Share repurchases in this context can work as a tool to
reassure markets about this potential conflict of interests. Grullon and Michaely (2004) find
1Dottling, Gutierrez Gallardo, and Philippon (2017).
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that share repurchasing firms reduce their current levels of capital expenditures and research
and development expenses and that their cash balances significantly decline. This corroborates
the deterioration of the investment opportunities hypothesis. They also find that, contrary to
what is suggested by the signalling hypothesis, the markets do not always react positively to
the announcement of share repurchases, as market participants are not always aware of the re-
duction of investments opportunities available to the firm before the share buyback programme
is announced. Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson (2006) show that there is a strong discontinuity in
the probability of accretive share repurchases around the consensus earnings per share (EPS)
expected by financial analysts. Firms that would have narrowly missed the analysts’ consensus
EPS are much more likely to increase their share repurchase activity to positively affect their
EPS and meet the consensus than those who narrowly beat the consensus EPS. Almeida, Fos,
and Kronlund (2016) exploit this discontinuity to show that EPS-motivated share buybacks are
associated with reductions in employment and investments. Fama and French (2001) focus on
a more usual way chosen by firms to divert cash towards shareholders: dividends. They study
the decline in the distribution of dividends by publicly traded firms in the last 20 years of the
twentieth century and relate the said decline to several contributing factors, including a change
in the characteristics of public firms (firms go public earlier in their development process) and
the emergence of competing ways to pay shareholders (e.g. share buybacks). The authors also
document an empirical inverse relationship between the firms’ propensity to pay dividends and
the investment opportunity it faces. Since the early 80s, share repurchases make a significant
part of the cash flows directed by firms towards investors. In chapter 4, I construct an index
combining both dividends and cash repurchases to account for all cash flows directed towards
equity investors as opposed to those being invested in the production processes. This follows the
literature concerned with total cash flow distributed by firms to equity investors. Bagwell and
Shoven (1989) give an early account of the increasing roles of share redistribution and take-overs
as ways to distribute cash from firms towards equity investors and suggest that yields of return
on equity investments should account for these ways of cash distribution. Robertson and Wright
(2006) use a total cash flow index that takes into account dividends, share repurchases and net
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share issues and use the constructed index to predict stock returns. Imrohoroglu and Tuzel
(2014) use total factor productivity (TFP) to predict equity returns and show that while TFP
underperforms other indicators such as the market to book ratio in predicting equity returns,
low productivity firms earn a significant premium over high productivity firms in the following
year. In chapter 4, I use various firm indicators to explain the propensity of firms to divert
cash towards shareholders. Following existing literature, these indicators include investments
in capital, research and development and employment. In this regard, my results provide fur-
ther validation of the idea that firms react to lower investment opportunities by diverting cash
towards shareholders. In order to provide an empirical foundation to the mechanism presented
in chapter 2, I show that when used in conjunction with a set of other investment indicators,
firm-level total factor productivity helps explain the levels of cash diverted to equity investors.
To this effect, I present evidence from repeated cross-sectional logit regressions documenting the
propensity of firms to pay shareholders. Additionally, I present dynamic panel data regressions
explaining the payout size when the firm decides to pay.
The term ”financial acceleration” was first coined in a 1996 paper by Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist, in which the authors focused on the agency costs of lending and their endogenous
changes over the business cycle (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996)). The seminal paper
of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) linked the firms’ ability to borrow to the value of the collateral
they own and thus to the fluctuation of the business cycle, providing a new motivation for the
financial acceleration mechanism. A later paper by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998)
builds on Kiyotaki and Moore’s idea and develops a New Keynesian model where the cost of
external funding of firms depends on their net worth. In chapters 2 and 3, I focus on the firm’s
decision process regarding its own financing and spending when credit is abundant. Separating
the financing problem from the spending problem gives the firm a more realistic economic
agency as it controls the use of the funds raised in the financing stage. The firm exerts its
control on real investment and can choose to invest less under low productivity conditions even
if credit is readily available. This can deepen and lengthen economic downturns and, unlike
many other financial accelerators studied in the literature, influences the business cycle in an
34
asymmetric fashion. Unlike the usual financial accelerator mechanisms that are more concerned
with credit availability, the mechanism I present is rooted in the firm-level financing/spending
process; it functions even if credit is readily available and asymmetrically affects the business
cycle.
Chapter 5 presents an alternative way to consider the financial acceleration due to changes
in the credit market. Instead of focusing on the impact of collateral value fluctuations on the
ability of borrowers to raise financing, this chapter focuses on generating endogenous defaults
emanating from the fluctuations in the borrowers’ revenues. If the revenues of the borrowing
firms are countercyclical, then default rates and credit spreads would be countercyclical too.
There is a rich literature proposing ways to generate endogenous firm bankruptcies. Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) build on the lending agency costs model by Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
and design a general equilibrium model with endogenous defaults, where the reliance of bor-
rowers on their net-worth to secure credit generates a hump-shaped reaction of investments
and output to changes in TFP. However, as explained by Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2003),
this model fails to produce countercyclical default premiums. Pesaran and Xu (2016) use a
default mechanism similar to the one I present in chapter 5. A significant difference resides
in the way the two authors deal with employment. While Pesaran and Xu choose a specific
consumer utility function to disentangle the problem of default from that of labour, I choose
to dissociate defaults from labour by assuming that some firms borrow to produce an inter-
mediate good (intermediate producers) and others hire labour and acquire capital to produce
the final good (final good production firms). The borrowing and thus bankruptcies are limited
to the intermediate producers that transform the economy’s single good into an intermediate
good without using labour. Other differences include the modelling of the banking sector, a
mere multiplier in Pesaran and Xu (2016) while it is assumed to play an important role in the
pricing of debt contracts in the model of chapter 5. Finally, default rates end up being invariant
in Pesaran and Xu (2016) while they are countercyclical in the model I propose. Christiano,
Motto, and Rostagno (2010) develop a large New Keynesian DSGE model with a mechanism for
endogenous defaults. The default mechanism they use assumes that an exogenous time-varying
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process drives the credit riskiness of debt contracts. This process represents the variance of
the idiosyncratic shocks affecting the ability of a class of borrowing entrepreneurs to transform
capital. The variation of credit risk through time generates countercyclical default rates and
credit spreads as long as an empirically reasonable covariance between the credit risk process
and aggregate TFP is assumed. In chapter 5, all the model variables’ fluctuations are derived
from the fluctuation of aggregate TFP. Countercyclical default rates and credit spreads are
generated without the need for an ad hoc exogenous stochastic process driving credit risk.
Another strain of literature produces countercyclical credit premiums through lender/borrower
relationships. Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010) and Aksoy, Basso, and Coto-Martinez (2013) ar-
gue that banks exploit existing lending relationships and the preference of borrowers to stay
with the same lender and charge higher credit spreads during slowdowns. This is achieved by
using the deep habits framework in Ravn, Schmitt-Groh, and Uribe (2006) to model the costs
of bank switching.
By providing a motivation for the firm to cut spending despite abundant liquidity and
to under-react to interest rates cuts near the ZLB, the underspending mechanism studied in
chapter 2 can be described as a firm based liquidity trap. This connects the thesis to the
literature explaining the slow recovery after the GFC through liquidity traps. Eggertsson and
Krugman (2012) argue that following a ”Minsky moment” where agents realise that debt levels
are too high, an aggressive deleveraging cycle begins. This decreases prices and triggers a
Fisher debt-deflation cycle. Bacchetta, Benhima, and Kalantzis (2019) build a monetary model
with assets scarcity and use it to show that a liquidity trap caused by a persistent deleveraging
shock increases real cash holdings and decreases investment and output in the medium term.
The authors argue that quantitative easing can lead to a deeper liquidity trap, while a higher
government debt can ease assets’ scarcity, helping to exit the liquidity trap, but may harm
investment in the medium term.
There is a vast literature dealing with the idiosyncratic origins of aggregate fluctuations. The
seminal work of Leontief (1941) has pioneered the use of input-output tables to study the effect
of industry-specific shocks on aggregate output. In more recent work, Gabaix (2011) argues
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that idiosyncratic firm-level shocks can explain an important part of the aggregate movement if
the firm size distribution presents a fat tail towards large firms. In the same article, the author
explains that the fat-tailed firm size distribution has strong empirical justification and that as
a result, ”the idiosyncratic movements of the largest 100 firms in the United States appear
to justify about a third of variations in output growth”. Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and
Tahbaz-Salehi (2012) argue that even in the case of a very disaggregated economy, i.e. an
economy with a large number of industries, the properties of the input-output matrix can
guarantee that industry-specific shocks carry on to affect the aggregate quantities and do not
vanish due to the law of large numbers. According to the authors, this is the case when some
sectors play an asymmetric role as a supplier to other sectors, as in a ”star” production network.
The nature of the production network linking industries plays a similar role in chapter 3, as I
find that a star network makes the asymmetries generated by the chapter 2’s main mechanism
subsist even when the economy contains a very large number of industries that are subject to
independent productivity shocks.
Chapter 2
Macroeconomic Effects of Firms’
Underspending in Times of Abundant
Credit
2.1 Introduction
This chapter studies a mechanism whereby firms set their production spending at a lower level
than the one permitted by the financial resources at their disposal. In the studied framework,
underspending happens following unpredicted adverse shocks that affect the profit rates in such
a way that distributing money back to investors becomes more appealing to firms than investing
in the production process.
In the chapter’s setup, money is used by the firm as a store of value to fund future pro-
duction. However, the firm may decide to spend less than the money originally earmarked for
production and distribute the excess cash to shareholders if production unexpectedly becomes
less profitable. In real terms, money deteriorates in value with inflation, but this is less of
an issue when inflation is low for an extended period of time while uncertainty regarding the
performance of other riskier investments is high. Whatever the level of inflation, as one of the
safest ways to store value, money provides a lower limit on the return of viable investments
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from the perspective of rational, profit maximising agents. At the financing stage, firms target
higher returns on investment than those offered by simply keeping money in their cash accounts.
Usually, the gross nominal returns on investment targeted by firms are higher than the return
provided by cash -i.e. one- as these returns need to be large enough to cover the firm’s cost of
financing. Investors who finance the firm activity (shares and debt holders) also expect a posi-
tive return on investment. Investor rewards, seen as a financing cost from the firm perspective,
represents a lower bound to the expected return on the projects the firm is undertaking for
these projects to be considered worthwhile by a rational firm manager maximising the firm’s
profit. Following unexpected drops in productivity between the financing stage and the time
of spending, the firm can decide to spend less than the previously set financing. This does not
occur when productivity matches or beats expectations. The studied mechanism asymmetri-
cally affects the business cycle: it results in the slumps of the cycle becoming more severe and
does not operate following shocks that improve productivity.
To clarify ideas, assume a firm operates in a competitive market with free entry and faces
the gross financing cost rt at time t. In addition, assume that its gross return from production
RT is affected by some uncertainty that remains unresolved until the time the producing starts
T . Given the perfect competition and free entry assumptions, the firm makes no profit and no
loss on average. At the financing stage t, a rational profit maximising firm would then target
an expected return equal to its financing cost 1
Et[RT ] = rt > 1. (2.1.1)
After raising financing, the firm compares the return on producing against the return on
holding cash. Barring a large enough unexpected drop between the financing and production
stages, the production return RT surpasses the return from distributing cash back to share-
holders (i.e., 1). If the firm’s expected return from producing drops low enough between the
financing stage and production time, the firm returns may become lower than that correspond-
1As it will be clear below, this depends on the decreasing return to scale assumption of the firm’s technology.
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ing to keeping cash and not producing
RT < 1. (2.1.2)
The firm would then cancel part of its previous spending plans and enters a low spending mode
simply because, at the margin, cash as a store of value outperforms investing in the production
process. A first important observation is that, as long as net interest rates remain positive,
the mechanism described here only functions following an unexpected drop in expected profits.
If firms’ returns from producing beat expectations, cash cannot represent a better alternative
than spending to produce.
Given the relationship between the firm’s expected gross return at the financing stage and
the cost of financing, one can rewrite the condition 2.1.2 for firms to enter an underspending
mode as follows
RT − Et[RT ] < −(rt − 1). (2.1.3)
This condition is one of the central results of this chapter. It states that the drop in expected
returns required for firms to cancel previous spending plans is tied to the financing costs facing
the firm at the time of making the original spending plans. An immediate consequence of this
is that firms are more likely to enter an underspending mode by preferring cash distributions to
production spending when: uncertainty over the firm’s returns from investing in the production
process is high, or financing costs are low. Both are features of advanced economies in the period
that followed the 2008 Great Recession.
I study this underspending mechanism in the context of a monetary general equilibrium
model by building on the work of Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995). In the adopted framework,
demand for money is two-fold. First, the firm is subject to a working capital constraint, which
means that it needs to secure the funds necessary to pay wages and capital costs before starting
production. These funds are assumed to be secured through loans issued by a representative
financial intermediary. Second, households are assumed to derive utility from holding money
through a Money in the Utility function (MIU) specification. The second assumption helps
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capture the usefulness of money balances in facilitating transactions.
As is standard in monetised business cycle models, the fluctuations of output are, in part,
driven by an exogenous aggregate productivity process, the main innovation being that the
financing problem facing the firm is considered separately from its spending problem. This
separation gives the firm’s management a more realistic economic agency as they exert their
control over the cash raised at the financing stage. The firm decides its level of financing first.
In order to decide its financing demand, the firm maximises expected profits, considering the
prevailing financing costs and the expected returns from future production. Once financing is
secured, the level of financing serves as a cap for future production spending. The spending
constraint binds as long as productivity does not drop below expectations more than by an
amount related to the financing costs in a similar fashion to what equation 2.1.3 indicates.
The lower the nominal financing cost, the more likely it is for firms to underspend. More
intuitions summarised by equation 2.1.3 are maintained in the context of the studied monetised
real business cycle model. The underspending mechanism asymmetrically affects the business
cycle: it worsens the slumps of the cycle and does not operate following shocks that improve
productivity.
The mechanism studied in this chapter can contribute towards understanding the significant
drop in output in 2008. However, given the levels of nominal interest rates facing firms before
2008, a large drop in productivity is required for firms to enter an underspending mode that
would worsen the cycle’s trough. Fernald (2014) has documented an important decline in
total factor productivity (TFP) growth between 2005 and 2008. More recent productivity data
published by the Bureau of Labour Statistics indicate a decline in utilisation-adjusted TFP
growth after the recession. Other factors contributing to an unexpected deterioration in firms’
profits can achieve a similar effect and push firms to spend less than the previously raised
financing. For example, a sudden collapse of consumer demand following a deterioration in the
households’ net worth as in Mian and Sufi (2012) can play a similar role to unexpected drops
in productivity.
Related Literature.— This paper explores a firm based financial mechanism while abstracting
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from the issues related to the inability of agents to raise debt as a result of the worsening in
the value of the asset they use as collateral (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke and Gertler
(1989) and others). Many authors discussed the role of financial frictions linking lower credit
access to the deterioration in the value of collateral in the context of the great recession (e.g.
Hall (2011) and Mian and Sufi (2012)). I view this work as complementary to this literature
as I explore the consequences of a large sudden drop in TFP on the behaviour of firms that do
not suffer from a credit constraint.
I assume that firms have to finance the production costs before engaging in production. This
hypothesis is similar to what is assumed in the working capital models such as in Christiano
and Eichenbaum (1992) and Cooley and Quadrini (2006). I also draw on this literature when
setting the role of unexpected monetary injections: the central bank injects new money into
the financial intermediaries to increase the supply of loans available to the production sector.
The increase in the money supply is not distributed equally to all agents, which guarantees a
role for money in the fluctuations of the model’s real variables. However, I depart from this
literature when setting the demand for money. Instead of using a cash in advance constraint
(CIAC) to generate a demand for cash from households, I adopt a Money In the Utility function
approach (MIU) to provide households with a reason to hold cash. The household demand is
complemented by the demand for cash emanating from the firms’ working capital constraints.
The approach I adopt for modelling money provides a more realistic form for the demand
for money by households and unlike CIA approaches, does not prevent the underspending
mechanism from operating by muting the fluctuations of the firms’ revenues.
The studied mechanism provides a potential motivation for the firm to cut spending despite
abundant credit by considering the role of money as a store of value. Although hitting the
interest rates Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) is not important to the model’s functioning, the likeli-
hood of firms underinvesting the cash available to them in the production process is stronger
when nominal interest rates are low. The underspending mechanism studied here can be loosely
described as a firm based liquidity trap. This connects this work to the literature explaining the
slow recovery after the GFC through liquidity traps such as in Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017)
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where the authors build a Bewley-Aiyagari-Hugget type model with households that are sub-
ject to a reduction in their borrowing limit. Constrained consumers are then forced to reduce
debt, and unconstrained consumers have an incentive to increase their precautionary savings.
This creates a powerful downward pressure on interest rates. Interest rates decrease sharply as
a result, and this pushes the economy into a liquidity trap. Eggertsson and Krugman (2012)
argue that following a ”Minsky moment” where agents realise that debt levels are too high, an
aggressive deleveraging cycle begins. This decreases prices and triggers a Fisher debt-deflation
cycle. Bacchetta, Benhima, and Kalantzis (2019) build a monetary model with assets scarcity
and use it to show that a liquidity trap caused by a persistent deleveraging shock increases real
cash holdings and decreases investment and output in the medium term. The authors argue
that quantitative easing can lead to a deeper liquidity trap, while a higher government debt can
ease assets’ scarcity, helping to exit the liquidity trap, but may harm investment in the medium
term. While the underspending mechanism I study becomes stronger when interest rates are
low, hitting the lower zero bound is not crucial for its functioning. The same applies to credit
constraints that are often assumed in liquidity trap models to limit the borrower’s demand for
financing. In the model presented here, I do not assume any form of credit rationing and still
establish situations where agents prefer cash to real investments. This is achieved by consid-
ering the faith of the cash transferred to the borrowing firm when productivity unexpectedly
deteriorates between the time financing is raised and the time of production.
The underspending mechanism studied here functions when the firms’ spending upper con-
straint imposed by the previously set financing is no longer binding. This model feature links
this chapter to the numerical literature studying the simulation of dynamic macroeconomic
models in the presence of occasionally binding constraints. To deal with this numerical issue,
I use the toolkit developed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015). This toolkit (OccBin) adapts a
first-order perturbation approach and applies it in a piecewise fashion to solve dynamic models
with occasionally binding constraints.
Finally, there is the link with the cash hoarding literature (e.g. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz,
and Williamson (1999)). The literature describes two main benefits of hoarding cash. The first
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concerns transaction costs savings and the avoidance of having to rely on liquidating assets at a
cost to finance new investment opportunities (transaction costs motive). The second is related
to the possibility of financing becoming unavailable or excessively costly in the future when
investment opportunities materialise (precautionary savings motive). The motive of transaction
costs cannot be analysed in this chapter because the firm is assumed to be very short-lived and
does not hold any assets besides cash. In the model studied in this chapter, the firm is subject
to a working capital constraint, implying that ad hoc financing is unavailable at the time of
production. The firm raises all its financing needs before the start of production and cannot
increase its financing just before production starts. This is akin to an extreme precautionary
saving motive. However, the fact that the firm is very short-lived means that it cannot hoard
the extra cash. The firm distributes the idle cash back to shareholders immediately.
The model is presented in section 2.2. Section 3.5 presents and comments the simulation
results and section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 The model
In this section, I build a monetised real business cycle model that illustrates the underspending
mechanism described in the introduction. In order to study the incentive of the firm to under-
spend, I separate the firm’s financing problem from its spending problem. The firm first sets its
financing based on its assessment of productivity at the financing stage. Production spending
is decided some time after the financing stage and the previously set financing acts as an upper
limit for potential spending. Following some unpredicted deterioration in productivity between
the financing stage and spending stage, the firm can set spending at a lower level than the
financing constraint.
In the set-up I consider, households maximize their utility to decide consumption and leisure
subject to a budget constraint. The single consumption good is produced by firms that are
constrained by a Cobb-Douglas production function. Production is financed by households





borrows ιt at rate rt
realises new productivity
eut+1 and wages ht+1
t+ 1
Constrained Case: high ut+1
uses all financing ιt to fund
expenditure ζt+1 = ιt
t+ 1
Unconstrained Case: low ut+1
firm gives back some cash to shareholders
ζt+1 < ιt
Figure 2.1: Timeline of the firm financing and spending process.
rt. The diagram in figure 2.1 explains the firm’s financing/spending decision process: the
representative firm decides its financing level ιt at time t and raises the required amount using
bonds before discovering the new productivity eut+1 between time t and time t + 1. At time
t + 1, the profit-maximizing firm assesses its own productivity and the prevailing wages then
chooses whether to spend all the raised financing ιt (constrained spending case) or to spend
less than the raised financing level ζt+1 < ιt (unconstrained spending case).
Firms are subject to a working capital constraint and money is introduced to satisfy the
firms’ need to hold cash before production starts. In addition, households are supposed to
derive utility from holding money. The fluctuation of the money stock are controlled by a
single monetary authority that may inject money in the economy to ease the credit conditions
facing firms as in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). The remainder of this section details the
behaviours of households, firms and the monetary authority before commenting on the level of
productivity drop required for firms to enter an underspending mode.
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2.2.1 Households
Households derive utility from consumption, leisure and real money holdings. Their utility
function takes the form










where lt denotes the household’s labour, ct consumption, M
H
t the households’ money holdings,
Pt the price of the consumption good, ψ is a paramter that helps control the level of real money
holdings by households, ν is the curvature on the utility form holding real cash balances, η the
curvature on dislike of labour and χ is a parameter that controls for households’ dislike of labour.
The direct demand by households for real money balances can be justified by a role played by
money to simplify transactions.2 Consumers maximise their expected lifetime utility discounted
at rate β under their budget constraint in order to set their consumption, their leisure time
1− lt, their savings through real capital kt, their real money holdings mHt := MHt /Pt and how







subject to the sequence budget constraint
mHs + cs + ks + bs ≤
mHs−1
1 + πs
+ (1− δ)ks−1 + rKs ks−1 + rs−1
bs−1
1 + πs





Where w is the real wage, r the gross nominal interest rate on deposits and rK the real net rate
of return on capital. The terms ΠF and ΠB represent the real profits distributed respectively
by the firms and the banks, both owned by households. Equity investors (i.e., households) are
assumed to cover the debt payment shortfall in the case where the firm’s proceeds do not cover
its debt obligations. This means that the real profit ΠF provided by the firm to households can
be negative to help avoid firms’ bankruptcies.
2See Croushore (1993) on the equivalence between money in the utility function and a shopping-time model.
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Solving the household’s optimisation problem, the nominal interest rate rt and the (real)










+ (1− δ) ct
ct+1
. (2.2.5)










2.2.2 Financial intermediation and monetary policy
Following Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), a direct monetary channel is operated by injecting
money in financial intermediaries to help finance the loans extended to production firms. The
representative bank provides the firms with the loan ιt charging the gross nominal rate r
F
t . The
bank finances its loans operations using households deposits bt and a monetary injection from
the central bank that is proportional to the existing nominal stock of money






where mt−1 is the existing total real stock of money inherited from the previous time period
and xBt is the relative change in the nominal stock of money. The bank profit function is then
ΠBt+1 = r
F










+ (rFt − rt)bt. (2.2.10)
The monetary authority provides the financial intermediaries with the new money in the goal
of easing credit conditions for firms. This prevents the increase in the money supply from being
distributed equally to all agents and guarantees a role for money in the model’s fluctuations.
Following Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995), I assume that the bank’s profit is zero (ΠBt+1 = 0).
This yields
rFt ιt = rtbt. (2.2.11)
by controlling the injection xBt helps control the lending rate
rFt =
1
1 + xBt .mt−1/(bt(1 + πt))
rt. (2.2.12)
I assume that the money growth xBt follows the AR(1) process
xBt = (1− ρB)xB + ρBxBt−1 + σBvBt , (2.2.13)
where xB is the steady-state value of xBt , σB is the volatility of innovations, ρB is the autocor-
relation parameter and vBt is an i.i.d error term that is independent of all other shocks in the
model.
The assumption that money is directly injected in the financial intermediaries can be jus-
tified by the the central bank’s ability of to affect lending through the use of open-market
operations (Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)). All the stock of money available at the end
of the production cycle is inherited by the households and is either kept in real cash balances
or deposited with the financial intermediary
mt−1
1 + πt
= mHt + bt. (2.2.14)
The latter money clearing condition, combined with the household demand for money ema-
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It is important to note that unlike in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), the household decisions
in terms of consumption, money holdings and deposits are not made before the injection of new
money by the monetary authority. While the new money is not distributed equally to all agents,
it still influences the decisions of households; for instance, through increasing inflation, the
monetary injection increases the nominal rate rt and pushes households to save more through
deposits at the expense of holding money.
Further to the direct monetary injection into financial intermediaries, I assume that money
holding is changes every period in a way that equally affects all agents. This is achieved by
distributing the new money to households at the start of every period. Overall, money grows










Where xHt also follows an AR(1) process
xHt = (1− ρH)xH + ρHxHt−1 + σHvHt , (2.2.17)
with xH being the steady-state value of xHt , σH is the volatility of innovations, ρH is the
autocorrelation parameter and vHt is an i.i.d error term that is independent of all other shocks
in the model. While the injection of money into the financial intermediaries directly affects













where kt denotes capital and lt the labour it uses, α is the share of capital, γ a return to scale
parameter and eut a stochastic productivity process. Within the studied framework, increasing
returns to scale would imply infinite financing demand and constant return to scale would lead
to undetermined levels of firm financing. Empirically, many studies could not reject the constant
return to scale hypothesis on the industry level while others point towards a slightly decreasing
returns to scale.3 Decreasing returns to scale are therefore used as a source of curvature in the
profit function that guarantees a unique solution to the financing problem (γ < 1).4
The aggregate log-productivity ut is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with the volatility
parameter σu and mean-reversion ρu.
ut = ρuut−1 + σuet.
The representative firm finances production using loan contracts that are issued by financial
intermediaries at a gross rate rFt . At time t, the firm decides the nominal financing amount
Ptιt that will potentially be invested in the next period’s production process (ιt denotes real







The firm’s real profit is a function of future sales proceeds yt+1, the real gross cost of financing
3Syverson (2004), Olley and Pakes (1996) and others could not statistically reject the constant return to
scale hypothesis. Other studies find slight to moderate decreasing return to scale, for example, Gao and Kehrig
(2017).
4This is consistent with the literature concerned with heterogeneous firms as for or example in Restuccia





and the real unspent financing ιt
1+πt+1
− ωt+1lt+1 − rKt+1kt







− ωt+1lt+1 − rKt+1kt
}
(2.2.20)




− ωt+1lt+1 − rKt+1kt
}
is nil when the firm is constrained at
the spending stage and is positive otherwise. Note that no discounting of the profit is needed
because all the cash-flows of the firm happen at time t + 1. As long as the discounting rate is
known at time t (which I assume), discounting plays no role in the firm’s financing problem.5
At period t+ 1, the representative firm chooses labour lt+1 and rented labour kt+1 to max-
imise profit with spending being constrained by the previously set level of financing ιt/(1+πt+1)
corrected for inflation. The terms ιt and rtιt in the profit function expression 2.2.20 are prede-
termined at time t, so the profit maximisation simplifies to
max
lt+1,kt+1
yt+1 − ωt+1lt+1 − rKt+1kt, (2.2.21)






Increasing returns to scale being excluded (γ < 1), it is a priori not obvious whether the
constraint 2.2.22 holds or not. Let us define ζt+1 as the cost of production t+ 1
ζt+1 := ωt+1lt + r
K
t+1kt. (2.2.23)
From the first order conditions of the spending problem 2.2.21
rKt+1kt = αζt+1 (2.2.24)
ωt+1lt+1 = (1− α)ζt+1 (2.2.25)
Exploiting the first order conditions above, one can rewrite production as a function of the
5A common practice is to assume that the firm uses the real discount rate (1/rt)Et(1 + πt+1).
CHAPTER 2. 51













The firm’s financing problem simplifies to the problem below, where the firm has to decide its











If the financing constraint is not binding (ζt+1 <
ιt
1+πt+1
), the firm sets labour such as the






ζt+1 = γyt+1. (2.2.31)
In other words, when unconstrained by financing, the representative firm sets its expenditure at
a level where it is indifferent between producing and simply distributing cash to shareholders.







6This formulation of production justifies the decreasing returns to scale assumption. The firm profit function
at time t + 1 is eut+1
ζγt+1
(λt+1)γ
− ζt+1. Clearly, if γ = 1 spending can be undetermined and if γ > 1, firms would
prefer to spend an infinite amount and the financing demand would be infinite as a result.
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The latter condition stipulates that, for unconstrained firms, the marginal return on spending
at the constraint is less than the marginal return of distributing cash to shareholders. This
underspending characterisation can be rewritten as follows
ut+1 ≤ ξt+1, (2.2.33)









Everything else being equal, underspending is more (less) likely when ut+1 is lower (higher), the
previously set real financing ιt is higher (lower), the real marginal cost of production λt+1 are
higher (lower) and inflation πt+1 is lower (higher). The formulae below summarise the results
















































Note how inflation plays a direct role in setting production spending and production only if the
firm is constrained by previous financing.7
The spending and production expressions 2.2.35 and 2.2.36 yield the derivatives of spending
7Inflation plays an indirect role in setting the production spending and the production of unconstrained firms
through its influence on the cost of producing λt+1.
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The last financing equation shows that, when underspending by firms is possible, money pro-
vides a floor for the marginal return on nominal debt financing Ptιt (the floor being 1). The
ability to underspend provides firms with an extra protection pushing them to increase their
demand for new financing.
2.2.4 Equilibrium and market clearing
The equilibrium is realised when prices (wt, r
K
t , rt, r
F
t ) and the quantities ct, bt, lt, kt, ιt, ζt,
lt and kt are such that firms maximise expected profit at the financing stage subject to the
technology constraint and maximise profit at the spending stage subject to the technology and
financing constraints, households maximise utility subject to their budget constraint and the
various markets within the economy clear. These markets are:
• The good’s market where all the production is either consumed by households or used to
accumulate physical capital
yt = ct + kt − (1− δ)kt−1. (2.2.43)
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• The labour market, where households labour supply must meet firms’ labour demand
• The market for real capital, where the capital accumulated by households is used by firms
in the following time period











2.2.5 Critical shock level triggering firms’ underspending
As noted above, firms’ underspending occurs when the log-TFP ut shock is lower than ξt.
The threshold level ξt depends on variables determined at time t as well as on previously
determined variables. To simplify the study of this threshold, I consider its steady-state value
ξ, that is derived from the steady-state loan interest rate by writing the steady-state version of












rF is a decreasing function of the variable ξ when the net lending interest rate is positive
(rF > 1). In graph 2.2, I show the threshold ξ as a function of the (quarterly, non-annualised)
net lending rate rF − 1. The graph assumes quarterly periods and σu = 1%, the same value
assumed in the section 3.5 dedicated to the calibration and simulation of the model. For all non-
negative values of the steady-state net loan rate rF−1, the critical value ξ is negative, confirming
that underspending happens after drops in productivity. Furthermore, underspending is more
likely (ξ is higher) when the lending net rate is closer to zero. Assuming a quarterly net rate
of lending around 1% implies that log-TFP needs to drop by more than a standard deviation
for the firms’ underspending to occur.
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Figure 2.2: Steady-state threshold ξ as a function of the lending rate rF − 1.
2.3 Simulation results
2.3.1 Calibration and steady-state results
The utility discount factor β determines the equilibrium rates of financing and is therefore
key to the main mechanism of the model. Mehra and Prescott (1985) report that between
1889 and 1978 the average annual real return on equity was 7%, while the average annual real
return on short term debt was 1%. In the current set-up, I assume an investment horizon of
one year; I then target an equilibrium interest rate closer to the return on short term debt at
2%, which is more in line with the low real interest rates experienced since 2008. This pins
down preference discounting β = 0.995, given that I assume quarterly periods. I assume no
monetary change in the money allocated directly to households in the steady-state xH = 0.
The steady-state increase in money stock through injections in financial intermediaries xB is set
to 0.5% to match an annual steady-state inflation at 2%. This implies that in the steady-state
banks’ lending rates are lower than the deposit rates. Following Atkeson and Kehoe (2005),
I assume that the firm return to scale parameter takes the value γ = 0.95.8 The volatility
8See also Atkenson, Khan, and Ohanian (1996). Importantly, the assumed value of γ does not impact the
effects discussed in this section as long as some decreasing return to scale is maintained γ < 1.
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parameter σ = 1% is chosen to match a quarterly productivity fluctuation around 1% and the
mean reversion parameter is set at ρ = 0.8. The calibration is performed in the steady-state to
match a steady-state level of employment of l̄ = 0.33. This determines the value of the labour
provision parameter χ.9 Furthermore, the parameter ψ is chosen so that the steady-state of
money balances to deposits mH/m matches the M1/M2 ratio for the United States around
25%. The remaining parameters are standard and are borrowed from the literature (table 5.1).
The effect of the preference discounting parameter β on the steady-state variables is pre-
sented in figure 2.3. Higher preference discounting implies lower the steady-state real rate
deposit rate 1/β−1, which in turn, implies lower lending rate rF in the steady-state and higher
likelihood of underspending (figure 2.2). Lower steady-state lending rates also imply higher
steady-state financing, capital, labour, output and utility. The steady-state effect of lower
money increase through direct distribution to households (lower xH) is qualitatively similar
to the effect of higher preference discounting as both lead to lower deposit rates and therefore
lower lending rates facing the firms. In the case of lower xH , the lower nominal deposit rates are
a result of lower steady-state inflation (figure 2.4). On the other hand, rising inflation through
monetary injections in the financial intermediaries (higher xB) lowers the nominal lending rates
and increases the probability of underspending. Higher values of xB imply higher steady-state
labour, capital, output consumption, and utility through its impact on steady-state lending
rates.
The drop in log productivity required for the model’s mechanism to operate as a function
of the steady-state interest rates is shown in figure 2.2. In order to show the dynamic effects of
the underspending mechanism, I assume a 4.5× standard deviations unexpected drop in TFP.
The results are presented and commented in the next subsection.
2.3.2 The dynamic effects of the model’s mechanism
To deal with the numerical difficulties related to the occasionally binding spending constraint, I
use the OccBin toolkit to simulate the model in the presence of the underspending mechanism.
9For more details regarding the steady-state equations and the calibration process, please refer to appendix
2.A.2.
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OccBin is a toolkit developed by Luca Guerrieri and Matteo Iacoviello that adapts a first-order
perturbation approach to solve dynamic models with occasionally binding constraints (Guerrieri
and Iacoviello (2015)).
I present impulse response functions illustrating the dynamic effects of the model’s main
mechanism. Figure 2.6 compares impulse responses of the model with the firm’s underspending
mechanism to a version of the model where the financing constraints are always binding (bench-
mark). The figure shows the impulse responses of the main model variables to a large negative
shock to productivity (−4.5× standard deviations).10 When the model’s main mechanism is
functioning, the negative productivity shock impacts the model’s variables sooner. As firms
gain knowledge of the new lower levels of productivity, they adapt by reducing expenditure
before the lower financing levels affect the economy. By contrast, when the firms cannot adjust
expenditure, their previous level of financing, which was based on a more optimistic view of
productivity, helps dampen the severity of the current negative shock. The drop in spending
by the unconstrained firms lowers labour demand and implies that wages decrease to lower
a level than when spending is always constrained. This implies a larger reaction of labour’s
provision to the drop in productivity when spending is not constrained and, in turn, implies
a more severe output drop. As output drops further, less is invested in forming capital and
as a result, real investments drop further . As a store of value, cash provides firms with extra
protection in the presence of the underspending mechanism. The TFP shock pushes households
to increase their deposit demands, thus bringing deposit rates lower. Lower deposit rates imply
lower loan rates, which increases the likelihood of underspending. As underspending becomes
more likely, the protection provided by the possibility to underspend later increases the demand
of firms for financing further, hence a less severe reaction of firms’ financing to negative pro-
ductivity shocks when firms are allowed to underspend. The moderate reaction of financing in
the presence of underspending implies that wages, labour, output and investment react less in
the main model in the period following the shock. Furthermore, the moderate reaction of firms’
financing implies a more moderate reaction of deposit rates and loan rates in the presence of
10As shown in figure 2.2, the steady-state value of ξ decreases in the the steady-state loan rate. In the used
calibration, the steady-state loan rate is 3.7%.
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underspending. Finally, lower output following the negative productivity shock causes higher
inflation in both models as the supply of money does not adjust following the real shock.
Large unpredicted real shocks are required for firms to underspend. Following moderate,
unpredicted negative TFP shocks, the underspending mechanism does not function and the
immediate reaction of the main model in terms of real wages, labour, output and investments
is similar to the reaction of the benchmark model without the underspending mechanism (fig-
ure 2.7). However, the option to potentially underspend in the future keep the demand for
financing higher in the main model, thus moderating the impact on wages, labour, output and
investments in the time period that follows the shock. The fluctuations of financing increases
the autocorrelation of output, investment and other aggregates. By moderating the fluctua-
tions of firms’ financing, the underspending mechanism reduces the autocorrelation of output,
investments and labour.
Following (unpredicted) positive TFP shocks, the underspending mechanism cannot func-
tion. The reaction of real aggregates is similar in the main and the benchmark models following
positive shocks to TFP, even when these shocks are large (figure 2.8). The model’s main mech-
anism has therefore important implications in terms of cycle asymmetry. The real effects of
Firm’s underspending can be significant following large unpredicted real shocks but remain
muted following positive shocks.
There are two sources of monetary shocks in the model. The process xHt that governs new
money supplied directly to households before they engage in any saving of or consumption
activities and the process xBt that govern monetary injections into financial intermediaries. A
positive unpredicted shock to the process xHt (figure 2.9) creates a pure inflation effect. Higher
inflation implies a lower value of the money held by firms, which pushes real wages, labour,
output, and investments lower following a positive shock to xHt . The behaviour following the
pure inflation shock is similar in both the main model and the benchmark model. A positive
inflation shock decreases the real value of the money held by firms and cannot cause them to
underspend.
A positive shock to the process xBt has two effects; an inflation effect because of the increase
CHAPTER 2. 59
in money supply and a liquidity effect as more money is available to financial intermediaries to
finance the productive sector. Figure 2.10 shows that, similarly to the pure inflation shock, a
positive shock to the money injected in financial intermediaries reduces the value of the cash held
by firms and pushes real wages, labour, output and investments lower. However, the liquidity
effect on the loan rate dominates the inflation effect: the loan rate drops lower following an
unpredicted positive shock to the money injected in financial intermediaries. Lower financing
rates pushes firms to increase financing demand in both model. This pushes real wages, labour,
output and investments higher in the period following the shock. The shock does not trigger
the underspending mechanism, so the aggregate variables’ reaction is similar in the main and
benchmark models.
To summarise, the model’s main mechanism amplifies the extreme lows of the business
cycle by pushing firms into an underspending mode following large unpredicted shocks to TFP.
Underspending has, however, little effect on real aggregates following moderate or positive
TFP shocks. Given the current monetary set-up, focused on the liquidity effects of monetary
injections, firms’ underspending has little effect on the real impact of monetary injections.
2.4 Concluding remarks
I presented a financial mechanism rooted in how firms change their behaviour towards setting
current expenditure as a reaction to unexpected large negative shocks to productivity. When
affected by large unpridcted drops in productivity, firms can react by reducing spending to lower
levels than those permitted by the financial resources at their disposal. The change of spending
behaviour can worsen and lengthen the trough of the business cycle, as firms adjust their
expenditure before the effects of lower corporate financing hit the economy. This mechanism
has important implications in terms of business cycle asymmetry. Firms would only adjust
expenditures following large negative shocks to productivity while they remain constrained by
previously determined levels of financing if productivity is improving.




β discount factor 0.995
η curvature on labour 1
χ disutility of labour 7.87
ν curvature on real money 2
ψ real money demand 0.19%
Technology
γ return to scale 0.95
α capital share 0.33
ρ aggregate TFP persistence 0.8
σ aggregate TFP volatility 1%
δ depreciation rate of capital 2.5%
Money Supply
xH steady-state money supply to households 0%
xB steady-state money supply to financial intermediaries 0.5%
ρm persistence of monetary shocks 80%
σm volatility of monetary shocks 0.25%
Table 2.1: Assumed and calibrated model parameters.
This means that when firms’ financing rates are low, smaller drops in productivity are required
for firms’ to enter an underspending mode. Nominal financing rates can be low because of a
low inflation environment or through central bank accommodative activity (liquidity effects in
the model). Low inflation and expansionary central banks activism are both features of the
advanced economies in the post-2008 period.
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Figure 2.3: Effect of changing utility discounting β on steady-state variables. The figures show the steady-state
variables as a function of the steady-state real deposit rate 1/β − 1.
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Figure 2.4: Pure inflation effects on steady-state variables. The figures show the steady-state variables as a
function of the steady-state growth of money xH .
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Figure 2.5: The effect of injecting money in the financial intermediaries on the steady-state variables. The
figures show the steady-state variables as a function of the steady-state growth of money dedicated to financial
intermediaries xB .
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Figure 2.6: Impulse response functions following a large drop in productivity (-4.5× standard deviation). The
graph shows deviations from the steady-states for all variables in their logarithmic form but for inflation and
the spending shortfall rates that are shown without any transformation. The benchmark model assumes no
underspending.
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Figure 2.7: Impulse response functions following a moderate positive and negative drop in productivity (-1×
standard deviation). The graph shows deviations from the steady-states for all variables in their logarithmic form
but for inflation and the spending shortfall rates that are shown without any transformation. The benchmark
model assumes no underspending.
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Figure 2.8: Impulse response functions following a large increase in productivity (+4.5× standard deviation).
TThe graph shows deviations from the steady-states for all variables in their logarithmic form but for inflation
and the spending shortfall rates that are shown without any transformation. The benchmark model assumes
no underspending.
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Figure 2.9: Impulse response functions a positive shock (1× standard deviations) to the process xH reflecting
the increase of money causing pure uinflation effects. The graph shows deviations from the steady-states for
all variables in their logarithmic form but for inflation and the spending shortfall rates that are shown without
any transformation. The benchmark model assumes no underspending.
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Figure 2.10: Impulse response functions a positive shock (1× standard deviations) to the process xB reflecting
the increase of money through injections in the financial intermediaries. The graph shows deviations from the
steady-states for all variables in their logarithmic form but for inflation and the spending shortfall rates that




I write the model equations below
ct + kt − (1− δ)kt−1 = yt, (2.A.1)



























(1 + πt)bt +mt−1xBt
rt, (2.A.8)
ιt = bt +mt−1x
B









































The steady-state (SS) variables are noted without the time subscript. The SS inflation is given by
π = xB + xH . (2.A.15)









− 1 + δ. (2.A.17)
I will express the remaining steady-state variables as a function of the critical final productivity shock
below which the firm underspends ξ. Then, I will provide a way to solve for ξ so that all steady-state
variables are determined.
First note that the cost of financing facing the firms in the steady-state can be expressed as a












Now note that the quantities λ
γ
1−γ y and λ
γ
1−γ ζ can be expressed as a function of ξ and the model
parameters using steady-state versions of equation and
λ
γ
























I combine the labour provision equation 2.2.6 with the good clearing identity (c + δK = y) and the













This, combined with the firm’s labour first order condition (w = (1− α)ζ/l), determines the steady-










Combine 2.A.22 and 2.A.23 with 2.A.19 to get ζ as a function of ξ and the model’s parameters. The
later result yields the steady-state production cost λ, the steady-state output y, the steady-state wage
w = (1 − α)ζ/l, the steady-state capital k = αζ/rK , the steady-state consumption c = y − δαζ/rK
and the steady-state real money (mH)ν = ψ rr−1c as a function of ξ and the model’s parameters. The
level of loans issued by banks is deduced as a function of wages and ξ using the definition 2.A.6







The steady-state real money is derived from the money demand condition 2.A.10. The steady-state





and the total stock of real money is m = (1 + xB)(mH + b).
After expressing all the steady-state variable of the model as a function of ξ and the model





For the model’s parameters I consider here, I verify numerically that the latter equation has a unique
solution. Once, the steady-state variable ξ is known, the remaining steady-state variables are deter-
mined in a straightforward manner.
The sign of the the variable ξ determines whether there is underspending in the steady-state.
• Case rF ≥ 1: Assuming rF ≥ 1 implies ξ ≤ 0. This implies that there is no underspending in
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the steady-state.
• Case rF < 1: Assuming rF < 1 implies ξ < 0. This implies that the firm underspends in the
steady-state.
Chapter 3




The previous chapter introduced a mechanism whereby firms may prefer to distribute cash to
shareholders after unexpected drops in productivity rather than investing in the production
process. This chapter considers the same mechanism in the context of a network of indus-
tries linked through input-output relationships. I show that if productivity drops in parts
of the productive sector, this can propagate through the production cost channel and cause
underspending in industries where productivity matches or beats expectations (downstream
transmission). In addition, underspending can affect the suppliers of industries witnessing
drops in productivity, thus propagating underspending to industries where productivity does
not deteriorate (upstream transmission). The nature of the input-output network linking firms
influences the way underspending can propagate from underperforming industries to the rest
of the productive sector.
I build on the framework in Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012) that I
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modify by separating the firm’s financing decision from its spending decision and by introducing
money and capital accumulation in a similar way to the model presented in chapter 2. I provide
several theoretical results characterising the level of underspending in the economy and its
impact on other model variables. These results help simulate the model while dealing with the
issue of occasionally binding spending constraints. I then present industry aggregation results
where the characteristics of the input-output network are linked to the likelihood of firms’
underspending as the number of industries in the economy grows large. To this effect, I focus
on two particular networks: the symmetric fully connected network, where every firm equally
uses all industries as a provider of intermediary input, and the star network, where a single
industry is the only provider of intermediary input to other industries. I find that in the case
of the star network, the model’s mechanism is maintained for highly disaggregated economies
as the probability for all firms to underspend remains stable independently of the number of
industries in the economy. The behaviour of underspending is different when symmetric, fully
connected networks link industries. In the latter case, the probability of all firms underspending
converges to zero for economies with a large number of industries.
When considering the underspending mechanism in a setup with multiple industries, under-
spending can, a priori, happen in any subset of industries. This complex ”occasionally binding
constraints” feature significantly complicates the simulation of the model. I provide several
theoretical results that enable the numerical simulation of the model while accounting for all
different possibilities in terms of the subset of industries where spending is not constrained. To
this effect, I develop an ad hoc simulation method that uses perturbation techniques to deal
with the forward-looking model equations while solving the other model equations without re-
course to perturbation techniques. This numerical method uses ideas similar to those used to
develop the ”Exact Today” method presented in Den Haan, Kobielarz, and Rendahl (2016).
However, this chapter’s ad hoc simulation method is substantially simpler to implement than
the ”Exact Today” method. It is also better suited to the model presented in this chapter.
Simulation results are shown for a simple economy composed of two industries following
an unexpected negative shock to one of the two industries. The model of this chapter is
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compared to a benchmark model where the previous financing always constrains spending.
Through the underspending mechanism, lower firms’ spending decreases labour compensation,
thus causing labour supply to drop. Lower labour supply causes lower output and therefore,
lower investments as consumers tend to smooth consumption variations. The labour supply
channel is key to the functioning of the underspending mechanism. To further demonstrate
the importance of the labour channel, I provide simulation results for an alternative calibration
assuming a higher elasticity of labour supply. The higher labour elasticity assumption causes
firms’ underspending to have more significant effects on aggregate variables.
Even when productivity remains stable in parts of the productive sector, a large enough
negative surprise shock in a subset of industries can propagate to the whole productive sector.
Besides the usual downstream propagation through industrial cost functions that depend on
the productivities of suppliers, propagation happens through two main demand channels. First
of all, a negative shock in parts of the productive sector causes a drop in households’ demand,
thus affecting demand for the goods produced by the industries where productivity remains
stable or improves. Moreover, the parts of the productive sector where the shock operates
reduce demand for intermediate goods produced by the remaining industries. These effects can
combine to reduce the marginal return on spending in stable and improving industries, pushing
their spending levels below the financing constraint.
In the absence of the underspending mechanism, production is more stable in the industries
that do not witness a productivity shock despite lower aggregate output and consumption.
This stability is due to a substitution effect where production is directed, through price change
effects, from the less productive industries where the shock originated to industries where pro-
ductivity remains stable or improves. However, this substitution effect is moderated by the
underspending mechanism. The way underspending affects stable industries is clearer when
simulating the model assuming an intermediate production sector composed of two industries
linked through a star input-output network. This is an economy with a single industry pro-
ducing an intermediate input used by all intermediate producers (source industry) and another
industry where firms use the input produced by the source industry to produce a good that
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is dedicated to final production (sink industry). A large enough negative productivity shock
in the source industry causes underspending in both industries. Firms’ underspending drops
output further down in both industries as both spend less on wages and attract less of the
elastic labour supply. However, lower output in the source industry has an indirect effect on
the sink industry. The price of the scarcer good produced by the source industry increases, thus
increasing the production cost of the sink industry. Underspending affects the sink industry in
two ways: by reducing its labour demand and by raising its production cost. Overall, the sink
industry is more impacted by underspending than the source industry.
The model presented in this chapter considers the effect of financial frictions in an economy
with multiple industries. This friction is linked to a working capital constraint similar to the one
presented in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). The previously raised financing (or working
capital) represents an upper limit to current spending but only if spending remains attractive
enough to the firm. Following unexpected drops in productivity, increases in production costs
or drops in demand, the firm might find it suboptimal to produce at a level of spending that
corresponds to the financing constraint set before the unpredicted shock hits its profits. In the
context of the model presented here, the mechanism only functions following unexpected adverse
shocks. The underspending mechanism has an asymmetric impact on the firms’ behaviour
which can help justify the asymmetry in the evolution of aggregate variables over the business
cycle (documented in Neftci (1984), among others). Given the importance of sectoral shocks’
aggregation to the functioning of the underspending mechanism, I build on the framework in
Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012). In this paper, the authors argue that
even in a very disaggregated economy, industry-level independent productivity shocks can lead
to non-negligible fluctuations of aggregate variables.1 This is the case when the input-output
network linking industries is such as a small number of industries play a disproportionately
important role as input supplies to others. The model presented here builds on this framework
and extends it in a direction where some of the asymmetries of aggregate variables can find
their roots in the sectoral behaviour of firms.
1A very disaggregated economy means an economy with a large number of industries subject to independent
idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
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The studied underspending mechanism relies on working capital frictions. It is therefore
related to the question of macroeconomic response to sectoral distortions as studied in Bigio
and LaO (2020). In the latter paper, the authors show that input-output networks can amplify
the effects of sectoral level inefficiencies. Focusing on financial inefficiencies, they show that
the U.S. input-output structure amplified distortions linked to the excess bond premia (as
defined in Gilchrist and Zakrajek (2012)) by roughly a factor of two during the 2008-2009
crisis. While the focus in this chapter is on when the financing constraints cease to be relevant
to the firms’ spending behaviour, the wedge introduced by the cost of financing affects the
steady-state in a way that is consistent with the theoretical results presented in Bigio and
LaO (2020). Financing constraints increase the production costs from the firm’s perspective by
introducing a wedge between real inputs prices and their marginal product. In the same vein
as Bigio and LaO (2020), Baqaee and Farhi (2019) provide theory of aggregation in inefficient
economies. The authors generalise Hulten Theorem (Hulten (1978)) to equilibrium allocations
away from the efficient one. Baqaee and Farhi (2019) assume that both labour supply and
distortion wedges are exogenous, while Bigio and LaO (2020) assume endogenous labour supply
and exogenous distortion wedges. The model presented here assumes that production input
includes capital besides labour and intermediary inputs and that supply for all these inputs
is endogenous. Moreover, the cost of financing (the only distortion wedge) is endogenous and
results from the optimising behaviour of borrowers and lenders. Finally, an additional layer of
complexity is introduced through the explicit modelling of money demand as a combination of
Households’ demand emanating from money in the utility function and working capital demand
from producers.2
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents the assumptions
of the model and some of the consequences of the agents’ optimising behaviour. Section 3.3
provides more theoretical results regarding the underspending mechanism. The network effects
on the model’s main mechanism are presented in section 3.4. This section also provides some
aggregation results in the case of two notable input-output network structures. The simulation
2Other related works focusing misallocation in economies with input-output relations include Jones (2011b)
and Liu (2019), the reader can refer to Bigio and LaO (2020) for a more comprehensive literature review.
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method and the model calibration are described in section 3.5. In addition, section 3.5 presents
and comments the simulation results. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The model
In this section, I present a general equilibrium model where firms are linked through input-
output relationships and can enter an underspending mode following unexpected drops in pro-
ductivity. In this setup, n intermediate goods are produced by industries indexed i = 1, ..., n.
These industries are constrained by a Cobb-Douglas production function, and they use each
other’s output as intermediary input. The use by each industry of inputs provided by other
industries is given by the use input-output matrix W := (wij)i,j=1...n where
∑n
j=1 wij = 1.
The mechanism presented in chapter 2 is adapted to allow for firms to be connected through
input-output relationships. The subsection below provides the details underlying the model
extension.
3.2.1 Households
Households derive utility from the consumption of a single good ct, leisure 1− lt and real money
holdings mHt
U (ct, 1− lt,mHt ). (3.2.1)
U verifies the first and the second derivatives conditions: Uc > 0, UmH > 0, U1−l > 0, Uc,c < 0,
U1−l,1−l < 0 and UmH ,mH < 0. Households decide their consumption ct, labour supply lt, capital
kt, deposits bt and real money holdings m
H






βs−tU (cs, 1− ls,mHs ), (3.2.2)
While being subject to the sequence budget constraint
bs + psm
H








+ (1− δ + rKs )psks−1 + Ts, (3.2.3)
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where pt is the price of the consumption good, ωt the nominal wage, rt the (gross) deposit rate,
rKt the (net) capital rent and Tt is the lump-sum transfers from the households’ owned firms
and banks. In line with the monetised real business cycle literature, all the nominal variables
(including bt, ωt, pt and Tt) are expressed as fractions of the previous stock of money that
grows at a rate xMt .
Deposit rates rt and capital rents r
K











(1− δ + rKt ). (3.2.5)





Finally, the representative household sets its money holding to satisfy




From the condition above and the derivative conditions satisfied by the utility function U , one
can see that it is more costly for households to hold positive money balances when the nominal
deposit rate rt is high and when consumption ct is low.
3.2.2 Financial intermediation and monetary policy
As in chapter 2, I follow Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and assume that a direct monetary
channel is operated by injecting money in financial intermediaries to help finance the loans
extended to production firms. The representative bank provides the firms with the aggregate
loan ιt (expressed as a fraction of the previous money stock) charging the gross nominal rate r
F
t .
The bank finances its loans operations using households deposits bt and a monetary injection
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from the central bank that is proportional to the existing nominal stock of money
ιt = bt + x
M
t , (3.2.8)
where xMt is the relative change in the stock of money. The bank profit (expressed as a fraction
of the previous money stock) is given by
ΠBt+1 = r
F
t ιt − rtbt. (3.2.9)
The monetary authority provides the financial intermediaries with the new money in the goal
of easing credit conditions for firms. This prevents the increase in the money supply from being
distributed equally to all agents and guarantees a role for money in the model’s fluctuations.
Following Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995), I assume that the bank’s profit is zero (ΠBt+1 = 0).
This yields
rFt ιt = rtbt. (3.2.10)
by controlling the money injection xMt , the central bank affects the lending rate
rFt =
1
1 + xMt /bt
rt. (3.2.11)
I assume that the money growth xMt follows the AR(1) process
xMt = (1− ρM)xM + ρMxMt−1 + σMvMt , (3.2.12)
where xM is the steady-state value of xMt , σM is the volatility of innovations, ρM is the auto-
correlation parameter and vMt is an i.i.d error term that is independent of all other shocks in
the model.
The assumption that money is directly injected into the financial intermediaries can be
justified by the ability of central banks to affect lending through the use of open-market op-
erations (Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)). All the stock of money available at the end of
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the production cycle is inherited by the households and is either kept in real cash balances or
deposited with the financial intermediary
ptm
H
t + bt = 1. (3.2.13)
The latter money clearing condition, combined with the household demand for money ema-
nating from utility maximisation as described by equation 3.2.7, determines the price of the
consumption good pt in the model.
3.2.3 Final good producer
I assume the existence of a final good producer that transforms the output of the industries
1, ..., n into a final good yt that is then used by households to consume or to accumulate capital:









where θi ≥ 0 is the share of good i in the final production and
∑n
j=1 θi = 1. The represen-








Through first order conditions
pi,tyi,t = θiptyt (3.2.16)







The intermediate goods are produced by industries indexed i = 1, ..., n that are constrained by
a Cobb-Douglas production function and that use each other’s output as intermediary input










where Xi,t := (xi,1,t, ..., xi,n,t)
′ denotes the vector of the outputs xi,j,t of industries j = 1, .., n
used as intermediary inputs by industry i, li,t is the labour employed by industry i, ki,t is the
capital rented by the same industry and zi,t is an industry-specific total productivity factor.
The use by each industry of intermediary inputs provided by other industries is determined
by the use input-output matrix W = (wij)i,j=1...n where
∑n
j=1 wij = 1 for i = 1, ..., n and the
overall use of intermediary inputs is governed by the elasticity parameter αI . The share of
capital (respectively labour) is noted αK (respectively αL) and I assume decreasing return to
scale (αK + αL + αI < 1). Firms belonging to the same industry i are assumed to be identical,
with log-normal productivity zi
zi,t = exp (ui,t) , (3.2.19)
where ui,t i = 1, ..., n are industry-specific shocks that are assumed to be AR(1)
ui,t = ρiui,t−1 + σiei,t,
σi is an industry-specific volatility parameter, and ρi denotes an industry-specific mean-reversion
parameter. The productivity processes are therefore driven by the i.i.d. normal innovations ei
that are also assumed to be independent across industries.
Firms finance production using banks’ issued loans carrying the gross interest rate rFt . At
time t, the firms decide the loan amount ιi,t that will potentially be spent in the next period’s
production process. To do so, the firm maximises its expected profit that is a function of the
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subject to the future financial resource constraint
pt+1r
K







Note that, as is the case of other nominal model variables, ιt is expressed as a fraction of
the previous period money stock. The constraint on spending in the next period needs to be
corrected to take into account the growth of the money stock xMt .
The main mechanism of the model functions in a similar way to the single industry case.
A firm belonging to an industry i decides its financing level ιi,t at time t, raises loan financing
before discovering the new productivity eui,t+1 , new sale prices pi,t+1 and the new production
costs it faces. At time t+1, the firm assesses its own productivity as well as the prevailing wages





in order to maximise its profit subject to the previously determined spending constraint ιi
max
xi,1,t+1,...,xi,n,t+1;li,t+1,ki,t+1



























where α := αK + αL + αI denotes the return to scale of intermediate production. Combining
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these first order conditions with the production technology leads the following expression for





where κi is an index representing the cost of production facing firms within industry i. the
index κi is a function of the rental rate of capital r
K


























= 1 when wi,j = 0. One can therefore write the production











The firm chooses whether to spend all the raised financing ζi,t+1 = ιi,t/(1 + x
M
t ) (constrained
case) or to spend less than the raised financing level ζi,t+1 < ιi,t/(1 + x
M
t ) (unconstrained case)











This equation is derived from the fact that when the firm is unconstrained, the marginal return
on spending matches the marginal return on returning cash to shareholders without spending




The industry i is unconstrained if, at the spending cnstraint
ιi,t
1+xMt
, the marginal return on
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(1 + xMt )
α−1 ≤ 1. (3.2.33)
The intuitions from the single-industry model are maintained, with firms entering unconstrained
spending when their industry’s log productivity is lower than a critical value determined by the
previous financing, money growth xM , sale prices pi and production costs κi. The input-output
relationships influence the model’s main mechanism through the production cost channel by
impacting the production cost indices κi,t+1 and through the demand channels affecting the
sale prices pi,t+1. A negative shock originating in a subset of industries can propagate to other
industries by increasing their production costs, thus making spending unconstrained even in
industries with improving productivities. Additionally, the negative shock can curtail demand
in the affected industries, thus affecting these industries’ suppliers. The effect the production
network has on the underspending mechanism is discussed in more detail in section 3.4.
At this stage, one can derive an industry-specific equation linking the level of financing
within industry i to the expected productivity within the same industry, expected sale prices


















Note that the marginal effect of financing ιt on expected firms’ profit is only positive if the
future spending is constrained; otherwise, the marginal effect of financing is nil. The financing
equation 3.2.34 confirms the importance of the decreasing returns to scale assumption in guar-
anteeing finite levels of financing demands. Additionally, under the decreasing returns to scale
assumption, financing levels increase with expected sale prices and productivity while being in-
versely related to financing costs and the expected production costs as summarised by κi. The
production cost index κi is key in propagating shocks originating in a single industry to the
rest of the production network: a negative shock impacting industry j reduces good j supply
and as a result increases the price of the same good. This in turn increases the production cost
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κi facing all industries i where the good j is used (these are the industries i such as wi,j > 0).
3.2.5 Market clearing conditions
For clarity, I provide the clearing conditions corresponding to all markets below.
• The markets for intermediate goods i = 1, ..., n where the supply matches the demand




xj,i,t = xi,t, (3.2.35)



















• The market for labour, where the demand from producers matches households’ supply
n∑
i=1
li,t = lt. (3.2.39)
3.3 Model theoretical results
I present below several theoretical results that provide insights about the functioning of the
model’s underspending mechanisms and aid in designing methods for its numerical simulation.
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As it will be shown below, many model variables can be expressed as a function of nominal
output, nominal spending, exogenous productivity shocks and previously determined state vari-
ables. This model structure proves crucial in simplifying the simulation procedure. To simplify
the exposition of the model results, I assume that if there are m industries where the financing
constraints are not binding, then these industries have indices 1, ...,m. This notational assump-
tion can be made without any loss of generality and will be adopted for the remainder of this
section.3 Most of the results of this section are also general enough to accommodate various
assumptions regarding the households’ utility function. A particular utility function will be
specified when needed to obtain an explicit households’ labour supply function.
The following lemma is derived from the goods’ clearing equations and the model’s first-
order conditions and shows that firm revenues are only a function of current firms’ expenditure
and the contemporaneous nominal output. The proof of this lemma and the proofs of the other
results presented in this section are detailed in appendix 3.A.1.





W ′Zt + y
N
t Θ (3.3.1)
where REVt := (p1,tx1,t, ..., pn,txn,t)
′ is the vector of industry revenues expressed as a fraction
of the previous period’s money stock, Zt := (ζ1,t, ..., ζn,t)
′ is the industries’ expenditures vector
also expressed as fractions of the previous period’s stock of money, Θ := (θ1, ..., θn)
′, W the
input-output matrix and yNt := ptyt the nominal output (expressed as a fraction of the previous
money stock).
Proof. The proof is presented in appendix 3.A.1. 
In the case where all industries are constrained by their previous period financing, their
expenditure is predetermined, and so is their nominal demand of various intermediary inputs.
This means that, when all financing constraints are holding, nominal output plays a central
3The notational assumption would imply that industry notations might change from one time period t to
the other. We will be focusing on solving the model one time step at a time, so this notational choice should
cause no confusion.
88
role in this model as the only contemporaneous variable determining overall nominal demand
for all goods produced by the economy. The following proposition extends the centrality of
nominal output to the case where some industries’ spending is not constrained, as it expresses
the expenditure of unconstrained industries as a function of the current nominal output and
predetermined model state variables.
Proposition 1. The firms’ expenditure are function of the firm financing raised in the previous
period and nominal output. Either the level of expenditure is equal to the previously raised
financing (binding constraint industries) or, for industries where the constraint is not binding,










where Lm := (Im,m−αIW ′1:m,1:m)−1 is the Leontief matrix corresponding to the subset of unconstrained
industries i = 1, ...,m, Im,m denotes the identity matrix of size m×m and if M := (mi,j) is a matrix,
then Mp:q,r:s denotes the sub-matrix Mp:q,r:s := (mi,j)i∈{p,...,q},j∈{r,...,s}.
Proof. The proof is presented in appendix 3.A.1. 
Combining proposition 1 and lemma 1 shows that revenues revi,t := pi,txi,t are also deter-
mined by nominal output and previous period financing. Using the first-order equations and
market clearing conditions, it follows from proposition 1, that other nominal variables are also
determined by the current nominal output and previous period investment levels. In other
words, the full current shocks impact on several nominal variables is reflected through the
current nominal output. These include firm revenues, firms’ spending levels, industry costs of
labour and capital, the overall wages paid and the overall rent cost of capital. Other variables
depend directly on specific industry shocks. These include the prices pi,t and the financing
levels ιi,t. The prices pi,t adjust to reflect the varying levels of production across industries,
while the financing levels are forward-looking variables that depend on the agents’ expectations
of the next period realization of industry-specific shocks.
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Proposition 2. The revenues revi,t := pi,txi,t, the costs of intermediary inputs pi,txi,j,t, the costs
of labour ωtli,t and the costs of capital ptr
K
t ki,t are determined by the current nominal output
and a predetermined state variables, namely the previously determined industry financing.
Proof. The proof is presented in appendix 3.A.1. 
As explained above, prices depend both on nominal output (through revenues and firms’
expenditures) and on industry-specific shocks as per the proposition below.
Proposition 3. The matrix In,n − αW ′ is invertible and prices are a function of the level of






(αK + αL)ζ̃t − αK k̃t−1 − αLl̃t
]
1n,1 + ˜REV t − αZ̃t − Ut
}
, (3.3.3)
where Lt = (In,n − αIW ′)−1 is the Leontief matrix, the superscript .̃ is used for logarithmic
values, U := (u1,t, ..., un,t)
′ is the industries’ log productivity vector, Zt := (ζ1,t, ..., ζn,t)
′ the
industries’ spending vector, ζt := ζ1,t + ...+ ζt,n is the aggregate industries’ spending and A :=
(ai)i=1,...,n is a constant vector with ai := αI α̃− αI α̃I − αI
∑n
j=1 wijw̃ij.
Furthermore, the final good price is determined by nominal output yNt , capital kt−1, labour
supply lt and the scalar linear combination of shocks ut =
∑n
i=1 τiui,t, where by definition,
T := (τ1, ..., τn)
′ := L Θ











Proof. The proof is presented in appendix 3.A.1. 
At this stage, it is useful to make an assumption regarding the utility function in order to
obtain an explicit labour supply condition.
Assumption 1. Assume that the utility function is given by











where ν is the curvature on the utility form holding real cash balances, η the curvature on dislike
of labour and χ is a parameter that controls for households’ dislike of labour. By convention, if
ν = 1, the utility function becomes















Combine this labour supply condition with the intermediate producers’ labour first-order con-
dition to obtain an expression of labour supply and prices as per the corollary below.




(α̃L − α̃− χ̃+ ζ̃t − c̃Nt ), (3.3.8)
and the good prices are given by


















where Â := A+ αL
1+η






















Proof. The proof is presented in appendix 3.A.1. 
To simplify the model solution, I make the following assumption on the economy’s agents
behaviour with regard to potential future underspending.
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Assumption 2. The economy’s agents do not take future firms’ underspending into account
when making their saving and financing decisions.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, this assumption is verified in approximation when
nominal interests rates are not too close to the zero lower bound. Assumption 2 implies a








for i = 1, ..., n, (3.3.11)
where revCi,t+1 := pi,t+1xi,t+1 denotes the next period’s revenues of industry i, assuming that all
industries’ spending constraints are binding, regardless of next period’s shocks. Alternatively,
one can rewrite the financing conditions 3.2.34, by exploiting the revenues’ expression in lemma
1, as follows
rFt It = Et
[
αIW






for i = 1, ..., n, (3.3.12)
where yN,Ct+1 denotes the next period’s nominal output, assuming that all industries’ spending
constraints are binding, regardless of next period’s shocks. Inverting the equation above yields
an expression for industry financings as a function of expected nominal output as shown in the
proposition 4.




(1 + xMt )Et[y
N,C
t+1 ]ΓtΘ, (3.3.13)
where by definition Γt =
(
In,n − αIrFt W
′
)−1
and Θ = (θ1, ..., θn)
′.
Under both assumption 1 and 2, the households’ demand for saving through deposits and















(1− δ + rK,Ct+1 ), (3.3.15)
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where the next time period’s variables denoted by the C correspond to a version of the model
where all industries are constrained in the next time period, regardless of the next period’s
shocks.
Proof. Equation 3.3.13 results from inverting equation 3.3.12. Equations 3.3.14 and 3.3.15
derive immediately from the housholds’ Euler intertemporal equations under assumptions 1
and 2. 
The corollary below is derived immediately from proposition 4, by noting that the sum of




Corollary 2. If the overall financing in the economy is noted ιt = ι1,t + ... + ι1,t, then under










(1 + xMt )Et[y
N,C
t+1 ], (3.3.17)
where by definition (γ1,t, ..., γn,t)
′ := ΓtΘ.
These results imply that in any simulation of the model, the n state variables ι1,t, ..., ιn,t
can be replace by ιt and r
F
t . In addition, note how higher financing costs decrease financing
and therefore bring future spending lower (equation 3.3.17). Financing costs introduce a wedge
between the marginal product of inputs and their real costs. Moreover, note that the fraction





and depends on the financing
cost facing firms (equation 3.3.16). In the absence of financing costs, the fraction of aggregate
financing going to industry i would be τi(1 − αI). The working capital friction can affect
the allocation of resources across industries even when all firms face the same financing cost.
Furthermore, the size of the financing/spending reallocation effect depends on the input-output
structure. This behaviour is consistent with the findings in Bigio and LaO (2020).







W ′Θ and noting that 11,n.W
′Θ = 1 for all k.
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The next section studies the effects of the input-output relationships and the final production
function parameters θ1, ..., θn on the model’s mechanism and presents some industry aggregation
results.
3.4 Effect of input-output relationships
The proposition below provides a criteria to determine which set of industries, if any, relax
their spending below the financing constraint.
Proposition 5. There are exactly m industries i = 1, ...,m where spending is unconstrained




























′ = Im+1:n,t−1 − (α2IW ′m+1:n,1:mLmW ′1:m,m+1:n + αIW ′m+1:n,m+1:n)Im+1:n,t−1,
(νm1 , ..., ν
m
m)
′ = I1:m,t−1 − αILmW ′1:m,m+1:nIm+1:n,t−1
and Lm := (Im,m − αW ′1:m,1:m)−1 is the Leontief matrix corresponding to the subset of uncon-
strained industries i = 1, ...,m.
Proof. The proof is presented in appendix 3.A.3. 
Note that the constants τmi , ..., τ
m
m and ηm+1, ..., ηn only depend on the input-output struc-
ture and the final production function parameters whilst the variables δmi and ν
m
i also depend
on the previous period industries’ financing It−1. Note also, that Independently of the level
of shocks and their influence on nominal output, a feasible set of unconstrained industries










i are only a function of the model’s parameters and the terms δ
m
i , νi and x
M
t−1 are pre-
determined at time t, the only contemporaneous variable deciding the subset of unconstrained
industry is the aggregate nominal output yNt . This implies that industry shocks matter to
underspending only in the way that they determine the aggregate nominal output given the
model’s state variables.
In order to study the behaviour of the model’s main mechanism when the number of indus-
tries making the productive sector becomes large, I focus on the situation where all industries
enter an unconstrained spending mode. The proposition below provides a sufficient and neces-
sary condition for every industry to spend less than the financing constraint.









where the constants τi are non-negative and are defined as: (τ1, ..., τn)
′ := L Θ, with L being
the Leontief matrix L := (In,n − αIW ′)−1 and Θ := (θ1, ..., θn)′ a vector representing final
production.
Under assumption 2, all the industries would relax their financing constraints if and only if












where by definition (γ1,t−1, ..., γn,t−1)






the period t nominal output assuming that all industries’ spending constraints are binding as
per assumption 2.
Proof. The proof of the proposition is in Appendix 3.A.3. Condition 3.4.2 follows immediately
from proposition 5. 
The first result of proposition 6 links the event where the whole economy enters an un-
derspending mode to the levels of raised financing and to the constants τi that are deter-
mined by final production as summarised by the vector Θ := (θ1, ..., θn)
′ and the matrix
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αIW := αI(wi,j)i,j=1,...,n summarising the input-output relationships. As one might expect,
higher financing levels ιi,t−1 make it more likely for all industries to enter an underspending
mode. On the other hand, one can prove that in a model where the firms do not require fi-
nancing before spending, industry i produces a fraction (1 − αI)τi of the overall intermediate
output in the steady-state. This means that the ratio ιi,t−1/τi, that is key to condition 3.4.2,
can be interpreted as relating the financing allocated to industry i to the proportion of steady-
state output produced by the same industry in the absence of the firms’ need to finance before
spending on production.
Condition 3.4.3 shows more explicitly the effect of the cost of financing rFt . It is important
to note that the terms γi,t−1 are non-increasing in r
F
t−1.
5 This implies that a lower cost of
financing makes it more likely it is for all industries to be unconstrained by their financing
levels for a given distribution of nominal output. The left-hand side of condition 3.4.3 is
the ratio of nominal output over the nominal output expected by producers in the previous
period. This condition states that all industries underspend when nominal output drops below
previous agents’ expectations by an amount that depends on the previous financing rate and
the economy’s input-output structure.
Assumption 2 is key to obtain condition 3.4.3 from 3.4.2. As seen in chapter 2, this as-
sumption is verified in approximation when the net financing costs are not too close to the zero
lower bound. To see this, first note that the term in the right-hand side of equation 3.4.3 is
one if the gross financing rate is one and that this term decreases with rFT (as noted earlier)
and converges towards zeros for high values of rFT . This implies that as net financing rates





gets closer to zero making
underspending unlikely under assumption 2 (baring an infinite volatility of nominal output,
which any decent model calibration would exclude). In other words, if financing rates are high
enough, underspending becomes very unlikely under assumption 2. Now, note that financing
is higher under assumption 2 compared to a situation where agents take future underspending
into account by comparing the financing equations 3.3.11 and 3.2.34. Given that lower financ-
5Note that (γ1,t−1, ..., γn,t−1)





′kΘ and that the matrix W ′ and the vector Θ
are non-negative.
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ing implies that underspending is even less likely, one can conclude that assumption 2 is true
in approximation if the financing rate is high enough. When studying particular input-output
networks below, we will see that financing rates do not need to be very high for underspending
to become unlikely.
The aggregate variables of the model presented here is driven by the aggregate log-productivity
shock ut =
∑n
i=1 τiui,t. The volatility of ut can be written in the following form
σu :=
√
Θ′L ′VL Θ, (3.4.4)
where V is the variance/covariance matrix of the industry shocks ei. This formulation enables
to see that potential positive correlation of industry shocks would increase the volatility σu and
therefore make the model aggregate variables more volatile. In the current setup V has zero off
diagonal elements. To simplify further, assume that: σi = σ for i = 1, ..., n. Then the formula




τ 2i , (3.4.5)
with the constants τi being the element of the vector T := (τi)i=1,...,n := L Θ.
The vector T comprises the effect of both the final production parameters Θ and the input-
output matrix W on the volatility σu. To fix ideas, let us first study the effect of the parameters
θ1, ..., θn. To that effect, assume that all industries are disconnected: W = In,n. Then the value







In the case where final production only uses a single good: θ1 = 1 and θi = 0 for i > 1, the
volatility of consumer spending is maximal σu = σ
1−αI





all goods play the same role in final production θi = 1/n for i = 1, .., n. Everything else being
equal, an economy where the inputs to the production of the consumption good are spread
across many intermediate goods would have a lower aggregate fluctuations and the mechanism
CHAPTER 3. 97
of the model would be less likely to operate.
To isolate the impact of the input-output network on aggregation, one can assume that
all intermediate goods play the same role in final production (θi = 1/n). This puts us in the
setup presented in Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012) and leads to the
same conclusion, namely that fluctuations are higher for networks characterised by dominant
industries that play an asymmetric role as a supplier to other sectors. An example of such
networks is the ”star” production network. I refer the reader to the aforementioned paper for
more details on the role played by networks in aggregating industry-specific shocks and turn to
network effects in the context of this chapter’s main mechanism.
To assess the effect of the input-output matrix, I assume that θi = 1/n for i = 1, ..., n
and study the aggregation of the underspending mechanism under two notable networks: the
symmetric fully connected network and the star network. To simplify the analysis further, I
make the following assumption regarding the money in the utility function parameter ν for the
remainder of this section. This assumption is standard in the literature, and will be maintained
when simulating the model in section 3.5.
Assumption 3. ν = 1.
As explained in appendix 3.A.2 (proposition 8), this assumption guarantees that the steady-
state financing rate r̄F is independent of the number of industries n and the input-output matrix
W . This result will be useful when studying aggregation in the two notable networks mentioned
above.
Symmetric fully connected network: In the case where all industries play a symmetric





for i = 1, ..., n. (3.4.7)








Note how the volatility terms is close to zero for large numbers of industries n. Assuming the




for i = 1, ..., n. (3.4.9)
In this case, the allocation of aggregate financing to each industry γi,t−1(1−αI/rFi,t−1) = 1/n is
independent of the loan rate rFt−1. In other words, the working capital friction does not affect
the allocation of resources across industries. The expressions of τi and γi enable us to rewrite












For all industries to reduce their spending below the level provided by previous financing, nom-




Under assumption 3, the steady-state financing rate r̄F is independent of the number industries
n. Given that the aggregate volatility σu becomes small for large values of n, while the required
drop of nominal output is stable, this indicates that the underspending mechanism becomes
unlikely to operate under the fully connected network when the intermediate production sector
is composed of a very large number of industries.
Star network: On the other hand, if one assumes that one industry (let’s say industry 1) is
the only provider of intermediary input to all industries and that all intermediate goods play






Figure 3.1: Fully connected network in an economy with 4 industries. Arrows show the direction of input
provision: they depart from the industry providing the intermediary input and arrive to the industry using the
input.






















if i > 1. (3.4.14)
In the context of the star network described here, the industry 1 is often referred to as the source
industries, while the other industries are referred to as sink industries. It is noteworthy that the
fraction of aggregate financing allocated to the source industry is given by γi,t−1(1−αI/rFi,t−1) =
1/n + (αI/r
F
t−1)(1 − 1/n) and decreases with cost of financing rFt−1. Unlike in the case of
symmetric network studied above, allocation across industries is impacted by the working
capital friction when production relations are represented by a star network. Higher financing
costs have a similar effect to an increase of the cost of all inputs, including the cost of the
intermediate input produced by the source industry. This reduces demand for the output of
the source industry thus reducing the proportion of aggregate financing dedicated to it.






Figure 3.2: Star network in an economy with 4 industries. Arrows show the direction of input provision: they
depart from the industry providing the intermediary input (source industry) and arrive to the industry using
the input (sink industries).















for n >> 1. (3.4.15)
















for n >> 1. (3.4.16)
Under assumption 3, the steady-state loan rate r̄F is independent of number of industries
n. This implies that, when the economy is previously in the steady-state, the drop in nominal
output required for all industries to enter an underspending mode remains stable as the number
of industries changes. In addition, the volatility σu converges to a positive level as the n grows
large (σu ≈ ασ
1−α). One can therefore conclude that, under a star network, the underspending
mechanism can function even when the intermediate production sector is composed of a large
number of industries.
In the analysis above, I use the behaviour of σu for large n as a proxy for the volatility
of yN as the number of industries n grows large. Because the model equations also change
when n changes, this reasoning requires further justification. Figure 3.3 shows the behaviour
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of the impulse response functions of the variables yN and cN as n grows larger, assuming the
fully connected network and the star network, respectively. The figure confirms the analysis
above, with the impulse response of yN and cN converging towards the zero line in the case
of the fully connected network and towards a stable non nil response for the star network. As
shown above, the unexpected drop in nominal output required for all industries’ spending to be
unconstrained is stable for large n for both types of networks. This implies that the probability
of all industries entering an underspending mode converges towards a positive value in the case
of a star network, and towards zero in the case of the fully connected network.
The results of this section point towards the fact that input-output production networks
where a small number of industries play an important role in providing intermediary inputs
would imply that the mechanism of the model is more likely to operate when the number
of independent industries is large. These results are consistent with and guided by existing
literature, for instance Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012) and extend
a literature mainly concerned with the network origins of aggregate output volatility in a
direction where part of the asymmetries affecting the distribution of aggregate variables can
also be attributed to the nature of the production networks prevailing in the economy.
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Figure 3.3: Impulse response functions of the nominal output yN and nominal consumption cN following
a shock to industry 1, assuming the fully connected network and the star network and different numbers of
industries n. The size of the industry 1 shock is chosen to imply a one standard deviation move of the aggregate
shock variable ut. The remaining model parameters are calibrated as in section 3.5. All variables’ responses are
presented in a logarithmic form and as a deviation from the steady state.
3.5 Simulation results
3.5.1 Simulation routine
To devise a simulation methodology, I first note that, whatever the number of intermediate
industries, the financing state variables ι1,,t−1, ..., ιn,t−1 can be replaced by just two state vari-
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ables: the aggregate financing ιt−1 = ι1,t−1 + ... + ιn,t−1 and the financing rate r
F
t−1 (corollary
2). Then, I note that the majority of the model variables can be expressed as a function of
the nominal output yNt and consumption spending c
N
t (proposition 1, lemma 1, corollary 1 and
proposition 4).
In the absence of forward-looking equations in the model, one can solve for the values of
yNt and c
N
t that satisfy all the model equations presented above. The main difficulty consists
in dealing with the model’s forward-looking equations. These are the households’ capital and
deposit savings equations 3.3.14 and 3.3.15, and the intermediate producers’ financing equations
3.3.13. Given assumption 2, the behaviour of the next period’s variables necessary to estimate
the expectations terms in the model equations can be modelled using a version of the model
where the spending constrained are always binding. This can be achieved through standard
perturbation techniques around the model’s steady-state.6 Perturbation near the steady-state






t+1 , conditional on the
period’s t state variables and the period t + 1 exogenous model shocks, thus providing a way
to approximate the expectations terms in the model equations through quadrature.
The model is then simulated by writing all the model equations, directly or indirectly, as a
function of yNt and c
N




t such as all the
model equations are verified. The model equations involving no expectations over the behaviour
of future model variables are solved exactly, while those involving future model variables are
solved through quadrature using the policy functions obtained through perturbation around
the steady-state, as explained above.7 Like the ”Exact Today” algorithm presented in Den
Haan, Kobielarz, and Rendahl (2016), this period’s outcomes are an exact solution of the
model equations, and I only approximate the next period’s outcomes. In Den Haan, Kobielarz,
and Rendahl (2016), however, the policy functions determining the next period’s outcomes are
approximated through perturbation around the current state of the model at each point of
the simulation path. This helps with solving models that do not possess a steady-state and
6Using the numerical suite DYNARE, for example.
7The steady-state of the model where the spending constraint always hold is the same as the steady-state of
the main model (see appendix 3.A.2).
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provides a way to incorporate the effects of uncertainty and non-linearities and interactions
between these two effects. As shown in appendix 3.A.2, the model studied here does possess a
unique steady-state. Furthermore, assumption 2 implies little interaction between uncertainty
over the future and the non-linearities emanating from the underspending mechanism. This
justifies the choice of using policy functions obtained through perturbations around the steady-
state to approximate the next period’s outcome. A detailed description of the algorithm used
is presented in appendix 3.B.2. The appendix also provides simulations testing the accuracy of
the suggested simulation routine.
3.5.2 Calibration
The model is studied in the symmetric fully connected case (wij = 1/n and θi = 1/n for all i, j)
for an economy with two industries (n = 2) and is simulated yearly. Households are assumed to
have the utility in assumption 1. The utility discount factor β helps determine the equilibrium
rates of financing and is, therefore, key to the main mechanism of the model. Mehra and
Prescott (1985) report that between 1889 and 1978, the average annual real return on equity
was 7%, while the average annual real return on short term debt was 1%. In the current
setup, I assume an investment horizon of one year. I then target an equilibrium real interest
rate closer to the return on short term debt at 2%. This implies that β = 0.98. The steady-
state money growth x̄M = 0.02 matches a steady-state inflation at 2%. Following Atkenson,
Khan, and Ohanian (1996), I assume moderate decreasing return to scale in the intermediate
production sector8 α = 0.95. Following Basu (1995) and Jones (2011a), I assume that the
share of intermediate input is αI = α/2 = 0.475. The share of capital is assumed to be half
the share of labour, which yields αK = 0.1583 and αL = 0.3167. The calibration is performed
to match a steady-state where the level of employment of l̄ = 0.3 and where households hold
a quarter of the money stock m̄H = 0.25 (matching the M1/M2 ratio for the United States).
This determines the value of the parameters χ and ψ.9 The industry TFP standard deviations
(σ1 = σ2) are such as aggregate TFP is around 1%. The remaining model parameters are
8See also Veracierto (2001) and Atkeson and Kehoe (2005).



















Table 3.1: Assumed and calibrated model parameters.
standard and are borrowed from the literature. Table 3.1 shows the assumed and calibrated
model parameters.
3.5.3 Dynamic effects of firms’ underspending
Figures 3.4 compares impulse responses of the model with the underspending mechanism to a
version of the model whereby the financing constraints are always binding (benchmark). The
figure shows the impulse responses of several aggregate variables following a large negative
shock to productivity in industry 1 (−4×
√
2 standard deviations), while keeping productivity
in industry 2 unchanged. The industry 1 shock size is chosen to imply an aggregate output
drop around 8% in the benchmark model, which approximately corresponds to the drop of U.S.
GDP below its trend between Q2 2008 and Q2 2009.
When the underspending mechanism operates, the negative productivity shock has a larger
immediate effect on output. When they are allowed to underspend, firms adapt faster after
gaining knowledge of the new lower productivity by reducing expenditure before adjustment
to financing levels affects the economy. Figure 3.4 shows that the underspending mechanism
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causes output to drop by a further 1% and capital investments to drop by a further 4%, whilst
making labour drop by an extra 1.5%. When spending by firms is curtailed, less cash is
dedicated to paying wages. Lower wages push the elastic labour supply lower in the presence of
underspending, which in turn causes an additional drop in output. Lower output implies lower
investments in physical capital, as households decrease their savings to smooth consumption.
On the other hand, when the firms cannot adjust expenditure, their previous level of financ-
ing, which was based on a more optimistic view of productivity, helps dampen the severity of
the current negative shock. In particular, the spending on wages remains stable, which implies
a relatively stable labour supply. In both models, the reverse hump shape reaction of con-
sumption implies lower deposit rates. This reaction is, however, muted by the rather smooth
change in households’ consumption. Assumption 2 implies no difference in the dynamics of
financing between the main model and the benchmark model. One period after the unexpected
productivity shock, there is no underspending in either model. This and the identical reaction
of financing in the period where the surprise shock occurs imply that the impulse responses of
both models are very similar beyond the first time period.10
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the impulse response of several industry-specific variables. Let
us first consider the reaction of the benchmark model to the unexpected negative productivity
shock to industry 1. Following the shock, the output of industry 1 drops as expected. The
price of the scarcer good 1 increases, thus the increasing the production cost of industry 2
firms. At the same time, the increase of the good 1 price pushes firms in both industries as
well as the final producer to divert more demand toward industry 2 (substitution effect). The
higher demand effect partially compensates for the effect of higher production costs, and the
output of industry 2 witnesses a small drop as a result. In the main model, the less productive
industry 1 firms adjust their spending lower following the large unpredicted shock affecting their
productivities. The underspending in industry 1 decreases the labour supplied by households to
this industry, thus making its output drop lower relative to the benchmark model. In addition,
underspending in industry 1 pushes the demand for good 2 lower, thus incentivising industry
10The identical reaction of financing in both models is a consequence of assumption 2.
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2 firms to underspend. The underspending by industry 2 firms decreases the labour employed
by this industry, and this industry’s output drops further as a result. Underspending causes
both industries’ contribution to the final production to drop by an extra 1%. Substitution
effects operating at the level of final and intermediate producers mean that, in the absence
of underspending, the industry 2 output and its contribution to final production would have
been more stable than the output and contribution of industry 1. This relative stability of
output within industry 2 makes the impact of the model’s main mechanism more visible in this
industry where productivity remains unchanged.
As mentioned above, the reaction of households to the lower wage spending by firms is key
to the functioning of the underspending mechanism and its effects on aggregate variables. The
reaction of labour supply to changes to firms’ wage spending depends on the assumed level of
Frisch elasticity of labour supply 1/η. Figure 3.7 provides the impulse response of aggregate
variables to an unpredicted shock to industry 1 productivity when a higher Frisch elasticity
is assumed (lower η = 0.1). Assuming a higher Frisch elasticity of labour implies that firms’
underspending makes output drop by a further 2.5% (as opposed to 1% for η = 1). This
is caused by a larger drop in labour supply in the presence of the underspending mechanism
(4.2% instead of 1.5% in the main calibration). The higher elasticity of labour supply causes
a moderate increase in underspending in both industries (figures 3.8 and 3.9). This moderate
increase in underspending is compounded by the higher elasticity of labour supply, making
underspending have a larger negative effect on labour hours. The larger negative impact of
underspending on hours implies a larger negative impact on output. In addition, in the new
calibration (η = 0.1), investment drops by an extra 9% in the presence of the underspending
mechanism (instead of 4% in the main calibration). This picture is confirmed when looking at
industries 1 and 2 output and contributions to final production. All these quantities drop more
when the elasticity of labour supply is higher.
In order to assess the dynamic effects of the nature of the input-output network, I present the
impulse responses of both the benchmark and the main model to an unexpected productivity
shock affecting a single industry, assuming an economy with two industries connected through
108
a star network (n = 2 and wi1 = 1, wi2 = 0 for i = 1, 2 and θ1 = θ2 = 1/2.).
11 A 4.24× standard
deviations negative shock is assumed to affect the industry that produces all intermediary goods
in the economy (industry 1 or the source industry), and productivity is assumed to remain stable
in the sink industry (industry 2). The impulse responses of the model aggregate and industry-
specific variables are presented in figures 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12. As in the fully connected network
case, the size of the productivity shock to industry 1 is calibrated to imply an 8% drop in
output. Let us first note that, in the context of the star network, the size of the source industry
productivity shock required to achieve an 8% drop of output in the benchmark model is smaller
than the size of the single industry shock required when a fully connected network describes
inter-industry relations as above. This is in line with the theoretical results of section 3.4.
Assuming a star network and a smaller shock to industry 1, the response of aggregate variables
is strikingly similar to the response in the case of a fully connected network. A different
picture emerges when considering the impulse responses of each industry, as the asymmetry
of the star network causes a differentiated behaviour across industries (figures 3.11 and 3.12).
Because, under the star network, the sink industry output is solely used as input in the final
production process and is not used as input by the source industry, the drop in the sink industry
output is matched by the drop of the same industry’s contribution to final production. Lower
spending in the source industry affects its output through the direct labour supply channel.
The decrease in the source industry output due to underspending increases the production
costs of the sink industry, pushing its output lower. This means that industry 2 suffers from
its own underspending, through the direct labour supply channel and from underspending in
the source industry through the intermediate input cost channel. As a result, underspending
reduces output more in the sink industry than in the source industry.
Finally, I present the impulse responses of the model’s aggregate variables following a posi-
tive monetary shock (figure 3.13). The price of the final good increases immediately after the
positive monetary shock (inflation effect). The inflation of the final good price decreases real
wages and causes the labour supply to drop lower. The lower labour supply causes lower out-
11In the case of two industries (n = 2), the star network coincides with the vertical network.
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put, consumption and investment. The increase in the money stock is directed to improve the
loan supply. This assumption regarding the use of new money means that aggregate financing
increases following the positive monetary shock. Following the higher financing levels, it takes
one time period for spending to increase, thus increasing real wages and labour supply. The
delayed higher labour supply increase causes a delayed positive reaction of output, consump-
tion and investment (liquidity effect). While the surprise positive monetary shock can cause a
surprise drop in nominal output, the unexpected drop is too low to cause firms’ underspending.
This implies that the reaction of the aggregate variables in the main model is identical to the
reaction in the benchmark model.
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Figure 3.4: Aggregate variables’ impulse response functions to a negative productivity shock in industry 1
(−4 ×
√
2 standard deviation) in the main calibration. All variables’ responses are presented in a logarithmic
form and as a deviation from the steady-state.
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Figure 3.5: Industry 1 variables’ impulse response functions to a negative productivity shock in the same
industry (−4
√
2× standard deviation), assuming the main calibration. All variables’ responses are presented
in a logarithmic form, and as a deviation from the steady-state, with the exception of underspending that is
presented without any transformation.
Figure 3.6: Industry 2 variables’ impulse response functions to a negative productivity shock in the industry
1 (−4
√
2× standard deviation), assuming the main calibration. All variables’ responses are presented in a
logarithmic form, and as a deviation from the steady-state, with the exception of underspending that is presented
without any transformation.
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Figure 3.7: Aggregate variables’ impulse response functions to a negative productivity shock in industry 1
(−4 ×
√
2 standard deviation), assuming higher Frisch elasticity of labour (η = 0.1). All variables’ responses
are presented in a logarithmic form and as a deviation from the steady-state.
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Figure 3.8: Industry 1 variables’ impulse response functions to a negative productivity shock in the same
industry (−4
√
2× standard deviation), assuming higher Frisch elasticity of labour (η = 0.1). All variables’
responses are presented in a logarithmic form, and as a deviation from the steady-state, with the exception of
underspending that is presented without any transformation.
Figure 3.9: Industry 2 variables’ impulse response functions to a negative productivity shock in industry 1
(−4
√
2× standard deviation), assuming higher Frisch elasticity of labour (η = 0.1). All variables’ responses are
presented in a logarithmic form, and as a deviation from the steady-state, with the exception of underspending
that is presented without any transformation.
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Figure 3.10: Aggregate variables’ impulse response functions to a negative productivity shock in industry 1
(−4.24× standard deviation), assuming a star network. All variables’ responses are presented in a logarithmic
form, and as a deviation from the steady-state.
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Figure 3.11: Industry 1 variables’ impulse response functions to a negative productivity shock in the same
industry (−4.24× standard deviation), assuming a star network. All variables’ responses are presented in
a logarithmic form, and as a deviation from the steady-state, with the exception of underspending, that is
presented without any transformation.
Figure 3.12: Industry 2 variables’ impulse response functions to a negative productivity shock in industry 1
(−4.24× standard deviation), assuming a star network. All variables’ responses are presented in a logarithmic
form, and as a deviation from the steady-state, with the exception of underspending, that is presented without
any transformation.
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Figure 3.13: Impulse response functions aggregate variables in the main and benchmark models following a
positive shock (1 standard deviation) to the process xM driving money supply, assuming the main calibration.
All variables’ responses are presented in a logarithmic form and as a deviation from the steady-state.
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3.6 Concluding remarks
I consider firm’s underspending in a multi-industry setup where firms are linked through input-
output relationships and where idiosyncratic industry-specific shocks drive aggregate fluctu-
ations. I show that a negative productivity shock originating in a subset of industries can
propagate through intermediary input channels and make other industries enter a low spending
mode where they spend less than the cash previously earmarked for production. These inter-
mediary input channels are key to the functioning of the multi-industry version of the model
and provide a potential additional explanation to how crises propagate across industries.
The model’s mechanism does not necessarily become irrelevant as the number of industries
in the economy grows large. On the contrary, I show that under some assumptions on the
nature of the input-output relationships, the likelihood of the mechanism operating remains
stable even when the production sector includes a large number of industries. The nature
of the input-output production network is key to the aggregation of the model’s mechanism:
a production network where a small number of industries provide most of the intermediary
input in the economy will maintain the model’s mechanism irrespective of the degree of in-
dustrial diversification. This is in line with the literature on the network origins of aggregate
fluctuations.
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3.A Technical appendix: multiple industries’ model
3.A.1 Multiple industries model theoretical results: proofs
Assume that the first m industries have non binding investment constraints, while the investment
constraint binds in the remaining n−m industries. Then, using equation 3.2.31, the invested capital









for i = m+ 1, ..., n. (3.A.2)




pi,txj,i,t + pi,tyi,t. (3.A.3)
Replace using the intermediate producers’ and the final producer first order condition for intermediate









where yNt := ptyt denotes the nominal output in the modelled economy. The technology function






Combining 3.A.1 and 3.A.5 yields a linear relationship between firm revenues and expenditure for




ζi,t for i = 1, ...,m (3.A.6)
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Now combine 3.A.6 with 3.A.4 to get an equation implying the levels of invested capital in the industries























where, if X := (xi,j), we define Xp:q,r:s := (xi,j)p≤i≤q,r≤j≤s, Lm :=
{
Im,m − αIW ′1:m,1:m
}−1
and the
remaining matrix notations are as above. At this stage, one needs to justify the matrix inversion in
the above formula. The matrix αIW
′
1:m,1:m is non-negative and the sum of its columns is lower than
one, the Perron-Frobenius theorem guarantees that all its left eigenvalues are less than 1 in modulus.









This completes the proof of proposition 1. Proposition 2 follows immediately from proposition 1 and
the model’s first order conditions.
Once the expenditure within each industry is determined, one can use equation 3.A.4 to determine




W ′Zt + y
N (t)Θ (3.A.10)
and then use equation 3.A.5 to determine the ratios
pi,t
κi,t
in a logarithmic form
p̃i,t − κ̃i,t = ˜revi,t − ui,t − αζ̃i,t (3.A.11)
Using the the expression for the production costs κi, one can write the log-linear system above as
follows












1n,1 + ˜REV (t)− αZ̃(t)− U(t), (3.A.12)
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where A := (ai) is a constant vector and ai := αI α̃−αI α̃I−αI
∑n
j=1wijw̃ij . Replace using the capital
and labour first order conditions from the intermediate producer spending problem
(In,n − αIW )P̃ (t) = A+
[
(αK + αL)ζ̃t − αK k̃t−1 − αL l̃t
]
1n,1 + ˜REV (t)− αZ̃(t)− U(t). (3.A.13)
This is the first result of proposition 3. Noting that p̃t = Θ
′P̃t, one can write the final good price












where ut := (L Θ)′Ut. This concludes the proof for all the expressions in proposition 3.
3.A.2 Stead state
The following proposition provides several equations determining the model equilibrium in the steady-
state.
Proposition 7. Under the model closing assumption 2, the steady-state equilibrium of the model
exists, is unique and the steady-state variables are determined by the following system of equations





r̄K = 1/β + δ − 1. (3.A.16)
• The overall financing ι is determined as a function of the steady state deposit rate and the
steady-state nominal output
ῑ =
α(1 + xM )ȳN + r̄xM
r̄ − αI
. (3.A.17)
• The financing rate is derived from the overall spending
r̄F = r̄(1− xM/ῑ). (3.A.18)
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• The aggregate ζ̄ := ζ̄1 + ...+ ζ̄n spending is given by
ζ̄ = ῑ/(1 + xM ) (3.A.19)
• The steady state consumption spending is












• The households’ deposits are derived from the overall firms’ financing
b̄ = ῑ− xM . (3.A.22)













where In,n is the square identity matrix with n rows and n columns.









α(1 + xM )
Ī . (3.A.25)
• The steady-state final good price is given by





























• The logarithm of steady-state good prices are expressed as a function of steady-state nominal
output and expenditure as follows




(αK + αL)ζ̃ − αK k̃ − αL l̃
]
1n,1 + ˜REV − αZ̃
}
, (3.A.28)
where the superscript .̃ is used for logarithmic values and A is defined as above.







• the steady-state final use of each good






















+ b̄ = 1. (3.A.32)
Proof. The steady-state version of the Euler equation yields
r̄ = 1/β. (3.A.33)
In the absence of unforeseen negative productivity shocks, the financing constraints hold in the
steady state: ζ̄i = ῑi/(1 + x
M ). Under assumption 2 one can rewrite the investment equations in the
steady-state as follows
r̄F ῑi = α(1 + x
M )p̄ix̄i, (3.A.34)
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W ′ is a non-negative matrix with column sums less than one, the Perron-Frobenius theorem
guarantees that all its left eigenvalues are less than 1 in modulus. This implies that In,n − αIr̄FW
′ is












Note here that θ ≥ 0 and (In,n−(αI/r̄F )W ′)−1 =
∑∞
k=0((αI/r̄
F )W ′)k > 0 guarantee that Ī ≥ 0. More
precisely, the industry financing levels ιi are non-negative, and as long as θi > 0 or there exist j and
q ∈ N∗ such as θj > 0 and the (i, j) element of the matrix W q is non nil, then ζ̄i = ῑi/(1 + xM ) > 0.
In other terms, a portion of the available financing is dedicated to an industry as long as its produce
is directly used in final production or if its produce is used directly or indirectly by another industry
which produce is used in final production. Notice that the columns of the matrix W ′ and the elements












The overall spending can then be deduced from the vector formula for Ī
r̄F ῑ− αI ῑ = α(1 + xM )ȳN . (3.A.39)
The financing rate is derived from the overall spending by combining the banks’ zero-profit (r̄F ῑ =
r̄b̄) condition and the clearing of the loan market condition (b̄ = ῑ− xM )
r̄F ῑ = r̄(ῑ− xM ). (3.A.40)
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Combine the later equation with 3.A.39 to find
ῑ =
α(1 + xM )ȳN + r̄xM
r̄ − αI
. (3.A.41)
Combine the capital first order condition p̄r̄K k̄ = αKα ζ̄ with the final good clearing condition c̄
N =
ȳN − δ̄p̄k̄ to obtain an expression for consumption spending






















Â+ ˜REV − αZ̃
]
, (3.A.43)
and replace for k̃ using the intermediate producers capital first order condition p̄r̄K k̄ = αKα ζ̄




























The equation 3.A.31 is derived from the household’s first order condition for money holding 3.2.7. The
equation 3.A.32, determining the steady-state consumer spending is derived from the money clearing
equation. 
Clearly, the above proposition provides a way to determine all steady-state variables as a function
of the model parameters and steady-state nominal output ȳN . In turn, the steady-state nominal
output ȳN is determined by solving equation 3.A.32. The proposition below is useful in establishing
the aggregation results of section 3.4.
Proposition 8. Assume ν = 1. Then all steady-state variables with the exception of the final good
price p̄ the intermediate good prices p̄i, and the industry spending and financing levels ζ̄i and ῑi are
independent of the number of industries n.
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Proof. Note that when ν = 1, equation 3.A.32 does not involve the price term p̄. Besides ȳN , the
remaining variables in equation 3.A.32 are expressed in proposition 3.A.2 as a function of ȳN and a
subset of model parameters that excludes the number of industries n. This implies that ȳN is not
impacted by the parameter n. The independence of other steady-state variables excluding p̄, ῑi and ζ̄i
of the number of industries n follows immediately from proposition 3.A.2. 
3.A.3 The effect of input/output relationships: proofs
Proof of proposition 5


























































while condition 3.A.47 can be rewritten using 3.A.8 as
α(1 + xMt−1)y
N
t LmΘ ≤ I1:m,t−1 − αILmW ′1:m,m+1:nIm+1:n,t−1. (3.A.49)
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Proof of proposition 6
In the case where the spending constraints are not binding, rewrite equation 3.A.8 for m = n:
Z(t) = αyNt T (3.A.50)
where as defined above T := L Θ. All industry constraints would be non binding if Z(t) ≤ It−1/(1 +









where the constants τi are defined as (τ1, ..., τn)
′ := T . These constants are non-negative because the
Leontief matrix is positive and the vector Θ is non negative. This proves the first characterisation of
proposition 6.






















where (γ1,t−1, ..., γn,t−1)
′ := Γt−1Θ. This is the second characterisation of proposition 6.
3.B Numerical procedures
The results of section 3.3 can be used to provide a simulation procedure as detailed the algorithm
1. The algorithm requires linearisation of the model when the spending constraints of all industries
are binding. This is realised using Dynare with a second order approximation, taking the model
equations in 3.B.1. Note how the model equations imply that the aggregate variables are driven by
the fluctuations of aggregate log-productivity ut =
∑n
i=1 τiui,t and does not depend on the distribution
of productivity shocks across industries.
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3.B.1 Constrained spending model equations
































(1− δ + rKt+1), (3.B.7)
ιt(r
F
t − αI) = α(1 + xMt )Etpt+1yt+1, (3.B.8)
rFt ιt = rtbt, (3.B.9)








t + bt = 1, (3.B.12)
ut = ρut−1 + σ
uet, and et is i.i.d and N(0, 1). (3.B.13)

















Â+ ˜REVt − αZ̃t
]
− ut, (3.B.14)












Algorithm 1. 1. Through linearising a version of the model where the spending constraints are
always binding, compute the policy functions giving the next period’s nominal output yN,Ct+1 , con-
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sumption spending cN,Ct+1 , capital rent costs r
K,C






t , kt, ut, x
M






t , kt, ut, x
M






t , kt, ut, x
M
t ; et+1, e
M
t+1), (3.B.17)
cCt+1 = C (ιt, r
F
t , kt, ut, x
M
t ; et+1, e
M
t+1). (3.B.18)
2. Given ιt−1 and r
F
















3. Assume a certain subset of industries where spending is not constrained, that we note i = 1, ...,m.
4. Assume some values for yNt and c
N
t respectively.
5. Given the assumed value of yNt compute the industries’ spending using 3.3.2 then the industry
















W ′Zt + y
N
t Θ. (3.B.23)
6. Given the calculated industry revenues REVt and spendings Zt, and the assumed consumption


























(α̃L − α̃− χ̃+ ζ̃t − c̃Nt ). (3.B.25)






(αK + αL)ζ̃t − αK k̃t−1 − αL l̃t
]
1n,1 + ˜REV t − αZ̃t − Ut
}
. (3.B.26)
9. Given the final good price pt and the previously accumulated capital kt−1 compute the rent on







10. Compute the new accumulated capital through the final good clearing condition given the assumed
values of yNt and c
N
t
kt = (1− δ)kt−1 +
1
pt
(yNt − cNt ). (3.B.28)
11. Solve the system composed of the two equations below to determine the values of aggregate














CN (ιt, rFt , kt, ut, x
M






The first equation of this system is derived from 3.3.17 by replacing the term yNt+1 using the
function Y N . The second equation is the result of plugging the loans market clearing condition
and the household’s deposits’ Euler equation into the banks’ zero-profit condition, and replacing
the term cNt+1 using the policy function C
N .








with (γ1,t, ..., γn,t)
′ =
(




13. Given the values of ιt and r
F
t , compute deposits bt and the deposit rate rt




14. Given the calculated value of rt, pt and c
N













15. Compute the following error term based on the money clearing equation and the capital’s Euler
first order condition
Err1 = ptm
H + bt − 1. (3.B.36)
Err2 = βctEt
1




1− δ + RK(ιt, rFt , kt, ut+1, xMt+1)
}
− 1. (3.B.37)
16. Vary the values of yNt and c
N
t so that the error terms Err1 and Err2 are small enough.
17. Check that the marginal return on spending is smaller than one for industries i = 1, ...,m and
greater than one for industries i = m+ 1, ..., n.
18. Vary the assumed set of unconstrained industries till the marginal return on spending conditions
in the previous step are verified.
3.B.3 Numerical tests
The main approximation in algorithm 1 concerns the use of perturbation methods to obtain policy
function used to model the behaviour of several next period variables. To test this approximation, I
study the impulse responses of a version of the model where spending is always constrained, assuming
the main calibration described in section 3.5. The variables studied are the ones for which approxima-
tion policy functions are obtained through Dynare. These are nominal output, nominal consumption,
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capital costs and (real) consumption. I compare the results obtained using the exact solutions for to-
day’s variables provided in algorithm 1 to those emanating from the policy functions approximations.
The size of the aggregate shock corresponds to the one implied by the industry shocks in section 3.5.
Given that the steady-state is the same for both models, results are presented in log form and as a
deviation from the steady-state. The results are presented in figure 3.14 and show negligible differences
for nominal output, nominal consumption and capital costs and a slight difference for consumption
(of the order of 0.1%).
Figure 3.14: Impulse response functions to a negative aggregate productivity shock (−4× standard deviations)
of a version of the model assuming that financing constraints are always binding (main calibration). The
continuous lines represent results obtained using the numerical method suggested studied in the appendix, and
the dashed lines represent Dynare results. All variables’ responses are presented in a logarithmic form and as
a deviation from the steady-state.
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Chapter 4
Investment Opportunity Indicators and
Investors’ Rewards
4.1 Introduction
This chapter is an empirical study of the relationship between the firm’s investment opportunity
indicators and the cash rewards received by investors holding ordinary shares of the firm. I
consider three investment opportunity indicators. First, there is the actual investment expense
scaled by the firm’s previous assets’ value. This ratio provides a measure of the firm’s current
investment activities and is therefore indicative of the firm’s inclination to invest and the
investment opportunity it faces. Secondly, I consider the market to book ratio, defined as
the market capitalisation divided by the firm’s previous period assets’ value. The higher the
firm’s market valuation for a given level of assets, the more market participants value the firm’s
growth potential. Finally, it is natural to assume that more productive firms dispose of more
growth opportunities. I, therefore, consider the firm’s ability to produce, proxied by Total
Factor Productivity (TFP), as a third growth indicator. These growth indicators are used to
predict future cash rewards received by ordinary shareholders in the form of dividends and
shares buybacks.
The results of this chapter can be used as an empirical foundation for the main mechanism of
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the models studied in chapters 2 and 3. This mechanism assumes that firms finance production
before using the funds raised to pay for production costs. If the firm’s productivity unexpectedly
drops between the financing stage and the spending stage, the firm’s management can choose
to cancel some of its spending plans made at the financing stage and return a portion of the
cash raised to investors without investing it in the production process. To provide an empirical
foundation for such a mechanism, one would ideally need a way to measure changes in the
spending intentions of firms, associate these changes of intention with an increase of the cash
diverted towards shareholders and link this process to a worsening in the firm’s productivity.
The data available to me does not provide a way to measure such changes in the firm’s spending
intentions. In place of measuring changes in the firms’ spending intentions, I focus on changes
to the cash they divert towards investors. I construct a measure of the overall cash diverted
towards shareholders that includes both dividends and share buybacks (”Distributed Cash”). I
then document the marginal effect of productivity and other growth indicators on the propensity
to divert cash towards shareholders using cross-sectional logit regressions repeated for every year
of the studied sample period. I assume that an increase in shareholder payout beyond what can
be explained by the relevant firm’s characteristics and cash flow figures signals a reduction in the
firm appetite towards spending. Thus, an inverse marginal relationship between productivity
and ”Distributed Cash” is an indication of a positive marginal relationship between productivity
and production spending. To confirm and strengthen the results from the cross-sectional logit
regressions, I run a fixed effect panel data regression explaining the size of the payout made by
firms choosing to distribute some cash towards shareholders.
I build on the work of Fama and French (2001) who consider the reasons behind the decline
in the proportion of public firms paying dividends in the period spanning 1978 to 1999 and the
work of Grullon and Michaely (2004) on the information content of share repurchase programs.
I also build on the work of Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014) that provides evidence regarding the
link between firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) and future stock returns. In particular,
I use a similar definition of productivity as the one used in Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014), the
repeated logit regressions in section 4.3.2 are inspired by Fama and French (2001). Furthermore,
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I follow the methodologies in Grullon and Michaely (2004) and Fama and French (2001) to
extract share buybacks from the available data.
I find that firms with low productivity are more likely to divert cash towards shareholders
and that, among the set of firms choosing to reward investors, the amount diverted is higher for
firms with lower productivity. This is in line with the existing corporate finance literature and
provides further confirmation to the Jensen (1986) free cash-flow assumption stipulating that
firms tend to increase their cash payouts in response to a deterioration in the set of investment
opportunities they face.
Related Literature.— The empirical study in this chapter builds on the existing finance
literature concerned with explaining the levels of cash distributed by firms towards shareholders.
These cash distributions take two important forms: dividends and share buybacks. Jensen
(1986) argues that, when the firm is facing less attractive investment opportunities, a conflict
of interest arises between shareholders and managers, with the latter having an incentive to keep
more resources under their control and thus not distributing free cash flows. Share repurchases
in this context can work as a way to reassure markets about this potential conflict of interests.
Grullon and Michaely (2004) find that repurchasing firms reduce their current levels of capital
expenditures and research and development expenses and that their cash balances significantly
decline. This corroborates the deterioration of the investment opportunities hypothesis. They
also find that, contrary to what is suggested by the signalling hypothesis, the markets do not
always react positively to the announcement of share repurchases, as market participants are
not always aware of the reduction of investments opportunities available to the firm before
the share buyback programme is announced. Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson (2006) show that
there is a strong discontinuity in the probability of accretive share repurchases around the
consensus earnings per share (EPS) expected by financial analysts. Firms that would have
narrowly missed the analysts’ consensus EPS are much more likely to increase their share
repurchase activity with the goal of positively affecting their EPS and meeting the consensus
than those who narrowly beat the consensus EPS. Almeida, Fos, and Kronlund (2016) exploit
this discontinuity to show that EPS-motivated share buybacks are associated with reductions in
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employment and investments. Fama and French (2001) focus on the more usual way chosen by
firms to divert cash towards shareholders: dividends. They study the decline in the distribution
of dividends by publicly traded firms in the last 20 years of the twentieth century and relate
the said decline to many contributing factors, including a change in the characteristics of public
firms (firms go public earlier in their development process) and the emergence of competing ways
to pay shareholders (mainly share buybacks). The authors also document an empirical inverse
relationship between the firms’ propensity to pay dividends and the investment opportunity it
faces. Since the early 80s, share repurchases make a significant part of the cash flows directed
by firms towards investors. I, therefore, construct an index combining both dividends and cash
repurchases to account for all cash flows directed towards equity investors as opposed to those
being invested in the production processes. This follows the literature concerned with the total
cash flow distributed by firms to equity investors. Bagwell and Shoven (1989) give an early
account of the increasing roles of share redistribution and take-overs as ways to distribute cash
from firms towards equity investors and suggest that yields of return on equity investments
should account for these ways of cash distribution. Robertson and Wright (2006) construct a
total cash flow index that takes into account dividends, share repurchases and net share issues
and use the constructed index to predict stock returns. Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014) use total
factor productivity (TFP) to predict equity returns and show that while TFP underperforms
other indicators such as the market to book ratio in predicting equity returns, low productivity
firms earn a significant premium over high productivity firms in the following year. In this
paper, I use various firm indicators to explain the propensity of firms to divert cash towards
shareholders. Following existing literature, these indicators include investments in capital,
research and development and employment. In this regard, my results further validate the idea
that firms react to lower investment opportunities by diverting cash towards shareholders. To
provide an empirical foundation to the mechanism presented in this paper, I show that besides
the investment indicators, total factor productivity helps predict the levels of cash diverted to
equity investors. To this effect, I present evidence from repeated cross-sectional logit regressions
documenting the propensity of firms to pay shareholders. Additionally, I present dynamic panel
CHAPTER 4. 137
data regressions explaining the size of the payout when the firm decides to pay.
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Cash Distributed to Equity Holders
Firms can divert cash towards shareholders in different manners. The method chosen depends,
among other things, on the intended recipients, the aim behind the distribution and its tax
implications. Namely, firms distribute cash to ordinary equity holders through three important
channels:
• Dividends are the most common way for a firm to distribute cash to shareholders. They
are subject to corporate taxation and to taxes on revenue. Dividends are typically paid in
a periodic fashion. This implies that starting to pay dividends or increasing their amount
creates an expectation of such behaviour continuing in the future.
• Firms can decide to buy back their own shares (Share Buybacks). This can happen
through fixed price tender offers and since 1982 mostly through open market operations.1
After selling all or part of their shares, ordinary equity holders are subject to taxes on
capital gains. Capital gains tax rates are typically lower than revenue tax rates, they
exclude the cost at which the shares were bought and can be netted against capital losses
from other investments by the seller. Share repurchases are therefore at a significant
advantage relative to dividends from a tax perspective.
• Firms can also distribute cash towards equity holders through cash financed mergers
and acquisitions. I will not focus on this particular channel for two reasons. First,
when firms buy shares of other companies during a merger and acquisition process, they
are typically paying the shareholders of other companies. More importantly, using cash
1The 10b-18 rule of 1982 provides guarantees to the firms willing to repurchased their own stock that they
would not be in breach of stock manipulation rules if they adhere to certain conditions (Safe Harbor conditions)
regarding the manner, timing, price and size of the repurchase. This regulation and others implemented around
the same time period simplified the execution of share buybacks and limited the legal liability facing the
repurchasing firm.
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to finance the acquisition of another company can be considered as a form of investment
in the physical, human and intangible capital of the acquired company.
Following the more lenient 1982 regulations, share buybacks have emerged in the mid 1980s as
a major way to compensate equity holders beside dividend payments. The left panel of figure
4.1 illustrates this trend and shows the evolution of the average yearly share repurchases versus
the annual dividends over time in the sample provided by Compustat for firms based in the
United States. The right panel of figure 4.1 also shows that from the early 1970s a significant
number of firms chose to buy their own stock back while not distributing dividends. Taking
into consideration both dividends and share buybacks is therefore important when studying
how firms decide to divert cash towards shareholders. One can hardly interpret a merger and
acquision as a signal that the acquiring company is motivated by a need to reduce investment
to a lower levels than previously intended.
Figure 4.1: Evolution over time of the average amount distributed through dividends and share buybacks
in log format by U.S. firms covered by Compustat (left). Proportion of Compustat U.S. firms with positive
cash return to equity holders through: dividends only, share buybacks only and a combination of the dividend
and share buybacks (right). Grey areas indicate NBER recession periods. Appendix 4.A.1 explains how share
buybacks are derived and other data treatments.
4.2.2 Data description
I try to explain three figures representing the cash diverted by the firm to the ordinary share-
holders: dividends, share repurchases and ”Distributed Cash” defined as the sum of both divi-
dends and share buybacks. The ”Distributed Cash” is a measure of the overall cash diverted to
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common shareholders. The cost to the company is different and depends on the tax treatment
of dividends and share buybacks. A number of firm’s characteristics and financial indicators
are used in order to explain the flow of funds towards ordinary shareholders. Three stand out
as reflecting the firm’s appetite for growth. These are productivity, investment expenses and
the market to book ratio. High investment expenses are a direct indication that the firm is in a
growth mode while a high market to book ratio can reflect a view by market participants that
the firm has a high potential for growth. Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is used as a proxy
for the firm’s efficiency of production and is typically high for growth firms.2 TFP is obtained





where g is value added by the firm, the firm-level capital stock k is given by gross plant, property
and equipment (PPEGT) and the stock of labour l is given by the number of employees. In
order to remove industry specific TFP effects, the firm level log TFP is corrected by removing
2 digits yearly industry averages. Investment expenses include investment in capital (CAPEX)
and in research and development (R&D). The market to book ratio is defined as the market
value of ordinary equity divided by the previous period’s assets’ value.3
I control for a number of firm level characteristics and cash-flow figures. These include size
related controls, namely, the firm’s asset value and market capitalisation. I also control for
net income as an indicator of the firm’s profitability. High levels of cash and cash equivalent
assets may indicate the presence of idle financial resources, providing a motivation for the firm
to reward shareholders. I therefore include a measure of cash and cash equivalent assets to the
set of control variables. The number of employees is also included as it both serves as a size
indicator and an indicator of the firm’s wiliness to hire.
I use Compustat US data to get or derive all the firm level variables of interest.4 Following
2See Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014).
3Another definition of the market to book ratio is the market value of the firm divided by its book value.
Adopting this definition restricts the size of the sample significantly as the book value data is only available for
a small protion of firms.
4The cost of labour data is obtained by multiplying the Compustat number of employees by the average
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existing corporate finance literature, utilities and financial industry firms are removed from the
sample as these companies are subject to specific regulations that impact dividends’ distribu-
tion. To avoid outliers, firms with no assets are also excluded. Share repurchases are defined,
following Fama and French (2001), as the increase in Treasury stock if the Treasury stock is
not missing. Following Almeida, Fos, and Kronlund (2016), if the Treasury stock is missing in
the current or prior year, share repurchases are measured as the difference between stock pur-
chases and stock issuances using the cash flow statements. If either measures is negative, share
repurchases are set to zero for the corresponding period. This data treatment is maintained for
the rest of this chapter.
Many of the studied firm characteristics and financial data vary in magnitude for a single
firm throughout the firm’s life cycle and between firms of various sizes for a given year. With-
out any scaling, big firms would influence the regressions’ results more than small firms and
later periods of the sample would influence the results more than earlier periods due to the
combined effects of inflation and capital accumulation. In order to correct for these effects, I
scale all of the variables, except for the market to book ratio that does not require scaling and
the assets’ value that I keep as an unscaled measure of the size of the firm. Debt, cash holdings,
net income, CAPEX, R&D investments, the number of employees and TFP are divided by the
value of the previous period’s assets.5 The market capitalisation, is replaced by its percentile
equivalent.6 Dividends, share buybacks and the distributed cash are divided by the previous
market capitalisation. All variables, except for the market capitalisation percentile, are Win-
sorised at the 1% level to correct for the outliers’ effect. Appendix 4.A.1 provides more details
about the definition of the derived variables as well as a summary of the transformation applied
to the data.
wages from the Social Security Administration. As explained in appendix 4.A.1, the cost of labour is useful in
the derivation of the firm level value added.
5These scaling choices are, to a large extent, inspired by Fama and French (2001).
6By percentile form of a variable Xt, I mean the transformation Percentile
X
t (x) = 100 ×
number of observations satisfying Xt<x
number of observations at time t .
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4.3 Empirical evidence
4.3.1 Growth indicators and firms’ payouts
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics of the distributed cash to market capitalisation ratios
for observations sorted using the growth indicators described in section 4.2. For every fiscal
year, I calculate the deciles of all growth indicators and divide the firms in every year in groups
delimited by two consecutive deciles. I then calculate the average cash returned for each of
the defined groups of observations over the period between 1980 and 2013. The results show
a tendency for the average payout ratios to be lower for higher deciles of Market to Book,
TFP, CAPEX and R&D spending. This relationship is strongest for the Market to Book decile
groups where the average cash returned to market capitalisation ratio monotonically decreases
from lower to higher deciles. The average cash distributed to market capitalisation in the 90%-
100% market to book decile is 0.47%. It is much higher in the 0%-10% decile at 40.9%. A
similar pattern is observed when considering TFP decile groups. The average cash distributed
to market capitalisation ratio for 0%-10% TFP decile is 31.0% while it stands at 1.34% for
the highest TFP decile. The relationship between TFP and the distributed cash to market
capitalisation ratio is mostly decreasing, with the monotony being broken only for the 50%-
60% and 60%-70% deciles. The lowest decile in terms of CAPEX spending has an average
distributed cash to market capitalisation ratio of 4.15% while the highest decile has an average
payout ratio of 1.48%. While there is no clear decreasing behaviour of the distributed cash
to market capitalisation ratio with relation to CAPEX deciles, the average payout to market
capitalisation ratio is smallest for the 90%-100% decile. R&D spending implied deciles display
a similar behaviour to the CAPEX implied deciles, with the average distributed cash to market
capitalisation being lowest for the 90%-100% decile at 0.26%.
Given that the market capitalisation appears in the nominator of the definition of the
market of book ratio and in the denominator of the distributed cash to market capitalisation
ratio, the results for the market to book deciles may appear harder to interpret. However, TFP
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decile groups display a similar behaviour to the market to book deciles’ groups while market
capitalisation play no role in the definition of TFP. In addition, the strong relationship between
the market to book ratio and the distributed cash is confirmed by the results of logit regressions
presented in the next subsection.
Percentile Distributed Cash / Market Cap. - Average
% Mkt to Book Decile TFP Decile CAPEX Decile R&D Decile
0-10 0.4090 0.3198 0.0415 0.0253
10-20 0.0336 0.1160 0.0577 0.0721
20-30 0.0309 0.0484 0.0355 0.0512
30-40 0.0287 0.0306 0.0476 0.2224
40-50 0.0256 0.0258 0.0782 0.0497
50-60 0.0231 0.0583 0.0761 0.0256
60-70 0.0194 0.0311 0.0686 0.0718
70-80 0.0158 0.0189 0.0727 0.0140
80-90 0.0110 0.0148 0.1108 0.0084
90-100 0.0047 0.0134 0.0148 0.0026
Table 4.1: Average cash distributed to market capiatlisation ratio by growth indicator decile buckets. Growth
Indicator decile cutt-off points are recomputed for every year of the sample period. The growth indicators are
defined, scaled and transformed as described in section 4.2.2. Data from 1980 to 2013.
4.3.2 Firm’s propensity to pay: evidence from repeated cross-sectional
logit regressions
In order to explain the decision of the firm’s management to payback investors, I run a series
of cross-section logit regressions repeated for every fiscal year between 1980 and 2013, where
the dependent variable is the ”Distributed Cash” and the explanatory variables of interest are
lagged indicators for the firm’s appetite to grow: TFP, market to book ratio and the investment
expenses (CAPEX and R&D). To avoid competing effects between these growth indicators,
separate regressions are run to get the respective marginal effect of TFP, market to book ratio
and the combined effects of CAPEX and R&D expenditures. In addition, I run regressions
including all the growth indicators to assess their combined effects. The market capitalisation
percentile, assets, cash and cash equivalents, net income, debt and number of employees are
used as lagged controls in all the regressions. Two digit industry dummies are also included
in the regressions to account for industry related effects. The repeated logit regressions can be
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described by the equation
yt = βx,txt−1 + βz,tzt−1 + industry dummies, (4.3.1)
where yt is the ”distributed cash” variable, xt−1 denotes the lagged growth indicators of interest,









[TFP, Market/Book, CAPEX, R&D],
zt−1 = [Market Capitalisation, Assets, Cash, Net Income, Debt, Employees].
Figure 4.2 reports the estimated coefficients βx,t of the growth indicators and the corre-
sponding 95% confidence intervals for the logit regression 4.3.1, repeated for every year from
1980 to 2013. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 provide the same coefficients and confidence intervals over the
same time period when the regression 4.3.1 is used to explain dividends and share buybacks,
respectively.
Firms with high growth indicators are less likely to divert cash towards investors, the effects
being both economically and statistically significant.7 Firms with higher market/book, CAPEX
and R&D investments have a lower propensity to reward shareholders. This is consistent with
Fama and French (2001) who find that firms with high investment opportunities as reflected
by high asset growth rates and high market to book ratios are less likely to pay dividends. The
results presented here confirm these findings when including share buybacks in the measure of
7See appendix 4.A.2 for means and standard deviations of the growth indicators.
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cash diverted towards equity holders. Although TFP has a statistically weaker marginal effect
when compared to other growth indicators, its effect remains both statistically and economically
significant for most of the studied period.8 Lower TFP leads to higher propensity to divert
cash towards shareholders, thus providing an empirical justification to the model in chapter 2.
When simultaneously including all the growth indicators in the regressions, the effects of
the market to book ratio and R&D dominate the effects of other growth indicators (figure
4.3). The marginal effects of CAPEX and TFP remain negative for most of the studied period
but lose their statistical significance in most years. This is consistent with Imrohoroglu and
Tuzel (2014) who find that firms with low TFP have significantly higher equity returns in the
following year but that the TFP effect is not significant when other predictors, such as the
market to book ratio, are used alongside TFP to predict equity returns.
The separate marginal effects of the growth indicators on dividends and share buybacks
are shown in figures 4.4 and 4.5. The results indicate that firms with lower TFP are more
likely to pay dividends and are more likely to buy their own shares back with this effect being
more pronounced in the case of dividends payments than in the case of shares buybacks. In
addition, the market to book ratio and R&D spending effects are maintained when considering
the propensity to pay dividends and repurchase shares separately. Firms with lower market to
book ratio are more inclined to pay dividend and buy their shares back and the same applies
for firms with low R&D spending. The magnitude of both the market to book effect and the
R&D effects is stronger when explaining the propensity to pay dividends.
The marginal effects of the used controls are presented in appendix 4.A.3. The results
confirm the literature findings with regard to the relationship between some of the firm’s char-
acteristics and the propensity to pay shareholders. Large firms, meaning those with large assets
and high market capitalisation tend to distribute more cash towards equity holders. Further-
more, as one may expect, firms that are burdened by relatively high debt levels are less likely to
pay equity investors, the debt effect being significant for almost every year of the studied time
8TFP underperforms the market to book ratio, possibly because TFP is measured with some noise. For
example, the formula 4.2.1 defining TFP assumes the same exponents for labour and capital for all firms over
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Figure 4.2: Repeated logit cross-section regressions estimates with 95% confidence boundaries corresponding
to the effects of TFP, Market/Book and investment variables (CAPEX and R&D) on the firm’s propensity to
pay shareholders. The logit regressions are repeated for every year from 1980 to 2013. The TFP marginal
effect is estimated without controlling for Market/Book, CAPEX and R&D, The Market/Book marginal effect
is estimated without controlling for TFP, CAPEX and R&D and the CAPEX and R&D effects are estimated
in the same repeated regressions that exclude both TFP and Market/Book. Controls common to all regressions
include: market capitalisation, assets, cash, net income, debt and the number of employees. Grey areas indicate
NBER recession periods.
period. Lastly, the evidence from the logit regressions shows no significant impact of cash on
the propensity to pay. This is not an intuitive result. It is legitimate to suspect that high levels
of cash holdings may indicate a low investment opportunity and therefore incite the firm to pay
equity holders. I propose two possible justifications for the non intuitive cash effect. First, the
static nature of the regressions does not allow for taking into account the firm’s idiosyncratic
need of holding cash. For example, firms may keep hold of relatively high cash amounts because
of a lack of access to capital markets, thus a high cash holding relative to assets might reflect
that the firm is still in an early development stage and has not reached the size where it can
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Figure 4.3: Repeated logit cross-section regressions estimates with 95% confidence boundaries corresponding
to the effects of TFP, Market/Book and investment variables (CAPEX and R&D) on the firm’s propensity to
pay shareholders. The logit regressions are repeated for every year from 1980 to 2013 and they include all the
growth indicators simultaneously. Controls common to all regressions include: market capitalisation, assets,
cash, net income, debt and the number of employees. Grey areas indicate NBER recession periods.
their development are less likely to reward shareholders through cash distributions.9 Moreover,
the absence of dynamic effects of cash holdings makes it harder to interpret the results. In order
to correct for these issues, I run a number of panel data fixed effects regressions explaining the
size of the cash diverted towards shareholders.
4.3.3 Size of payout: evidence from dynamic fixed effects regressions
After considering the propensity of firms to divert any cash at all towards shareholders, I now
turn to the size of the payout, expressed as a fraction of the previous period’s market capitali-
sation. In order to capture the strong persistence of cash distributions and to control for non
9The negative correlation between the cash to asset ratio and the value of the firm’s assets appears to give
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Figure 4.4: Repeated logit cross-section regressions estimates with 95% confidence boundaries corresponding
to the effects of TFP, Market/Book and investment variables (CAPEX and R&D) on the firm’s propensity to
pay shareholders through dividends. The logit regressions are repeated for every year from 1980 to 2013. The
TFP marginal effect is estimated without controlling for Market/Book, CAPEX and R&D, The Market/Book
marginal effect is estimated without controlling for TFP, CAPEX and R&D and the CAPEX and R&D effects
are estimated in the same repeated regressions that exclude both TFP and Market/Book. Controls common
to all regressions include: market capitalisation, assets, cash, net income, debt and the number of employees.
Grey areas indicate NBER recession periods.
time varying firm level characteristics, I exclude observations where no cash has been returned
and run a two-way fixed effect dynamic panel data regression to explain the size of the cash
returned to ordinary equity holders during the period between 1980 and 2013. Similarly to the
static regressions case, each of the main growth indicators are included in a separate regression
to assess its effect in absence of other indicators. I also present the results of a regression includ-
ing all the growth indicators to show which ones maintain a significant effect in the presence
of the others. The size of the overall cash distributed to shareholders is a strongly persistent
process. This requires the inclusion of multiple lagged dependent variables in the regressions.
To deal with the issue of estimating the coefficients of the lagged dependent variables, I exclude
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Figure 4.5: Repeated logit cross-section regressions estimates with 95% confidence boundaries corresponding
to the effects of TFP, Market/Book and investment variables (CAPEX and R&D) on the firm’s propensity to
pay shareholders through share buybacks. The logit regressions are repeated for every year from 1980 to
2013. The TFP marginal effect is estimated without controlling for Market/Book, CAPEX and R&D, The
Market/Book marginal effect is estimated without controlling for TFP, CAPEX and R&D and the CAPEX and
R&D effects are estimated in the same repeated regressions that exclude both TFP and Market/Book. Controls
common to all regressions include: market capitalisation, assets, cash, net income, debt and the number of
employees. Grey areas indicate NBER recession periods.
number of time observations per firm is higher than 20 in all regressions.10 The latter condition
restricts the size of the sample substantially. In order to increase the sample size, I exclude





βiyt−i + βxxt−1 + βzzt−1 + fixed effects + time dummies, (4.3.2)
10See Nickell (1981) and Bruno (2005) for more on the issue of estimating dynamic panel data regressions
with a large number of units and a small number of observations per unit.
11Excluding R&D expenses for the repeated logit regressions does not affect the estimation results in a way
that undermines the conclusion made in subsection 4.3.2.
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where yt is the distributed cash expressed as a fraction of the previous period’s market capital-










and zt−1 are the same controls as in the logit regressions presented in subsection 4.3.2.
The results in table 4.2 confirm the strong persistence of the size of the payout. Furthermore,
all growth indicators have economically and statistically significant effects when other growth
indicators are excluded. The Akaike information criteria show that the market to book ratio
outperforms TFP and CAPEX as a growth indicator. This is confirmed by the results of the
model that uses all growth indicators as explanatory variables (Full Model). In this model, the
market to book ratio is the only growth indicator with a statistically significant coefficient at
the 0.001 confidence level. The dynamic regressions’ results confirm that large firms by assets’
value tend to pay more relative to their market capitalisation with the estimated coefficient
being statistically and economically significant and stable in value in all regressions. In the
presence of the market to book ratio in the regression, the latter result is extended to large
firms by market capitalisation. In the absence of the book to market ratio as an explanatory
variable, net income has a negative and statistically significant effect on the distributed cash.
This effect changes sign and becomes statistically insignificant in the presence of the market to
book ratio. As predicted above, when controlling for the firm’s idiosyncratic effects and taking
dynamic aspects into account, firms with relatively high cash holding tend to pay shareholders
more. This is consistent with the agency theory presented by Jensen (1986), stipulating that
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firms holding large sums of idle cash have an incentive to distribute more through dividends
and share buybacks in order to reassure shareholders on the potential conflict of interest where
corporate managers keep large cash amounts on the firm’s balance sheet as a way to increase
resources under their control. Finally, the size of the distributed cash decreases with the number
of employees. This indicates that when controlling for the firm’s fixed effects, changes in the
number of employees represent a proxy for investment in the labour force.
Full Model TFP Effect Market/Book Effect Investment Effect
L.Dist. Cash 0.166∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗
L2.Dist. Cash 0.0439∗∗∗ 0.0489∗∗∗ 0.0448∗∗∗ 0.0475∗∗∗




L.Market Cap. percentile 0.000176∗∗ 0.00000163 0.000187∗∗ 0.0000364
L.Assets 0.000000385∗∗∗ 0.000000493∗∗∗ 0.000000387∗∗∗ 0.000000453∗∗∗
L.Cash 0.0310∗∗∗ 0.0268∗∗∗ 0.0314∗∗∗ 0.0256∗∗∗
L.Net Income 0.0113 -0.0144∗ 0.00814 -0.0125∗
L.Debt -0.0182∗∗∗ -0.0191∗∗∗ -0.0192∗∗∗ -0.0176∗∗∗
L.Employees -0.238∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗
Constant 0.0262∗∗∗ 0.0317∗∗∗ 0.0249∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗
AIC -100793.7 -100567.1 -100786.5 -100585.9
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.2: Two-way fixed effects dynamic model for the size of the cash distributed.
The dynamic fixed effect regression results for the size of dividends and share buybacks are
in tables 4.3 and 4.4. The results show that both dividends and share buybacks sizes are per-
sistent processes with dividends’ size showing stronger persistence. When explaining the size
of dividends and share buybacks separately from each other, TFP fails to have a statistically
significant effect even when other growth indicators are excluded from the regression. This
provides extra motivation to consider the combined ”distributed cash” variable. Firms invest-
ing in capital expenditure tend to execute smaller share buybacks operation, while CAPEX
investments do not appear to affect the size of dividends. Large firms by market capitalisation
or assets tend to pay large dividends relative to their market capitalisation with assets’ size
having little impact on the size of dividends. On the other hand, large firms by assets are more
likely to complete larger share buyback operations with little effect attributed to the market
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capitalisation percentile. Higher net income increases the size of dividends while not impacting
the size of share buybacks operations. The results also suggest that firms use share buybacks
more than dividends to manage relatively high cash balances. Finally, hiring reduces the size
of both dividends and share buybacks relative to market capitalisation.
Full Model TFP Effect Market/Book Effect Investment Effect
L.Dividends 0.467∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗
L2.Dividends 0.0888∗∗∗ 0.0889∗∗∗ 0.0882∗∗∗ 0.0892∗∗∗




L.Market Cap. percentile 0.000115∗∗∗ 0.0000685∗∗ 0.000121∗∗∗ 0.0000769∗∗∗
L.Assets 8.34e-08∗∗∗ 0.000000101∗∗∗ 7.69e-08∗∗ 9.52e-08∗∗∗
L.Cash 0.00437∗∗ 0.00335∗ 0.00417∗∗ 0.00331∗
L.Net Income 0.00501 -0.00102 0.00504 -0.00204
L.Debt -0.00129 -0.00103 -0.00108 -0.00111
L.Employees -0.0396∗ -0.0482∗∗ -0.0381∗ -0.0490∗∗
Constant 0.00388∗ 0.00562∗∗∗ 0.00365∗ 0.00501∗∗
AIC -144153.6 -144041.2 -144151.5 -144036.0
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.3: Dynamic two way fixed effect model FE model explaining the size of dividends.
Full Model TFP Effect Market/Book Effect Investment Effect
L.Shares Buybacks 0.116∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
L2.Shares Buybacks -0.00244 0.000751 -0.00152 -0.000444




L.Market Cap. percentile 0.000110 -0.0000460 0.0000927 -0.0000310
L.Assets 0.000000254∗∗ 0.000000376∗∗∗ 0.000000276∗∗ 0.000000352∗∗∗
L.Cash 0.0301∗∗∗ 0.0257∗∗∗ 0.0310∗∗∗ 0.0251∗∗∗
L.Net Income 0.00510 -0.0160∗ 0.00344 -0.0113
L.Debt -0.0201∗∗∗ -0.0214∗∗∗ -0.0216∗∗∗ -0.0193∗∗∗
L.Employees -0.272∗∗∗ -0.317∗∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗ -0.298∗∗∗
Constant 0.0273∗∗∗ 0.0327∗∗∗ 0.0275∗∗∗ 0.0331∗∗∗
AIC -49301.8 -49219.3 -49295.4 -49236.4
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.4: Dynamic two way fixed effect model FE model explaining the size of share buybacks.
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4.3.4 Summary of the empirical results
After considering empirical evidence linking the firm’s appetite to grow to its propensity to
pay shareholders and the size of the payouts, it appears that firms with an ability and appetite
for growth divert less cash towards shareholders. I measure the appetite/ability to grow using
the market to book ratio, investment expenses and TFP. While the market to book ratio
performs better than other growth indicators in explaining distributions to shareholders, the
TFP’s marginal effect on the propensity to pay and size of the payouts is significant both in
economic and statistic terms in the absence of other growth indicators.12 As predicted by the
theory, firms holding large sums of cash are more likely to divert cash towards shareholders.
This relationship fails to appear in the repeated static logit regressions that do not control for
the changes in cash levels and for the firm idiosyncratic effects, but is shown to hold in the
two-way fixed effect dynamic regression explaining the size of shareholders payout.
The model developed in section 2.2 assumes that profit maximising firms can choose to
distribute some of the cash at their disposal to shareholders instead of spending to produce,
following unpredicted drops in productivity. The evidence presented above can serve as an em-
pirical justification to model’s mechanism linking the firm’s productivity to the firm’s spending.
4.4 Concluding remarks
I study the effect of productivity on the propensity of firms to pay shareholders back and on
the size of these payouts. I show that higher firm level productivity lowers both the likelihood
and the levels of the payouts. I assume that part of the cash diverted towards investors would
have been spent on improving or increasing production had the firm decided against rewarding
shareholders in the short term. The latter assumption and the negative empirical relationship
between productivity and investor payouts indicate that firms decrease spending to respond to
12The market to book ratio is derived using the share price. It is reasonable to assume that market participants
take into account information regarding the firm’s productivity and investment expenses when setting their
beliefs about the share price. Additionally, TFP is a noisy measure of the firm’s production efficiency. It is
therefore not surprising that market to book ratio is a superior measure of the firm’s ability/wiliness to grow.
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negative productivity shocks. The findings of this chapter serve as an empirical justification of
the model presented in chapter 2.
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4.A Appendix To Chapter 4
4.A.1 Data and derived variables
These variables are reported directly by the data: assets’ value, cash and cash equivalent, net income,
CAPEX spending, R&D spending and the number of employees. Other variables are derived as follows.
Market Capitalisation = ”Common Shares Outstanding” × ”Price Close - Annual - Calendar”;
Debt = ”Debt in Current Liabilities - Total” + ”Long-Term Debt - Total”;
Market to Book = ”Market Capitalisation” / ”Assets - Total”;
Value Added = ”Operating Income Before Depreciation” + ”Employees” x ”Average Wage from
the Social Security Administration”;
Share Buybacks = 1 year change in ”Treasury Stock - Common”, if the above is negative or missing
use: ”Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock” minus ”Sale of Common and Preferred Stock”. If
both figures are negative or missing, Share Buybacks are set to zero for the corresponding period.
Except for the assets value, all the variables are scaled either using the percentile form of the
variable or through division by the previous time period’s assets or the previous market capitalisation.
All the variables but those in percentile form are 1% Winsorised to deal with outlier values. These
data transformations are summarised in table 4.5.
4.A.2 Descriptive Statistics
I present the summary statistics of the indicators used to construct the regressions variable in table
4.6, the summary statistics of the transformed variables are in table 4.7. The correlation matrix of
the variables as used in the regressions are in table 4.8.
CHAPTER 4. 155
Divided by prev. assets Percentile Divided by prev. market cap. Winsorised (1%)
Assets X
Cash Dist. X X
Dividends X X
Share Buybacks X X
Productivity X X
Market to Book X
Market Cap. X
Cash X X





Table 4.5: Summary of transformation applied to the models’ variables.
mean sd min p1 p25 p50 p75 p99 max
Cash Dist. 73.89 601.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.14 1503.00 67643.80
Dividends 47.02 389.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.04 982.00 67643.80
Shares Buy. 23.64 313.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 461.59 34420.00
TFP 1.21 2.23 0.00 0.13 0.82 1.03 1.28 4.21 283.51
Market Cap. 2256.37 13201.11 0.00 0.67 21.74 107.18 619.62 43294.66 1819781.88
CAPEX 148.67 977.18 -401.61 0.00 0.77 5.20 34.44 2760.00 65028.00
RD 85.50 487.32 -0.55 0.00 0.19 2.72 17.11 2015.00 14035.29
Assets 2200.24 13328.37 0.50 0.98 20.94 106.47 601.96 39042.00 797769.00
Cash 212.67 1406.27 -40.00 0.00 1.25 8.54 52.37 4007.00 91052.00
Net Income 91.63 1056.33 -98696.00 -353.71 -2.32 1.39 18.78 2285.29 125000.00
Debt 668.75 5355.19 0.00 0.00 1.67 16.85 168.75 11122.70 523762.00
Employees 9.21 37.64 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.85 4.35 144.78 2200.00
Table 4.6: Summary statistics of the unscaled data used to construct the dependent and independent variables
used in the various regressions: all cash variables are in millions of U.S. dollars, the number of employees is in
thousands, data for the 1980-2013 period.
4.A.3 More Empirical Results
Further empirical results are presented in this subsection. I present the complete results of the logit
regressions including all growth indicators results and explaining, respectively, the propensity to return
cash, to pay dividends and to buy shares back in figures 4.6 to 4.8.
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mean sd min p1 p25 p50 p75 p99 max
Cash Dist. 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.24 0.24
Dividend 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.12
Share Buy. 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.17
TFP 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.23 0.23
Market/Book 1.78 2.75 0.05 0.05 0.45 0.90 1.84 17.17 17.17
CAPEX 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.76 0.76
RD 0.08 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.72 0.72
Mkt. Cap. % 39.70 22.70 1.00 1.00 20.00 40.00 59.00 80.00 85.00
Assets 1513.10 4736.80 0.67 0.98 20.94 106.47 601.96 31001.40 31001.40
Cash 0.19 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.22 1.81 1.81
Net Income -0.04 0.28 -1.50 -1.50 -0.06 0.03 0.08 0.43 0.43
Debt 0.29 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.24 0.41 1.37 1.37
Employees 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.19
Table 4.7: Summary statistics of the scaled variables used in the regression models, data for the 1980-2013
period.
Cash Dist. Div. Shares Buy. TFP Mkt/Book CAPEX R&D Mkt Cap. Assets Cash Net Inc. Debt Empl.
Cash Dist. 1.00 0.65 0.75 -0.13 -0.15 -0.07 -0.18 0.15 0.13 -0.12 0.13 -0.00 -0.03
Div. 0.65 1.00 0.05 -0.16 -0.14 -0.05 -0.21 0.24 0.19 -0.15 0.15 0.01 -0.02
Shares Buy. 0.75 0.05 1.00 -0.06 -0.10 -0.07 -0.10 0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.07 -0.02 -0.02
TFP -0.13 -0.16 -0.06 1.00 0.24 0.09 0.17 -0.47 -0.17 0.20 0.07 -0.01 0.24
Mkt/Book -0.15 -0.14 -0.10 0.24 1.00 0.25 0.50 0.15 -0.07 0.63 -0.21 -0.06 0.10
CAPEX -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 0.09 0.25 1.00 0.09 0.08 -0.04 0.13 -0.01 0.26 0.17
R&D -0.18 -0.21 -0.10 0.17 0.50 0.09 1.00 -0.08 -0.12 0.58 -0.50 -0.16 -0.08
Mkt. Cap. 0.15 0.24 0.05 -0.47 0.15 0.08 -0.08 1.00 0.46 0.02 0.27 0.02 -0.12
Assets 0.13 0.19 0.05 -0.17 -0.07 -0.04 -0.12 0.46 1.00 -0.09 0.10 0.03 -0.15
Cash -0.12 -0.15 -0.06 0.20 0.63 0.13 0.58 0.02 -0.09 1.00 -0.24 -0.14 0.04
Net Inc. 0.13 0.15 0.07 0.07 -0.21 -0.01 -0.50 0.27 0.10 -0.24 1.00 -0.02 0.06
Debt -0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.26 -0.16 0.02 0.03 -0.14 -0.02 1.00 0.09
Empl. -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.24 0.10 0.17 -0.08 -0.12 -0.15 0.04 0.06 0.09 1.00
Table 4.8: Correlation matrix of regressions’ variables (1980-2013).
4.A.4 Tests
The studied dependent variables follow strongly persistent processes. Failing to correct for such
persistence can cause serial correlation tests to fail. I present the serial correlation test in table 4.10.
The tests show that serial correlation is either statistically insignificant or too low to seriously affect
the result of the regressions.
Running dynamic panel data models for a large number of units and a small number of observations
per unit comes with the issue of a biased estimate of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variables.
The absence of an important serial correlation in the error terms provides an indication that there
is little underestimation of the lagged variables coefficient if any. To gain more confidence around
this issue, regressions are run where the number of observations per firm is unrestricted, is required
to be higher than 30 (T ≥ 30) (table 4.11) . The results show that, as expected by the theory,
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Full Model TFP Effect Market/Book Effect Investment Effect
L.Dist. Cash 0.0830∗∗∗ 0.0939∗∗∗ 0.0839∗∗∗ 0.0938∗∗∗
L2.Dist. Cash 0.00819 0.0120 0.00882 0.0105




L.MArket Cap. percentile 0.000208∗∗∗ -0.0000430 0.000230∗∗∗ 0.0000208
L.Assets 0.000000425∗∗∗ 0.000000573∗∗∗ 0.000000413∗∗∗ 0.000000510∗∗∗
L.Cash 0.0323∗∗∗ 0.0237∗∗∗ 0.0324∗∗∗ 0.0221∗∗∗
L.Net Income 0.0199∗∗∗ 0.00491 0.0161∗∗∗ 0.00305
L.Debt -0.0170∗∗∗ -0.0184∗∗∗ -0.0182∗∗∗ -0.0163∗∗∗
L.Employees -0.218∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗
Constant 0.0328∗∗∗ 0.0418∗∗∗ 0.0310∗∗∗ 0.0394∗∗∗
AIC -201928.0 -201460.3 -201897.9 -201460.1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.9: Dynamic two way fixed effect model FE model explaining the size of distributed cash, no exclusion
of firms based on the number of observations.
a low number of observation per unit leads to underestimating the autoregressive coefficients. The
differences in the lagged dependent variables estimates remain small when increasing the minimum
number of observations per firm from 15 to 30.
Cash Dist. Resid. Div. Resid. Shares Buy. Resid.
L.residuals -0.0234∗ -0.0189 0.0173
L2.residuals -0.0176 -0.00106 0.0215∗
L3.residuals -0.0184 -0.00385 -0.00282
L4.residuals -0.0150 -0.00580 -0.0132
L5.residuals -0.0263∗∗ -0.0153 -0.0220∗∗
L6.residuals -0.0201∗ -0.000362 -0.00750
L7.residuals -0.0178∗ 0.00615 -0.0253∗∗
Constant 0.000251∗∗∗ -0.000524∗∗∗ -0.0128∗∗∗
Observations 20660 20660 20738
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 4.6: Repeated logit cross-section regressions estimates with 95% confidence boundaries for the full
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Figure 4.6: Repeated logit cross-section regressions estimates with 95% confidence boundaries for the full
model explaining the distributed cash.
Cash Dist T ≥ 15 T ≥ 30 Div T≥ 15 T ≥ 30 Share Buy ≥ 15 T ≥ 30
L.Dist. Cash 0.083∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.0079) (0.010) (0.017)
L2.Dist. Cash 0.0082 0.044∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.0068) (0.0080) (0.013)
L3.Dist. Cash 0.0027 0.042∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.0071) (0.0083) (0.015)
L.Dividends 0.37∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.017) (0.033)
L2.Dividends 0.066∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.014) (0.027)
L3.Dividends 0.027∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗
(0.0085) (0.010) (0.021)
L.Share Buybacks 0.028∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.014) (0.023)
L2.Share Buybacks -0.032∗∗∗ -0.0024 0.016
(0.0098) (0.013) (0.020)
L3.Share Buybacks -0.023∗ 0.026 0.018
(0.011) (0.014) (0.019)
Observations 53104 25298 8971 39786 23474 8902 29393 12282 4474
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.11: Lagged dependent variables tests. The lagged variables coefficients from the model including
all firms are shown next to estimates of the same coefficients from a models excluding firms with less than 15
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Figure 4.7: Repeated logit cross-section regressions estimates with 95% confidence boundaries for the full
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Figure 4.7: Repeated logit cross-section regressions estimates with 95% confidence boundaries for the full
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Figure 4.8: Repeated logit cross-section regressions estimates with 95% confidence boundaries for the full








1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
year







1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
year








1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
year
Employees estimate 95% lower limit
95% upper limit
Figure 4.8: Repeated logit cross-section regressions estimates with 95% confidence boundaries for the full




Production and the Business Cycle
5.1 Introduction
I present a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a sector of firms that borrow to
finance the production of a single intermediate good, banks providing the required financing
and an endogenous mechanism for the borrowing firms to bankrupt on their debt obligations.
The intermediate good is used as an input by a representative firm that hires labour and rents
capital to produce a final good that is then sold to households. Within the studied framework,
intermediate production firms raise financing using the information available to them at the
financing stage, including how they assess their own production efficiency and the expected
sale prices of the intermediate good they produce. When a borrowing firm realises its actual
production efficiency and the prevailing sale prices, its revenues might drop to levels below
initial expectations. If this drop is large enough, the firm’s revenue may not suffice to repay
the debt obligations the firm committed to at the financing stage. The firm would then fail to
honour its financial obligation. As a result, the lending bank takes over the firm, and a fraction
of production is lost to reflect the costs of the bankruptcy workouts and the fact that banks
are less knowledgeable about the production process.
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Intermediate production firms sell the good they produce to a representative final pro-
ducer that is constrained by a Cobb-Douglas type technology and using labour, capital and
the intermediate good as inputs. The productivity of the intermediate production firms is de-
composed into an idiosyncratic part that is specific to the firm and a systemic component that
is shared with the productivity of the final good producing firm. This assumption guarantees
two desirable outcomes of the model. First, bankruptcy is limited to a subset of the interme-
diate production firms, namely the group of firms with low enough productivities. Second, the
importance of the systemic part of the intermediate producers’ efficiencies helps control the
intermediate production fluctuations’ contribution to the variance of key aggregate variables.
The division of the productive sector into one group of firms that borrows to produce an
intermediate good and a final representative firm that uses the intermediate good as input is
crucial for the model’s main mechanism to operate. The intermediate producers’ output is an
input in the final production process; its price displays a procyclical behaviour. When aggregate
productivity, defined as the final producer’s productivity, is high, demand for the intermediate
good increases, and so does its price. Higher sale prices improve the revenues of the borrowing
firms and, in turn, decreases default rates. Similarly, revenues are depressed when aggregate
productivity is deteriorating so that default rates are higher and credit spreads are wider. This
way, countercyclical default rates and credit spreads are generated even when one assumes no
correlation between intermediate and aggregate production efficiencies.
While not crucial in generating countercyclical default rates and credit spreads, other model
assumptions are useful in generating realistic second moments of credit spreads and important
aggregate variables. For instance, I assume that intermediate production firms are subject to
a quadratic cost of changing the production size. This limits the changes in loans’ demand
by the intermediate production firms following fluctuations in total factor productivity. The
borrowing firm’s inability to change its production levels without incurring a cost maintains
borrowing at relatively high levels during economic slumps. As a result, default rates are even
higher in periods of recession. Higher default rates cause wider credit spreads during periods
of recession as banks need to hike loan rates to reflect higher default expectations. Similarly,
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this friction causes lower default rates, and tighter credit spreads when aggregate productivity
is rising. While the intermediate/final production structure is key to generating countercyclical
defaults rates and credit spreads, the costly change of the borrowing firm production level helps
reproduce quantitatively realistic dynamics of credit spreads.
Banks are assumed to be competitive and face no entry costs. Therefore, in expectation,
banks make no profit and no loss from extending loans. To compensate for the future default
of a fraction of the intermediate production firms, banks charge a credit spread on the top of
the interest rate they expect to pay depositors. When macroeconomic conditions are worse,
both the intermediate good’s price and the intermediate production efficiency are lower. This
depresses the revenues of the borrowing firms and, as a result, causes the proportion of firms
expected to default to increases. Banks take this into account and raise the loans’ interest
rates. The business cycle is depressed further, in a way reminiscent of the financial accelerator
effect studied by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998) and other
authors. The framework studied in this paper focuses on the way banks readjust the interest
rate they charge firms to reflect the relationship between business cycles and bankruptcy rates,
while typical financial accelerator models assume rationing of credit following a deterioration
in the market value of assets used as collateral by borrowers.
Non-exhaustive literature review– There is a rich literature on general equilibrium
models with endogenous bankruptcies. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) build on the Bernanke
and Gertler (1989) model whereby lending agency costs arise endogenously and introduce a
class of capital transforming entrepreneurs who rely on their net-worth as collateral to raise
external debt financing. These entrepreneurs can default on their debt obligations after a large
enough negative shock affects their ability to transform capital. The possibility of defaults
interacts with the dynamics of the entrepreneurs’ net-worth over the business cycle to replicate
the empirically observed positive autocorrelation of output at short horizons. In this paper, I
ignore the net-worth effects on the ability of borrowers to secure external financing. Instead,
I link default probabilities to the aggregate TFP driving the business cycle–Mostly through
the variation of the intermediate good prices. This generates countercyclical financing costs
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that increase output when aggregate TFP improves and reduces it when TFP is lower. On the
other hand, the costly financing general equilibrium model in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) fails
to reproduce the empirically observed countercyclical default premiums (As noted in Gomes,
Yaron, and Zhang (2003)).
The bankruptcy mechanism used in this paper is similar to the one in Pesaran and Xu
(2016). A first difference resides in the way both models deal with employment. While Pesaran
and Xu (2016) choose a specific consumer utility function to disentangle the problem of default
from that of labour, I choose to dissociate defaults from labour demand by assuming that
some firms borrow to produce an intermediate good (intermediate producers) and others hire
labour, rent capital and use the intermediate good to produce the final good (final producers).
Another difference lies in the banking sector’s modelling, a mere multiplier in Pesaran and Xu
(2016); the model presented here assumes that banks set interest rates taking expected profits
into account. Banks provide the intermediate good producing firms with loans carrying an
interest rate that reflects default expectations. Finally, intermediate productivity is assumed
to be correlated with an aggregate total productivity factor driving final production. Unlike
in Pesaran and Xu (2016) where default probabilities do not fluctuate with the cycle, the fact
that the revenues of intermediate producers fluctuate with the cycle implies that default rates
fluctuate with the cycle in a countercyclical fashion. Banks reflect expectations over future
defaults in the interest rates they charge borrowers. This bank behaviour means that credit
spreads are countercyclical. The countercyclical behaviour of credit spreads accelerates growth
during the highs of the business cycle and through recession periods.
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010) develop a New Keynesian DSGE model with a
mechanism for endogenous defaults. This is achieved by assuming that a class of entrepreneurs
transforms capital by investing their net worth as a source of self-financing and securing the
rest of the required financing through bank loans. Similarly to what I do in this paper, the
authors assume that the efficiency of the entrepreneur’s ability to transform capital is subject to
idiosyncratic shocks. A sufficiently unfavourable shock can lead to the borrower’s bankruptcy.
Furthermore, the authors assume that the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks that affect the
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entrepreneur’s return is the realisation of a time-varying process. As this variance changes
through time, the cross-sectional distribution of returns also changes, thus producing time
variation in credit risk and thereby time-varying credit spreads. In the model I consider here,
the variations in default rates and credit spreads are generated by the borrowers’ revenues’
procyclical behaviour. This guarantees a countercyclical behaviour of bankruptcy rates and
credit spreads without having to assume the existence of an additional exogenous process driving
credit risk.
A different strain of literature attributes countercyclical credit premiums to sticky lender/borrower
relationships. Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010) and Aksoy, Basso, and Coto-Martinez (2013) ar-
gue that banks exploit existing lending relationships and the preference of borrowers to stay
with the same lender and charge higher credit spreads during slowdowns. The authors build
on the deep habits framework in Ravn, Schmitt-Groh, and Uribe (2006) to model the costs of
bank switching.
Falato and Xiao (2020) argue that learning from noisy information is an important propaga-
tion mechanism for understanding credit and business cycles. They build a general equilibrium
model with information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers whereby lenders interpret
deteriorations in short-term profit outlook as bad news about default risk. In turn, firms per-
ceive debt as underpriced and cut investments. The authors develop a model of credit-market
investors’ learning that generates countercyclical default rates and credit spreads. Their model
can also quantitatively account for the long-lasting widening in spreads and contraction in
aggregate investment during the 2007-09 financial crisis. The model I develop in this paper
requires no asymmetries in the information available to the lender and borrower at the time
of issuance. Countercyclical default rates and credit spreads are generated by the procyclical
behaviour of the intermediate good’s price. Procyclical prices guarantee that revenues are pro-
cyclical and are sufficient to make default rates move inversely with the cycle. Because credit
spreads reflect the cost of future defaults, they too display countercyclical behaviour.
The remainder of this work is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents the general equi-
librium model. Section 5.3 provides details about the calibration and simulation of the model
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and comments the steady-state results and dynamic effects of the main mechanism. Section
5.4 concludes.
5.2 General equilibrium
I study a general equilibrium model with an intermediate good producing sector that provides a
final representative firm with input. Intermediate production is funded through debt financing
provided by a competitive banking sector with no entry costs that use households’ deposit to
fund its lending operations. Some of the borrowing firms can default on their debt obligations
when their revenues are too low to cover debt payments. To achieve no profit and no loss in
expectation, the competitive banks reflect the default losses they expect in the interest rates
they charge the borrowing firms. The representative final producer uses capital and labour to
produce the final good. This final good is either consumed by households, transformed into
new capital or used as an input to the intermediate production process. Households set their
consumption, labour supply, capital investments and deposits to maximise expected utility,
discounted over their lifetime.
5.2.1 Intermediate good producing firms
I assume the existence of a sector with firms that transform output before its use as an interme-
diate good by final production firms. The intermediate production process is fully financed by
banks through loan issuance. It takes an intermediate good producing firm a single time period
to produce a quantity yMt+1, to do so it issues a single time period maturity loan to the banks
of principal Xt and uses the production function below to transform the invested quantity of










where the index i denotes the firm, Zi,t+1 is a heterogeneous and stochastic efficiency factor, λ
is a parameter reflecting the cost of changing the level of production and f(.) represents the
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deterministic component of the intermediate production technology before incurring adjustment
costs. Furthermore, I assume that intermediate production efficiencies follow a log-normal
processes





zat is a common efficiency factor, representing aggregate productivity, that is time-dependent
and that follows an AR(1) process: zat = ρaz
a
t−1 + et where et are normal and i.i.d. shocks. The
terms εi reflect the idiosyncratic firm efficiencies and are normally distributed, independent
across firms and independent from the common efficiency factor zat . The parameter σM is
a volatility parameter representing the intermediate production projects’ riskiness, and ρM
reflects the interdependence of intermediate production across different firms. The type of firm
εi is unknown before the loan’s maturity so that all intermediate production firms are a priori
identical, and they all face the same cost of financing Rt and raise the same loan principal Xt.
They also produce the same intermediate good, sold at the common price Qt.
In the case where the intermediate production firms do not default, their profit is
πMi,t+1 = Qt+1Zi,t+1g(Xt, Xt−1)−RtXt,






. The intermediate good producing
firms walk away on their debt if their non-default profit is negative. In the case where a
firm defaults, the lending bank takes over intermediate good production and loses a fraction
θ of the produced intermediate goods in the process, reflecting a cost for the bank to go
through bankruptcy workouts and the fact that the firms’ managers possess more knowledge
about the production process than banks. In the spirit of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), an




. In other words, defaults happen when standardised version of the
Gaussian variable zi,t+1 is below a certain value, denoted −ξt+1.1 The default probability of the
1The standardised version of Gaussian variable X ∼ N(µ, σ2) is X−µσ .
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intermediate production firms is given by
DPt+1 = Φ(−ξt+1), (5.2.3)
where Φ denotes the normal cumulative distribution function. Following the nomenclature
inspired by Merton (1974), ξt+1 is called the ”distance to default”. In the current set-up, the
distance to default depends on the common factor zat+1, the current loan and previous loan sizes















Note here that DPt+1 is the default probability at the loan’s maturity before the firm realizes
its type εi. Once the type εi is known to the borrowing firm, default or survival is immediately
determined and not random anymore. The used correlation structure and the assumption that
0 < ρM < 1 guarantee a positive correlation of efficiencies across firms. During recessions, the
common factor zat+1 is low, and all firms have lower efficiencies, while intermediate producers’
efficiency is high when zat+1 is high. Aggregate TFP has a direct impact on default rates
through the intermediate productivities channel. In addition to the direct effect of aggregate
efficiency, indirect effects operate through other variables affecting the ”distance to default”.
These variables are the price of the intermediate good Qt+1, the size of the loan Xt and the
charged interest rate Rt. While it is clear that, everything else being equal, default rates
increase with higher loan levels Xt and higher interest rates Rt and decrease with higher sale
prices Qt+1, the net combined effect of these variables is unclear at this stage. Section 5.3 is
dedicated to numerical simulations; it clarifies the magnitude of each of the competing effects
and shows the net effect of aggregate fluctuations on default rates. Section 5.3 also shows
the effect of the cost of adjusting investment as reflected by the parameter λ. The fact that
changing the level of intermediate production is costly has two crucial implications. First, it
dampens the changes in the levels of intermediate production. Second, the costly adjustment
in intermediate production levels pushes intermediate producers to maintain a relatively high
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demand for loans when the productivity is low. The loan market clears at a higher interest rate
Rt, implying higher credit spreads during recession periods. This and the fact that investment
adjustment costs do not impact the steady-state of the model implies that the parameter λ is
key to generating realistic credit spreads dynamics.
The intermediate goods’ producing firms maximise profit, taking defaults into account, to








where Et denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information set available at time
t and πM,di,t+1 is the profit taking into account the possibility of future default
πM,di,t+1 = Qt+1Zi,t+1g(Xt, Xt−1)1εi>−ξt+1 −RtXt1εi>−ξt+1 . (5.2.6)
Given the independence between the idiosyncratic shocks εi and the aggregate productivity
common factor zat+1, one can rewrite expected profits as follows
Etπ
M,d









where ΣM := σM
√
1− ρ2M is the volatility of the idiosyncratic part of the intermediate produc-
tion efficiency. One can therefore write the loan demand equation in a form that is common to

































The latter formulation of the loan demand equation confirms the fact that all firms face the













(Xt −Xt−1) f(Xt). (5.2.9)
The parameter λ shifts loan demand lower when it is increasing in comparison to the previous
period loan principal (Xt > Xt−1) and shifts it higher when it is decreasing (Xt < Xt−1).
5.2.2 Production firms
Production of the final good is performed by a representative firm that is constrained by a










M ζt , (5.2.10)
where ζ is the share of the intermediate good and (1 − ζ)α is the share of capital. The
production sector productivity Zat is completely driven by the systemic factor defined in the
previous section ln(Zat ) = σaz
a
t . The demand for capital, labour and the intermediate input are
set to maximize the final producer’s profit
max
Ht,Kt,Mt
Yt − rKt Kt − wtHt −QtMt, (5.2.11)
where wt is the wage and r
K
t is the rental cost of labour. The first order condition for investments
in capital, labour and the intermediate good are
























In addition, households are assumed to accumulate capital Kt and invest in deposits Dt. They
decide consumption Ct, labour supply Lt, deposits Dt and new capital Kt by maximising their







where 0 < β < 1 denotes the preferences discount factor. The household optimisation is subject
to the budget constraint
Ct +Dt +Kt = wtLt +R
D
t−1Dt−1 + (1− δ + rKt )Kt−1 + Πt (5.2.17)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital, rKt is the rental rate of capital, R
D
t is the gross
deposit rate and Πt is the profit distributed to households. Πt is the combination of the profit
distributed by the banks ΠBt and the profit distributed by the intermediate good producing





















Banks hold a balance sheet composed of loans issued to finance the intermediate producers’
operations and fund these loans using households’ deposits. The representative bank invests in
a large enough portfolio of loans such as the final fraction defaulting is Φ(−ξt+1), where t + 1
is the loans’ maturity and ξt+1 the distance to default.
2 The bank recovers a fraction 1− θ of
the production proceeds after the borrower’s default. In the case of the model I study, one can
calculate the recovery term in the bank’s profit function as follows








Φ(ξt+1)RtXt +Rect+1 −RDt Xt
]
. (5.2.23)
The profit function includes the return from the non-defaulting loans Φ(ξt+1)RtXt, the recovery
from the defaulting loans Rect+1 and the cost of borrowing from households R
D
t Xt. Banks are
assumed to be competitive and face no entry cost so that the representative bank runs no profit
and no loss in expectation. The zero expected profit condition yields a crucial link between the








Clearly, the charged interest rate Rt increases with the default probability Φ(−ξt+1), with the
fractions of production lost conditional on default θ and with the deposit rates RDt . It is useful
to note that, in the absence of defaults, the bank would charge the deposit rate when issuing
loans to the intermediate production firms (Rt = R
D
t ). The difference between the gross loan
rate Rt and the deposit rate R
D
t reflects the extra spread banks charge the borrowing firms
to compensate for losses due to future defaults. Credit spreads are defined as an annualised
2This is a direct consequence of the law of large numbers.
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where dt is the time length separating two consecutive time periods (dt = 0.25 in the case of
a quarterly frequency). The idea that banks charge the borrowing firms the expected cost of
future defaults is made clearer by replacing for the loan rate in the expression of intermedi-
ate production firms’ profit 5.2.6 using condition 5.2.24 to derive an expression for the profit
expected by the borrowing firm
Etπ
M,d
i,t+1 = EtQt+1Zi,t+1g(Xt, Xt−1)−RDt Xt − θEtQt+1Zi,t+1g(Xt, Xt−1)1εi<ξt+1 . (5.2.26)
The expression above shows that when there is no loss of intermediate production because of
defaults θ = 0, the intermediate producers’ expected profits are uninfluenced by credit spreads
or the probabilities of future defaults. The loan demand function remains impacted by credit
spreads as the borrowing firms are price takers and the banks’ pricing equation 5.2.24 is external
to their profit maximisation problem. However, section 5.3 will show that, for the calibrated
model parameters, credit spreads have little impact on credit markets when θ = 0.
5.2.5 Aggregation and Market Clearing
In this subsection, I clarify the market clearing conditions. These are
i The clearing of the final goods market.
Yt = Ct +Xt +Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1. (5.2.27)
ii The clearing of the labour market.
Ht = Lt. (5.2.28)
iii The clearing of the bank loan market where supply of loans by banks meets the demand of
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the intermediate production firms.
iv The clearing of the intermediate good market, taking into account the effect of bankruptcies
in reducing intermediate production
Mt = Eεi [y
M
i,t ]− θEεi [yMi,t1εi<−ξt ]. (5.2.29)
v The clearing of the deposits market
Dt = Xt. (5.2.30)
The remainder of this paper is dedicated to the calibration and simulation of the model
presented in this section. Section 5.3 presents the calibration and simulation procedures; and
comments on the dynamic effects of each of the model’s main assumptions.
5.3 Model simulations and findings
5.3.1 Steady-state equilibrium and calibration
In order to study the model numerically, I borrow the capital production function in Aksoy
and Basso (2014) to express the deterministic part of the intermediate production function
f(Xt) = ln(1 +Xt). (5.3.1)
The steady state of the model exists and is unique for the set of model parameters chosen in












The quantity ΣM := σM
√
1− ρ2M is crucial to default rates in the steady-state. Given the
model’s remaining parameters, the volatility ΣM is calibrated to match the historical U.S.
3See appendix 5.B for more on the steady state determination.
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private default rate at 3.2%.4 This default rate figure is consistent with Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1998) and Pesaran and Xu (2016). The dislike for work parameter χ is chosen to
match a steady-state labour at L̄ = 0.3. The loss in production following default θ is chosen
to match the historical U.S. recovery rates at 40%. The preferences discounting parameter β
is chosen so that the model’s steady-state deposit rate matches the average historical deposit
rates in the U.S. following Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010). The parameter describing
the share of intermediate goods in the production function is set to ζ = 0.5 following Basu
(1995) and Jones (2011a).
The cost of readjusting intermediate production λ and the correlation parameter ρM are
key to the reaction of output, default rates and credit spreads following shocks. These two
parameters are jointly calibrated to match output and credit spreads volatilities in U.S. data.5
The remaining model parameters are standard. They are either chosen to match U.S. data
or borrowed from the literature. Table 5.1 provides a summary of the model parameters,
and table 5.2 provides the values of key steady-state variables. Table 5.3 shows the second
moments of the main variables. The model replicates well the data’s second moments of log
output, log investments, log TFP and log credit spreads. On the other hand, the model implied
consumption volatility is lower than the value inferred from the data. As we will see below,
the low consumption volatility is inherited from the baseline RBC framework upon which the
model was built and is not the consequence of the main mechanism studied here.
5.3.2 Dynamic effects
In this subsection, I show the dynamic effects of the model’s main assumptions by studying the
impulse response functions following negative shocks to the aggregate total factor productivity
Zat . I start by showing the effect of defaults in accelerating the business cycle before studying
the effects of costly adjustment of intermediate production and the impact of the correlation
4See Moody’s (2012) for Moody’s quarterly default rates affecting U.S. private firms for the period between
Q4 2002 and Q4 2011. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998) assume 3% default rate in the steady-state while
Pesaran and Xu (2016) assume 3.4%.
5More specifically, the volatility of credit spreads of BAA rated entities in the U.S., for the period between Q1
1980 and Q4 2011. Output and other macroeconomic data are collected for the same period. All macroeconomic




σH risk aversion 1 Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010)
η curvature on labour 1 Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010)
β discount factor 0.996 Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010)
χ disutility of labour 9.55 steady state labour at 0.3
Technology
α 0.36 Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010)
ζ 0.5 Basu (1995) and Jones (2011a)
ρa 0.79 U.S. data
σa 1.1% U.S. data
δ depreciation rate of capital 2.5% Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010)
Intermediate production
ΣM idiosyncratic volatility 2.1% Steady state annual default rate 3.2%
θ loss of production upon default 60.1% Steady state loss upon default 60%
ρM correlation with systemic factor 2.14% ρM and λ are set to target a volatility of log spreads
λ cost of varying investments 10.1% at 28.4% and the volatility of log output at 1.37%
Table 5.1: Assumed and calibrated model parameters.
Variable Steady state value





Intermediary good M̄ 0.106
Deposit rate R̄D − 1 0.40%
Default Rate D̄P 0.80%
Distance to default ξ̄ 2.38
Credit Spread C̄S 2.13%
Price of intermediate good Q̄ 1.12
Table 5.2: Steady state variables.





Credit spreads 28.42% 28.42%
Table 5.3: Second moments of log variables: model vs data.
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between the efficiency of intermediate production and aggregate TFP. The displayed simulations
are realised, for quarterly time periods, in Dynare, using third-order approximations.
The effect of default rates and credit spreads
Figure 5.1 shows the impulse response function (IRF) of the main variables of the model after
one standard deviation unpredicted negative shock to logarithmic TFP (lnZa). The IRFs are
shown for: (i) the main model as calibrated in section 5.3.1 (ii) a version of the model assuming
no loss in intermediate production upon default (θ = 0, dashed lines) and (iii) a simple RBC
model with no intermediate good production (ζ = 0, dotted line). It is important to note
that the model with no production losses due to defaults assumes the same cost of adjusting
intermediate production λ and the same correlation among intermediate producers ρM as the
main model while the remaining parameters are recalibrated as in section 5.3.1 except for the
parameter θ that is set to zero. This guarantees that all the model parameters, except for θ, are
the same as in the main model. The assumption θ = 0 implies no immediate loss in intermediate
production because of defaults. Besides, figure 5.1 shows that despite an increase in default
probabilities following a negative TFP shock, there is little fluctuation in credit spreads when
defaults imply no loss in production (θ = 0). Steady-state results show that when θ = 0, the
steady-state credit spread remains positive but is very close to zero.6 There is therefore little
impact on credit markets and future intermediate production because of credit spreads when
θ = 0. The differences between the reaction of the model variables under the main calibration
assumptions and when θ is set to zero can be associated with the effects of defaults and credit
spreads. On the other hand, the RBC model results represent the main model’s behaviour in
the absence of intermediate production and credit markets.
The presence of defaults related production losses implies a larger drop in loan levels, invest-
ments, capital, labour and output. When defaults impact credit markets, default probabilities
increase following a negative productivity shock. This increase results from the combined effect
of lower intermediate production efficiency (ρM > 0) and lower intermediate good’s prices. Both
6When θ = 0, the recovery is very close to the face value of the loan but remain less than the face value.
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these effects depress the revenues of intermediate producers causing higher default rates. This
impact on default probabilities has two main consequences. First, higher default rates increase
the proportion of intermediate production lost because of the bankruptcy workouts. The loss
of intermediate production causes a larger immediate drop in intermediate production and,
as a result, depresses output, labour, capital investments and consumption further. Second,
credit spreads increase as banks adjust the interest rates they charge intermediate producers to
compensate for future defaults and loan demand is lower as the borrowing firms consider the
higher cost of financing on their future profits. Higher financing costs depress the size of loans
issued further and, in turn, worsen the impact of lower TFP on future output relative to the
model where defaults do not impact credit markets.
The RBC model produces the familiar dynamics with an immediate drop in output, invest-
ment and hours following a surprise negative shock to productivity. The models that assume
the existence of an intermediate production sector relying on loan financing display a reverse
hump-shaped reaction of intermediate production and output. This shape is due to the drop
in the size of the loans issued, which lowers future intermediate production and negatively im-
pacts final production in the second period after the shock. The reverse hump-shape reaction of
intermediate production to adverse shocks implies a similarly shaped reaction of hours worked
as labour is less productive when fewer intermediate goods are available in the economy. In the
current set-up, I assume a single-period maturity of the loans. A version of the current model
with longer loan maturities would propagate the effects of TFP fluctuations for multiple periods
after the shock. Longer maturity debt instruments would, therefore, cause more persistence in
the response of output and investments.
Similarly to Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), a positive autocorrelation of outputs is generated
by assuming the possibility of bankruptcy in parts of the economy’s productive sector. However,
there is a major difference between the mechanisms of both models. In Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997) investments cuts are delayed following adverse shocks as it takes time for the shock
to affect the net-worth of borrowers, thereby affecting their ability to raise external financing.
In the model I study, the worsening of aggregate productivity triggers a systemic increase in
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default probabilities. Banks reflect higher future default probabilities in the credit spreads.
The higher credit spreads discourage intermediate production firms from borrowing and reduce
the level of loans in the economy. Which, in turn, reduces future intermediate production and
future output. The model I present produces countercyclical credit spreads and default rates
that delay part of intermediate production and output reaction to shocks. The countercyclical
behaviour of credit spreads is a documented feature of business cycles that is not generated by
models of the type in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998).
As explained in Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2003), in these agency cost models, the borrowers’
net worth takes some time to deteriorate after a negative shock. This dampens internal funds’
reaction and implies a lower reliance on external funds as the financing needs drop faster than
internal funds. Monitoring costs decrease as a result, thus reducing default premiums after
negative shocks. On the other hand, the slow reduction in net-worth also pushes the borrower
to delay some of the investment cuts, generating a reverse hump-shaped reaction of investments
and output. Popular agency cost models’ ability to generate a persistent autocorrelation of
output and investment is tied to them displaying procyclical default premiums. Procyclical
credit spreads are inconsistent with empirical observations regarding credit spreads and the
business cycle.
Effect of investment adjustment costs
Figure 5.2 shows the dynamic effect of costly adjustment of intermediate production. The figure
shows the impulse response functions for a calibration that assumes that no costs are incurred
by intermediate producers when changing production levels (λ = 0). This ”no-adjustment
cost” model assumes otherwise the same correlation parameter ρM as the main model while
the parameters χ, ΣM and θ are recalibrated as in subsection 5.3.1. The parameter λ has no
steady-state implications, so the steady-state calibrated parameters χ, ΣM and θ are the same
in the main calibration and ”no-adjustment cost” calibration.
The presence of intermediate production adjustment costs primarily affects the reaction of
default rates, credit spreads, and loan principals to a deterioration in the aggregate productivity,
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with a minor impact on the remaining model variables. The impact on default rates immediately
after the shock is almost identical in the main calibration’s model and the ”no-adjustment cost”
model. However, because adjustment costs hinder the borrowers’ ability to set the demand
for loan lower, their presence prevents demand for loans to drop at the same rate as in the
”no-adjustment cost” calibration. The drop in the loan principal is less severe as a result.
The relatively higher loan sizes imply that defaults remain high in the following period. This
persistence of default rates increases the immediate reaction of credit spreads.
The way the parameter λ impacts credit spreads more than consumption, real investments
and output, justifies its use to help the model match the historical volatility of credit spreads
as per the calibration process described in section 5.3.1. As mentioned above, the costs of
changing the size of intermediate production are not crucial to the model’s ability to generate
countercyclical default rates and credit spreads. However, by slowing the borrowers’ reaction
to adverse shocks, these adjustment costs make the reaction of default rates more persistent
and is key in reproducing credit spread volatilities that are consistent with data.
Effect of the covariance between intermediate and final production
Figure 5.3 shows the impact of the correlation between the productivity of the intermediate
producers and aggregate productivity (ρM) on the response of the main variables of the model
to a negative aggregate productivity shock. The ”high correlation” model assumes that the
correlation parameter is ten percentage point higher (ρM = 12.1%) and maintains the same
intermediate production adjustment cost parameter as in the main calibration. The remaining
parameters are recalibrated as in section 5.3.1.
A high intermediate efficiency correlation parameter ρM = 12.1% means that the efficiency of
intermediate production deteriorates more following negative shocks to TFP and implies lower
intermediate production. The larger drop in intermediate production implies a larger drop in
output, causing lower investments, consumption and hours. Furthermore, a higher correlation
parameter ρM worsens the deterioration of intermediate producers’ revenues following negative
shocks and causes higher default rates. This, in turn, causes higher credit spreads following
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adverse shocks.
The higher correlation parameter ρM causes a more considerable drop in intermediate pro-
duction. This is only partially compensated by the smaller drop in the price of the intermediate
good. As a result, intermediate producers’ revenues drop further when ρM is high, thus causing
higher default rates and credit spreads following a negative aggregate shock. Higher values
of the parameter ρM imply higher volatility of output, consumption, default rates and credit
spreads. These dynamic effects of the parameter ρM justify the calibration choice made in
subsection 5.3.1, where the pair (λ,ρM) is calibrated for the model to match the historical
volatilities of output and credit spreads.
As suggested by the low value of the calibrated correlation ρM = 2.14% in the main cali-
bration, this parameter is useful to replicate historical values of the second moments of some of
the aggregate variables but is not crucial to the functioning of the model’s main mechanism.7
Figure 5.4 in the appendix shows that even when the efficiency of intermediate production is
independent of aggregate TFP (ρM = 0), default rates and credit spreads remain countercycli-
cal and accelerate the business cycle by affecting loan issuance and intermediate production,
thus causing output, consumption and hours to drop further. The countercyclical behaviour of
default rates (and by extension that of credit spreads) is chiefly a consequence of the procyclical
behaviour of the borrowing firms’ revenues. This procyclical behaviour of revenues is rooted
in the fact that the borrowing firms’ good is an input in the final production process. De-
mand for the intermediate good drops during slumps, which negatively affects the intermediate
good’s price and, by extension, reduces intermediate firms’ revenues. The lower revenues of the
borrowing firms increase default rates and credit spreads.
7Alternatively to matching the volatility of log output, one can calibrate for the value of ρM to match the
historical volatility of investments or hours.
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Figure 5.1: Impulse response functions following a negative shock to TFP (−1× standard deviation) of: (i)
the main model, (ii) a version of the model assuming no loss in intermediate production upon default (θ = 0,
dashed lines) and (iii) a simple RBC model with no intermediate good production (ζ = 0, dotted line). All
variables but deposit rates, credit spreads and default probability are in logarithmic form. Credit spreads are
annualised, but other interest rate variables are not.
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Figure 5.2: Impulse response functions following a negative shock to TFP (−1× standard deviation) of: (i)
the main model and (ii) a version of the model assuming no cost of changing intermediate production (λ = 0,
dashed lines). All variables but deposit rates, credit spreads and default probabilities are in logarithmic form.
Credit spreads are annualised, but other interest rate variables are not.
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Figure 5.3: Impulse response functions following a negative shock to TFP (−1× standard deviation) of: (i)
the main model and (ii) a version of the model assuming that the efficiency of intermediate production is more
correlated with aggregate TFP (ρM = 12.1%, dashed lines). All variables but deposit rates, credit spreads and




I present a general equilibrium model with endogenous defaults that reproduces the counter-
cyclical fluctuations of default rates and credit spreads. This is achieved by assuming the
existence of a sector of firms that borrow from banks to produce an intermediate good used by
a representative final production firm. The model displays procyclical behaviour of the inter-
mediate good prices. This price behaviour depresses the revenues of intermediate production
firms during slumps and increases these revenues when the economy performs well, thus gen-
erating countercyclical default rates and, in turn, countercyclical credit spreads. The studied
mechanism becomes more potent when assuming a positive correlation between the interme-
diate producers’ efficiency and aggregate TFP. I also assume that the borrowing firms face a
quadratic adjustment cost when adapting their production level to take productivity shocks
into account. I show that these adjustment costs are key to generating quantitatively realistic
dynamics of credit spreads, while the correlation between the productivity of the borrowing
firms and the aggregate productivity contributes to the fluctuation of aggregate output, in-
vestment and consumption. These features inform the model’s calibration process so that the
model can generate reasonable dynamics for the aggregate quantities that are well captured by
the usual real business cycle models while generating realistic dynamics of default rates and
credit spreads.
The model considered in this paper provides a simple framework for the modelling of en-
dogenous bankruptcies in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. The model can
be extended to capture the behaviour of simple economies with long term debt contracts and
economies with multiple debt maturities. Such modelling effort would help analyse the effect
of long-term debt contract on the dynamic stability of the general equilibrium describing the
economy and in the modelling of various other term structure effects.
Because of the relative simplicity of the used bankruptcy mechanism, it can be used in the
context of larger general equilibrium models. For instance, monetary DSGE models can be
augmented to reproduce countercyclical default rates and credit spreads and their effects on
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other aggregates by introducing an intermediate production sector relying on debt financing,
as described in this paper.
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5.A Model equations
The model equations describing the general equilibrium are presented in this appendix.
zat = ρaz
a
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Dt = Xt, (5.A.17)
Lt = Ht, (5.A.18)
Yt = Ct +Xt +Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1. (5.A.19)
5.B Steady state
In this appendix, I provide the equations that uniquely determine the steady state of the model. First,
the SS deposit and capital rental rates follow directly from the Euler equations
R̄D = 1/β, (5.B.1)
r̄K = 1/β − 1 + δ. (5.B.2)
I will express the remaining SS variables as a direct or indirect function of the SS loan principal X̄,
the SS distance to default ξ̄ and the SS price of the intermediate good Q̄. First the SS intermediate
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The final good clearing condition yields SS consumption
C̄ = Ȳ − M̄ − δK̄. (5.B.6)





One can then deduce the SS wages from the labour demand first order condition
w̄ = (1− ζ)(1− α) Ȳ
L̄
. (5.B.8)
The recovery in the SS is
R̄ec = (1− θ)Q̄Φ(−ξ̄ − ΣM )eΣ
2
M/2f(X̄). (5.B.9)
The expression of the recovery combined with the bank loan pricing condition leads to an expression
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The SS distance to default expression 5.2.4, demand for loans condition 5.2.8 and technology
constraint 5.2.10 provide three equations to solve for X̄, Q̄ and ξ̄ using the above to express other
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5.C Impulse response function with ρM = 0
Figure 5.4: Impulse response functions following a negative shock to TFP (−1× standard deviation) of: (i)
the main model and (ii) a version of the model assuming that the efficiency of intermediate production is
independent of aggregate TFP (ρM = 0, dashed lines). All variables but deposit rates, credit spreads and




Firms typically raise financing before fully realising their production costs, production efficiency
and sale prices. A time friction arises because financing rarely happens under full information
regarding the profitability of prospective projects. This thesis considers different aspects related
to this time friction.
Chapter 2 considers the macroeconomic implications of firms spending less than the fi-
nancial resources previously earmarked to fund the production process. The underspending
mechanism is studied in a monetised RBC setup with firms raising financing before deciding
their production spending. This study leads to several theoretical and numerical conclusions.
The main theoretical conclusion is that the likelihood of firms entering an underspending mode
depends on the size of the shock affecting the economy and the interest rate costs on existing
debt. Numerical simulations are then realised, showing that the underspending mechanism
asymmetrically affects the cycle as it only operates following large enough negative shocks.
The simulation results also show that firms’ underspending can significantly amplify the lows
of the business cycle.
The underspending mechanism is studied in the context of a multi-industry model in chap-
ter 3. This chapter proves that underspending can propagate from underperforming industries
to the rest of the productive sector through input-output relations. The relationship between
the likelihood of underspending and past interest rate levels is maintained in the multi-industry
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setup. In addition, I show that the nature of input-output relations plays a key role in main-
taining the asymmetric effects of firms’ underspending when the number of industries becomes
large. Namely, industrial input-output networks where a few industries play an important role
in supplying intermediate inputs to the economy are favourable to aggregations of industry-level
shocks that keep the underspending mechanism operating.
Chapter 4 is an empirical study of the relationship between growth indicators and equity
investors rewards. This chapter reinforces the existing literature concerned with the positive
impact of lower growth opportunities on short term cash distributions to investors through
dividends and share buybacks. For instance, I show that variations in firm-level TFP can con-
tribute to explaining changes in dividends and share buybacks. Assuming that higher investor
cash rewards imply low spending, this provides microeconomic empirical evidence that supports
the underspending mechanism studied in chapters 2 and 3.
Chapter 5 of this dissertation considers a different mechanism originating at the same time
friction causing firms’ underspending. As firms raise financing before fully knowing all the
factors affecting their future revenues, they can find themselves in situations where revenues do
not cover existing debt obligations. This is used to build a general equilibrium model with en-
dogenous bankruptcies and credit spreads. An intermediate producer/final producer structure
is used to generate procyclical intermediate good prices and thus generating procyclical rev-
enues for intermediate producers. The behaviour of revenues throughout the cycle means that
the intermediate producers that borrow to finance the production of the intermediate input are
more likely to default during the lows of the business cycle.
This work can be improved, extended and built upon in several ways. Below, I suggest few
possible directions for extending and improving the content of this thesis.
• The underspending mechanism in chapter 2 can be provided with further empirical valida-
tion through the use of macroeconomic data sets. In addition, more theoretical research is
required to disentangle the effects of the worsening of the investment opportunities from
those related to precautionary saving and other competing effects.
• An obvious way to improve on the conclusions of the multiple-industry underspending
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model in chapter 3 is to fit it to real-life input-output networks connecting production in
one of the advanced economies. This would allow studying the effect of the underspending
mechanism on the aggregation of industry-level shocks in more realistic contexts than the
ones considered in chapter 3.
• The endogenous defaults model in chapter 5 can be calibrated to match more aspects
of default rates and credit spreads dynamics. For instance, one can attempt to match
the volatility term structure of default rates. Moreover, the endogenous defaults model
can be extended to include prices rigidities in line with modern DSGE literature. This
would help design larger DSGE models that capture realistic dynamics of default rates
and credit spreads without introducing an exogenous process driving credit risk.
• Combining the underspending effect in a multiple industry setup with chapter 5 endoge-
nous defaults mechanism in a general equilibrium model can generate default dynamics
with two distinct modes. When the size of adverse shocks surpasses the critical level
beyond which firms start to underspend, default rates may jump much higher as the
reduction in intermediate demand further depresses the revenues of the borrowing firms.
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